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fix(security): Resolve symlinks before checking deny rules (CVE-2025-59829)
This commit fixes a security vulnerability where deny rules could be bypassed by creating symbolic links to restricted files. Changes: - Add symlink resolution in rule_engine.py _extract_field method - Add symlink resolution in security_reminder_hook.py check_patterns - Create new symlink_deny_hook.py for blocking symlinks to system paths - Include Read tool in file event handlers for deny rule checking - Update hooks.json to apply security hooks to Read tool The vulnerability allowed attackers to bypass deny rules like Read(/etc/passwd) by creating a symlink (e.g., ln -s /etc/passwd test.txt) and then reading the symlink instead of the restricted file directly. The fix uses os.path.realpath() to resolve all symlinks to their canonical paths before checking against deny patterns, ensuring that deny rules are enforced regardless of whether the path is accessed directly or via symlink.
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@@ -141,6 +141,39 @@ class RuleEngine:
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patterns = matcher.split('|')
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return tool_name in patterns
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def _resolve_symlink_path(self, file_path: str) -> str:
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"""Resolve symlinks in file path to get canonical path.
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Security fix for CVE-2025-59829: Deny rules could be bypassed by creating
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a symlink to a restricted file. This method resolves the symlink to its
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target path so that deny rules are checked against the actual file.
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Args:
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file_path: The file path that may contain symlinks
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Returns:
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The canonical path with symlinks resolved, or original path if
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resolution fails (e.g., file doesn't exist yet)
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"""
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import os
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if not file_path:
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return file_path
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try:
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# Expand user home directory first
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expanded_path = os.path.expanduser(file_path)
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# Use realpath to resolve all symlinks and get canonical path
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# This handles nested symlinks and relative path components
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resolved = os.path.realpath(expanded_path)
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return resolved
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except (OSError, ValueError):
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# If resolution fails (e.g., permission denied, invalid path),
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# return the original path to avoid blocking legitimate operations
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return file_path
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def _check_condition(self, condition: Condition, tool_name: str,
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tool_input: Dict[str, Any], input_data: Dict[str, Any] = None) -> bool:
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"""Check if a single condition matches.
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@@ -196,6 +229,10 @@ class RuleEngine:
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if field in tool_input:
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value = tool_input[field]
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if isinstance(value, str):
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# Security fix: resolve symlinks for file_path fields to prevent bypass
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# CVE-2025-59829: Deny rules could be bypassed via symlinks
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if field == 'file_path':
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value = self._resolve_symlink_path(value)
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return value
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return str(value)
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@@ -241,11 +278,18 @@ class RuleEngine:
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elif field == 'old_text' or field == 'old_string':
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return tool_input.get('old_string', '')
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elif field == 'file_path':
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return tool_input.get('file_path', '')
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# Security fix: resolve symlinks to prevent deny rule bypass
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return self._resolve_symlink_path(tool_input.get('file_path', ''))
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elif tool_name == 'Read':
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# Security fix for CVE-2025-59829: Read tool symlink bypass
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if field == 'file_path':
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return self._resolve_symlink_path(tool_input.get('file_path', ''))
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elif tool_name == 'MultiEdit':
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if field == 'file_path':
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return tool_input.get('file_path', '')
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# Security fix: resolve symlinks to prevent deny rule bypass
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return self._resolve_symlink_path(tool_input.get('file_path', ''))
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elif field in ['new_text', 'content']:
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# Concatenate all edits
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edits = tool_input.get('edits', [])
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@@ -45,7 +45,9 @@ def main():
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event = None
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if tool_name == 'Bash':
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event = 'bash'
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elif tool_name in ['Edit', 'Write', 'MultiEdit']:
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elif tool_name in ['Edit', 'Write', 'MultiEdit', 'Read']:
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# Include Read tool in file events to check symlink bypass
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# Security fix for CVE-2025-59829
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event = 'file'
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# Load rules
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