chore: Update CHANGELOG.md and feed.xml

Add Claude apps gateway on AWS example deployment assets

CHANGELOG.md

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 # Changelog
 
+## 2.1.217
+
+- Added emoji shortcode autocomplete in the prompt input: type `:heart:` to insert ❤️, or `:hea` for suggestions — disable with the `emojiCompletionEnabled` setting
+- Added warnings when transcript writes are failing (e.g. disk full) or when session saving is off due to an inherited environment variable, instead of losing transcripts silently
+- Fixed a memory leak where truncated MCP tool outputs kept the full untruncated result in memory for the rest of the session
+- Fixed Windows auto-update failures that could leave `claude.exe` missing; failed updates now restore the preserved executable automatically
+- Fixed background session isolation not canonicalizing symlinked working directories, which could let sessions escape their workspace folder
+- Fixed auto-compact never triggering for Claude Opus 4.8 on Bedrock and `/compact` failing once over the limit
+- Fixed corporate mTLS, TLS-verify, OAuth scope, and proxy settings being ignored in Claude Desktop sessions
+- Fixed screen reader mode's startup announcement being cut off by the first prompt render, and the thinking status row re-rendering every few seconds to update elapsed time and token counts
+- Fixed managed settings that set `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT` not governing all signals — lower-scope signal-specific overrides no longer redirect telemetry away from the managed endpoint
+- Fixed `--resume`/`--continue` and `/resume` failing with a TypeError when a transcript has a malformed attachment entry
+- Fixed Remote Control sessions not showing a pending permission prompt or dialog to viewers that connected after it appeared
+- Fixed background shells sometimes becoming impossible to stop after a session is sent to the background (`/background` or `←`) or when the session exits on a heavily loaded machine, most visible on Windows
+- Fixed a `CLAUDE.md` or `SKILL.md` paths frontmatter value with many brace groups OOM-killing or stalling the CLI at startup — brace expansion is now budget-bounded
+- Fixed the transcript preview sitting flush against the input area when attaching to a starting background session; it now leaves the same one-line gap as the live layout, so the transcript no longer shifts when the session takes over
+- Improved footer PR badge links to be clickable hyperlinks even when terminal support can't be detected (e.g. over ssh/tmux); set `FORCE_HYPERLINK=0` to opt out
+- Changed the login-expiry warning to appear 3 days before expiry instead of 5
+- Capped the frontend-design plugin suggestion tip at 3 lifetime impressions instead of repeating indefinitely
+- Added a cap on concurrently-running subagents (default 20, override with `CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_CONCURRENT_SUBAGENTS`) so one message can't fan out unbounded background agents
+- Changed subagents to no longer spawn nested subagents by default; set `CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_SUBAGENT_SPAWN_DEPTH` to allow deeper nesting
+- Fixed `--max-budget-usd` not stopping background subagents: once the cap is reached, new spawns are denied and running background agents are halted
+
+## 2.1.216
+
+- Added `sandbox.filesystem.disabled` setting to skip filesystem isolation while keeping network egress control
+- Fixed a slowdown in long sessions where message normalization cost grew quadratically with the number of turns, causing multi-second stalls and slow resumes
+- Fixed auto mode denying commands with "HTTP 401" classifier errors after the OAuth token expired or rotated mid-session
+- Fixed AskUserQuestion telling Claude to continue even when your answer asked it to wait or explain first — free-text answers now get neutral wording
+- Fixed Claude Code on the web re-asking the same question and dropping your answer after the session sat idle for a few minutes
+- Fixed @-mentions silently attaching nothing after file-modifying hooks, vim dot-repeat of `c`-operators and paste, statusline running twice on resume, and resume-picker hangs on failure
+- Fixed resumed background agent sessions reverting to the default agent: the agent's prompt and tool restrictions are now restored
+- Fixed worktree-isolated subagents redirecting git into the shared checkout via `git -C`, `--git-dir`, or `GIT_DIR`/`GIT_WORK_TREE`
+- Fixed worktree sessions landing in another project's leftover worktree when the working directory did not match the selected project
+- Fixed background sessions whose worktree has no git repository being undeletable
+- Fixed `claude daemon stop --any` potentially terminating an unrelated process via a stale legacy daemon lockfile
+- Fixed Esc-Esc at an idle prompt not opening the rewind picker in long-running sessions with background tasks
+- Fixed Bash command permission checking for compound statements with redirects inside `&&` lists or negations
+- Fixed pressing Ctrl+X twice in the agent list failing to delete a session, and deleted sessions reappearing when their background worker had died
+- Fixed background subagents getting cancelled when a high-priority message arrives during their startup window
+- Fixed mouse and focus garbage in the terminal while a GUI editor from `/memory`, `/plan`, `/keybindings`, or Ctrl+G is open; `/memory` no longer waits for the editor to close
+- Fixed Claude-in-Chrome 403-looping on reconnect when the session's OAuth token lacks a required scope
+- Fixed workflow saves and scheduled-task writes following a symlink at `.claude`, which could redirect writes outside the project
+- Fixed MCP re-authenticate revoking working credentials before the new sign-in succeeds, and the reconnect needs-auth message in background sessions pointing at an unusable command
+- Fixed read-only commands on Windows accessing network paths without a permission prompt
+- Fixed Bash command parsing of non-ASCII characters to match real shell word boundaries
+- Fixed PowerShell tool permission validation of commands containing invisible Unicode characters
+- Fixed dialogs in fullscreen mode stretching past the right-hand edge of their panel
+- Fixed the `/config` settings list in fullscreen mode clipping its keyboard-hint footer
+- Fixed the transcript-mode (Ctrl+O) footer hint wrapping on terminals narrower than 104 columns
+- Fixed the Prometheus metrics endpoint (`OTEL_METRICS_EXPORTER=prometheus`) emitting invalid `# UNIT` lines
+- Fixed skills and commands changed during a session not appearing in the slash menu until restart
+- Fixed plugin skills with a `name` frontmatter field losing their plugin prefix in slash-command autocomplete
+- Fixed telemetry misreporting permission denials: failed permission-prompt requests no longer count as user rejections, and user interrupts are now reported as user aborts instead of rejections
+- Improved the `/fork` confirmation to one line with the new session's name, `claude attach` id, and a note when the copy shares your checkout
+- Improved validation of `git` and `gh` command arguments in the PowerShell tool
+- Improved the `/ultrareview` diff-too-large error to show configured limits, measured diff size, and largest contributing files
+- Improved `/code-review ultra` empty-diff message to name the exact base ref and suggest passing an explicit base
+- Improved the spend limit adjustment prompt to show the server's reason when a spend limit change is rejected
+- `/context` now shows an explicit warning when the conversation exceeds the context window, and a failed `/compact` displays as an error
+- `/rewind` no longer restores or deletes files through symlinks or hard links at tracked paths and reports how many paths it skipped
+- Background sessions: `/mcp` and `/install-github-app` now park a "needs input" request in the agent view when no client is attached
+- Updated the bundled dataviz skill: reordered the default chart palette and fixed guidance that suggested direct labels for four-series charts
+- [VSCode] Fixed right-to-left text (Arabic, Hebrew, Persian) rendering in the wrong order when mixed with English or code
+- Fixed cloud sessions dropping the in-flight message when the session's container restarts mid-turn — the interrupted turn now re-runs on resume instead of leaving the session unresponsive
+
+## 2.1.215
+
+- Claude no longer runs the `/verify` and `/code-review` skills on its own; invoke them with `/verify` or `/code-review` when you want them
+
+## 2.1.214
+
+- Fixed single-segment `dir/**` allow rules like `Edit(src/**)` auto-approving writes to nested `dir/` directories anywhere in the tree instead of only `<cwd>/dir`
+- Fixed a permission-check bypass affecting commands run in Windows PowerShell 5.1 sessions
+- Fixed Bash permission checks to fail closed on file-descriptor redirect forms that bash parses differently than the permission analyzer
+- Fixed Bash permission checks misjudging very long commands — commands over 10,000 characters now always prompt instead of running automatically
+- Fixed Bash permission checks treating zsh variable subscripts and modifiers in `[[ ]]` comparisons as inert text — these commands now prompt for approval
+- Fixed Bash permission checks to no longer auto-approve certain `help` and `man` commands that could run unsafe options, command substitutions, or backslash paths
+- Fixed permission prompts on remote sessions that could proceed before the local confirmation dialog
+- Added the EndConversation tool: Claude can end sessions with highly abusive users or jailbreak attempts, as on claude.ai since 2025 — see https://www.anthropic.com/research/end-subset-conversations
+- Added a periodic progress heartbeat for long-running tool calls that previously went silent
+- Added an ISO `modified` timestamp to memory file frontmatter
+- Added `message.uuid`, `client_request_id`, and `tool_source` attributes to OpenTelemetry log events for message-level correlation and tool provenance
+- Added `CLAUDE_CODE_OTEL_CONTENT_MAX_LENGTH` to configure the 60 KB truncation limit on OpenTelemetry content attributes
+- Added reasoning effort to the `subagentStatusLine` payload, so custom agent rows can render model and effort
+- Added permission prompts for `docker` commands (including the Podman `docker` shim) carrying daemon-redirect flags (`--url`, `--connection`, `--identity`, and Podman's remote mode) that previously ran without one
+- Fixed a crash when a GrowthBook feature evaluates to null, and a bug where a malformed flag payload could wipe the cached feature flags
+- Fixed Bash tool killing the Claude session when a `pkill -f` pattern accidentally matched the CLI's own process (Linux)
+- Fixed unbounded memory growth when `--settings` points at a device file or multi-GB file; oversized (>2 MiB) settings files now fail at startup with a clear error
+- Fixed streaming turns failing with "Socket is closed" behind corporate proxies on Windows
+- Fixed stream-json output truncation at exit for slow-reading SDK/pipeline consumers; the exit drain now scales with queued bytes instead of a flat 2s cap
+- Fixed scheduled tasks refusing their own configured prompt as untrusted input — the fired prompt is now delivered as the session's assigned task
+- Fixed PowerShell tool commands hanging until timeout when a child process waited on standard input (Windows)
+- Fixed Python scripts under the PowerShell tool crashing with UnicodeDecodeError when reading non-UTF-8 data from standard input (Windows)
+- Fixed Python scripts run via the PowerShell tool crashing with UnicodeEncodeError on non-ASCII output, and PowerShell 7 error messages containing raw ANSI escape sequences (Windows)
+- Fixed the PowerShell tool reporting `where.exe`, `fc.exe`, and `diff.exe` as errors when they return a valid negative answer (Windows)
+- Fixed `>` and `>>` under the PowerShell tool on Windows PowerShell 5.1 writing UTF-16LE files that other tools couldn't read as UTF-8
+- Fixed a displaced background daemon deleting its successor's control socket on shutdown, which made the next client kill the healthy replacement daemon
+- Fixed background sessions parked with `←` or `/background` and left idle keeping the background daemon and a worker process alive indefinitely
+- Fixed completed background sessions being impossible to remove via `claude rm` or the agent view once the background service had gone idle
+- Fixed background sessions dispatched from a non-git folder being impossible to delete from the agents view
+- Fixed reopening a stopped background session failing to restore its saved conversation when an unreadable folder exists in the session store
+- Fixed the Remote Control "session ready" push notification firing for sessions where Remote Control was not explicitly enabled
+- Fixed `/install-github-app` and the `/mcp` settings menu being blocked in agent-view sessions — they're now refused only in background sessions with no terminal attached
+- Fixed plugins enabled via the `--settings` CLI flag not loading (regression since v2.1.181)
+- Fixed feature flags going stale in long-running sessions after the OAuth token rotates
+- Fixed `/ultrareview` refusing to run in repos with no merge base — it now offers to review all tracked files
+- Fixed `claude update` and `claude doctor` hanging silently, and the `/status` System diagnostics section going blank, when a shell-config path is a directory
+- Fixed memory frontmatter values being silently truncated at an inline `#` when memory files are saved
+- Fixed session cost and token telemetry double-counting on streams that emit multiple cumulative `message_delta` frames
+- Fixed a spurious "check your network" warning that appeared while the advisor was thinking
+- Fixed hooks with exit code 2 not blocking as documented when the hook's stdout JSON fails schema validation
+- Fixed OTel log events emitted outside the turn's async context missing the interaction span's trace context
+- Fixed MCP transient errors during prompts/resources refresh clearing the server's slash commands and resources
+- Improved the `claude rc` workspace-trust error in the home directory to say trust there is never saved and to suggest running from a project directory
+- Changed single-segment `dir/**` hook `if:` conditions to match only `<cwd>/dir`; write `**/dir/**` for any-depth matching. `deny`/`ask` permission rules keep their any-depth match.
+- Changed `file` commands using `-m`/`--magic-file` or `-f`/`--files-from` to require permission instead of being auto-allowed as read-only
+- Changed keep-alive connection pooling to disable after a stale-connection error, so retries open a fresh socket
+- Changed SessionStart hooks to report source `"fork"` when a session begins as a fork instead of `"resume"`
+
+## 2.1.212
+
+- `/fork` now copies your conversation into a new background session (its own row in `claude agents`) while you keep working; the in-session subagent it used to launch is now `/subtask`
+- Added `claude auto-mode reset` to restore the default auto-mode configuration, with a confirmation prompt (pass `--yes` to skip)
+- Added a session-wide limit on WebSearch tool calls (default 200, tunable via `CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_WEB_SEARCHES_PER_SESSION`) to stop runaway search loops
+- Added a per-session cap on subagent spawns (default 200, override with `CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_SUBAGENTS_PER_SESSION`) to stop runaway delegation loops; `/clear` resets the budget
+- MCP tool calls running longer than 2 minutes now move to the background automatically so the session stays usable; configure the threshold or disable with `CLAUDE_CODE_MCP_AUTO_BACKGROUND_MS`
+- Typing `/resume` in the agent view now opens a picker of past sessions — including sessions deleted from the list — and resumes your pick as a background session
+- Fixed plan mode auto-running file-modifying Bash commands (e.g. `touch`, `rm`) without a permission prompt or SDK `canUseTool` callback
+- Fixed worktree creation following a repository-committed symlink at `.claude/worktrees`, which could create files outside the repository
+- Fixed a `continue:false` hook's halt being dropped when the tool fails or completes mid-stream, and hook infrastructure errors being misreported as user rejections
+- Fixed SIGTERM during a running Bash tool orphaning the command's process tree in print/SDK mode; the CLI now aborts the turn, kills the tree, and exits 143
+- Fixed `/background` and `claude --bg` failing with "EUNKNOWN: unknown error, uv_spawn" on Windows when Group Policy blocks PowerShell 5.1; the daemon now prefers PowerShell 7
+- Fixed shell mode (`!`) not executing commands containing file paths while the path autocomplete popup was open
+- Fixed auto-mode denial notifications rendering broken characters when a long denial reason was truncated mid-emoji
+- Fixed Ctrl+J not inserting a newline in the agent view dispatch input on terminals with extended key reporting, and surfaced the newline shortcut in the `?` help overlay
+- Fixed `/ultrareview` rejecting PR references like `#123`, `PR 123`, and pasted PR URLs; error hints now name the command you actually typed
+- Fixed `/ultrareview <branch>` not fetching the branch from origin when it exists remotely; it now suggests the closest branch name on typos
+- Fixed `/ultrareview` skipping the billing confirmation in a new conversation after `/clear`
+- Fixed `/ultrareview`'s "not a git repository" error on Claude Desktop now suggesting the project's repository folder instead of terminal commands
+- Fixed hosted (host-managed) sessions failing at startup when repository settings configured mTLS certs, extra CA bundles, or OAuth scopes; these transport settings are now ignored with a warning
+- Fixed a spurious "File has not been read yet" error when editing a file that had been read with offset/limit before resuming a session
+- Fixed `ExitWorktree` failing with "no active EnterWorktree session" after resuming a session with `--continue`/`--resume` in print/SDK mode
+- Fixed the workflow agent grid staying empty for Remote Control clients that join a session mid-run
+- Fixed streaming-mode control requests being marked complete before their handler finished, which could lose the request on session restart
+- Fixed background sessions created with `/fork` losing their live-parent protection after a state write failure
+- Fixed reopening a stopped background session from the agent view failing silently — it now resumes the session, or shows why it can't and lets you force a restart
+- Fixed agent teams: a stopping teammate could send the leader duplicate idle notifications when team initialization re-ran within a session
+- Fixed the plan-approval dialog footer splitting "ctrl+g to edit in <editor>" apart when the file path is long
+- Fixed the welcome banner keeping its old panel widths after a combined width+height terminal resize in fullscreen mode
+- Fixed diff previews losing their line numbers and +/- markers in narrow layouts
+- Fixed @-mentions attaching nothing after a partial file read, plugin uninstall targeting the wrong marketplace, and false "Command timed out" on exit code 143
+- Fixed OpenTelemetry HTTP exports being rejected with 411/400 by Azure Monitor and other endpoints that don't accept chunked transfer encoding
+- Fixed OTLP event log records missing `trace_id`/`span_id` when `TRACEPARENT` is set in SDK/headless mode
+- Fixed conversations with many images incorrectly failing with "Request too large" errors, and improved the error message to explain the actual cause
+- Fixed web search and web fetch returning "API Error" text as search results or page content when the API was overloaded
+- Improved web search and web fetch reliability by retrying 529 errors and rate-limited requests with bounded backoff
+- Improved prompt caching: the mid-conversation system block now works behind LLM gateways and custom base URLs (Bedrock, Vertex, 1P)
+- Improved background agent attach: cold-attaching now instantly shows the formatted transcript while the session boots, instead of a blank wait
+- Reduced token usage in inter-agent messaging: `SendMessage` bodies are no longer duplicated into replayed history and tool results
+- Changed `/fork` to name the copy after your prompt when the session has no title, so the row is recognizable in the agent view
+- Changed bare `/btw` to reopen the side-question panel on your most recent exchange so you can browse earlier answers
+- Changed the `←` footer hint to pulse `N done` for a moment when a background agent finishes while nothing needs your input
+- Deprecated the Task tool's `mode` parameter (now ignored); subagents inherit the parent session's permission mode by default
+- Changed Enterprise `forceLoginMethod` to be enforced for VS Code extension, SDK, `setup-token`, and `install-github-app` logins, not just the terminal
+- Changed session transcripts to record the reasoning effort level on each assistant message
+- Changed headless/SDK sessions to apply a `set_model` control request mid-turn; the next model round-trip uses the new model instead of waiting for the next turn
+- Changed agent view / `claude agents --json`: sessions waiting on a sandbox, MCP-input, or managed-settings prompt now show as "Needs input" instead of "Working"
+- Updated the auth status panel title from "Cloud authentication" to "Authentication"
+- Corrected an earlier release note (2.1.200): tmux through the 3.6 series lacks synchronized output; newer tmux with support is detected automatically
+
+## 2.1.211
+
+- Added `--forward-subagent-text` flag and `CLAUDE_CODE_FORWARD_SUBAGENT_TEXT` environment variable to include subagent text and thinking in stream-json output
+- Fixed permission previews relayed to chat channels not neutralizing bidirectional-override, zero-width, and look-alike quote characters, so tool inputs cannot visually alter the approval message
+- Fixed auto mode overriding a PreToolUse hook's `ask` decision for unsandboxed Bash — a hook `ask` now floors the decision at a prompt
+- Fixed parallel Claude Code sessions all logging out simultaneously after wake-from-sleep when many sessions share one credential store
+- Fixed plugin MCP servers not reconnecting after an idle web session woke, leaving MCP calls failing until the next message
+- Fixed Claude Code on Vertex and Bedrock attempting the default Opus model at startup and printing a spurious fallback notice when a model is explicitly configured
+- Fixed subagents spawned with an explicit model override reverting to the parent's model when resumed or sent a follow-up message
+- Fixed nested `.claude/rules/*.md` files loading even when setting sources exclude project settings
+- Fixed file upload validation: filenames ending in a DOS device suffix (`.prn`) or trailing dot are now accepted, and files with multiple hard links are refused
+- Fixed file uploads to Claude in Chrome from remote and CLI sessions
+- Fixed edits that leave the input as "?" being silently swallowed and toggling the shortcuts panel
+- Fixed a startup hang when the Claude in Chrome extension is enabled but Chrome is not running
+- Fixed a 300ms delay revealing async content (Settings tabs, Stats, diff views, and other loading states)
+- Fixed reopening a just-stopped background session from the agents view starting a blank conversation under the same session id
+- Fixed `/loop` hiding the session from `/resume` after a single use
+- Fixed screen reader users losing the audible terminal bell after `/terminal-setup` or onboarding terminal setup
+- Fixed background jobs on LLM gateway auth (`ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN` + `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`) coming back "Not logged in" after the daemon respawns them
+- Fixed `claude agents` jobs becoming permanently undeletable when git no longer recognizes their worktree — the row now shows why the delete was refused instead of silently reappearing
+- Fixed `/clear` not resetting the session cost counter — the statusline's cost now starts at $0 after `/clear`
+- Fixed Claude in Chrome setup pages failing to open in the browser on Windows
+- Fixed headless print-mode sessions on Windows crashing or silently exiting when stdin is unreadable
+- Fixed background session titles in the agents view showing the naming model's refusal text when the prompt contains a link
+- Fixed background agents killed by the user auto-respawning, and revived agents re-running stale prompts from old sessions
+- Fixed routines with no schedule reporting a next run time in the year 1
+- Hardened synced skill/plugin directory naming on Windows and kept CCR web fetch/search proxies working after `/clear`
+- Improved terminal layout and rendering performance
+- Improved background agent result reporting — Claude now reports the status of still-running agents and waits for the real completion instead of fabricating results
+- Improved the memory index over-limit warning to measure only loaded content, excluding frontmatter and HTML comments
+- Updated integer environment variables (timeouts, token budgets, retry counts) to accept scientific notation and digit-separator spellings like `1e6` and `64_000`
+- Updated documentation links to the current docs sites
+- Changed "always allow" permission rules to save at the repository root, so approvals granted in a git worktree persist across sessions and worktrees
+- Changed `/usage-credits` to ask for confirmation before sending a request to organization admins
+- Changed Vim mode `s` and `S` (substitute char/line) to work in NORMAL mode, matching vim behavior
+- [VSCode] Updated the Remote Control banner to describe what it does
+- Claude in Chrome: hardened file-upload path validation
+- Claude in Chrome: `save_to_disk` on screenshot actions now writes the image to disk and returns the path; previously it did nothing
+- Fixed a prompt-caching regression on Bedrock, Vertex, Mantle, and Foundry that billed the trailing system context block as fresh input tokens on every request.
+
+## 2.1.210
+
+- Added a live elapsed-time counter to the collapsed tool summary line so long-running tool calls visibly tick instead of looking stuck
+- Added a startup warning for `Write(path)`, `NotebookEdit(path)`, and `Glob(path)` permission rules — use `Edit(path)` or `Read(path)` instead
+- Fixed `isolation: 'worktree'` subagents being able to run git-mutating commands against the main repo checkout instead of their own isolated worktree
+- Fixed the `ultracode` keyword opt-in firing on non-human-originated input such as webhook payloads and relayed PR comments
+- Fixed a rendered text fragment leaking into crash telemetry when a UI component returned content outside a styled text element
+- Fixed paste markers leaking into external editors opened from Claude Code, which could appear as stray È/É characters around pasted text
+- Fixed `claude attach` sometimes failing with "job not found" or "agent is still starting" errors during session transitions — attach now waits for the daemon to settle, and terminal resizes during a slow attach are applied once it completes
+- Fixed a session crash when a tool's result renderer returned a numeric bigint value or plain text instead of a UI element
+- Fixed a hook callback timeout being misreported to the model as a user rejection, which made unattended sessions stop and wait
+- Fixed Claude assuming a `cd` took effect after its command was moved to the background; the tool result now states the working directory is unchanged
+- Fixed plugin-provided MCP servers being torn down when MCP servers are re-synced mid-session
+- Fixed plan approvals without edits being labeled "(edited by user)" and overwriting the plan file with a stale snapshot
+- Fixed `/doctor` skipping its auto-mode-default proposal on Bedrock, Vertex, and Foundry, where auto mode no longer needs an opt-in
+- Fixed Grep content mode claiming "No matches found" when paginating past the end of results
+- Fixed unmatched `$1`/`$2` positional placeholders in skills and commands being silently stripped; they are now preserved verbatim
+- Fixed plugin cache writes leaving temp files behind on failure and failing on locked-file renames on Windows and network filesystems
+- Fixed background workers crash-looping when a client resets its connection to the background service
+- Fixed `claude agents --effort ultracode` not reaching dispatched sessions; the value was silently dropped
+- Fixed pressing ← to open the agents view dropping the task tracker when returning to the session
+- Fixed the agents dashboard retaining pasted images from abandoned reply drafts after their session was deleted
+- Fixed killed background sessions leaving a permanent `git worktree lock` behind; the periodic sweep now releases locks whose owning process is gone
+- Fixed SDK MCP servers registered via an `initialize` control request waiting until the next turn to start connecting
+- Fixed returning to the agents view from a session leaving overlapping ghost frames with `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_ALTERNATE_SCREEN=1`
+- Fixed late-appearing `.claude/*` symlinks not being reconciled into the sandbox deny-write list
+- Hardened the Agent tool against indirect prompt injection via content a subagent read
+- Improved the Bash/PowerShell tool message when a command hits its timeout and is auto-backgrounded, so the model can distinguish a hang from an explicit background request
+- Improved auto mode: the permission classifier now defaults to Sonnet 5 for external sessions, validated on the session's first request and pinned for the session
+- Improved the bundled dataviz skill's chart color validation with perceptual OKLab color difference and recalibrated color-blindness thresholds
+- Memory writes that leave a MEMORY.md index over its read limit now produce an explicit error instead of silent truncation
+- Screen reader mode now announces permission mode changes aloud when cycling modes with Shift+Tab
+- The agents footer hint now shows how many background agents are waiting on your input, with a brief color emphasis when the count changes
+- Agent view: the session you pressed ← from stays visibly marked even after mouse hover or arrow keys move the selection
+- Fable temporarily shows as unavailable in the advisor picker while a server-side issue causing Fable advisor failures is fixed
+
+## 2.1.209
+
+- Fixed /model and other dialogs being blocked in `claude agents` background sessions (reverts an overly broad guard)
+
+## 2.1.208
+
+- Added screen reader mode: opt-in plain-text rendering for screen reader users. Run `claude --ax-screen-reader`, set CLAUDE_AX_SCREEN_READER=1, or add "axScreenReader": true to settings.
+- Added `vimInsertModeRemaps` setting: map two-key insert-mode sequences like `jj` to Escape in vim mode
+- Added `CLAUDE_CODE_PROCESS_WRAPPER`: agent view and the background service now honor a corporate launcher by running every Claude Code self-spawn through a required wrapper executable
+- Added mouse-click support for multi-select menus and "Other" input rows in fullscreen mode
+- Changed the Fable 5 usage-credits consent prompt to start with the decline option focused
+- Fixed fast mode staying off after switching back to a model that supports it — it now restores automatically when enabled in settings
+- Fixed replies typed to a background agent being lost when delivery fails — the text is now saved and delivered when the session restarts
+- Fixed background-session attach failing permanently ("Couldn't start the background daemon") after an update replaced the binary a running `claude agents` process was launched from
+- Fixed the context window (and auto-compact indicator) briefly resetting to 200k after the CLI auto-updates, causing a false "100% context used" when resuming long-context sessions
+- Fixed supervised and background sessions crashing when a server closed an HTTP/2 connection with a GOAWAY while requests were in flight
+- Fixed truncated stream-json/JSON output and missing result message when piping large responses from `claude -p`
+- Fixed `CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS` and similar env vars silently using the mantissa of scientific-notation values (`1e6` became `1`)
+- Fixed very large markdown tables stalling rendering or using excessive memory; tables over 200 rows show the first 200 with a "… N more rows" notice
+- Fixed the Edit tool failing on files modified after reading when the target text still matches uniquely
+- Fixed Read reporting empty files as "shorter than offset", Grep silently returning "No files found" for invalid regex patterns, Grep count mode under-reporting totals when paginated, and Glob crashing with an unclear error when the pattern, path, or working directory contained a null byte
+- Fixed `apiKeyHelper` script failures being hidden behind a generic 401 after ~10 silent retries; the script's own error is now shown within 3 attempts
+- Fixed Bedrock streaming requests failing with a misleading "Truncated event message received" when a gateway transforms the response — the error now names the content-type and points at the proxy
+- Fixed `/upgrade` showing a login flow instead of the upgrade URL when the browser fails to open
+- Fixed stream-json input killing the session on blank CRLF or whitespace-only lines from Windows-style SDK hosts
+- Fixed headless stream-json sessions hanging permanently when a `control_request` carried a non-string `set_model` payload; the CLI now answers with an error response
+- Fixed repeated "No completion record was found" notices on session resume — orphaned background tasks now collapse into a single summary
+- Fixed Remote Control clients attaching to a terminal-hosted session not seeing background agents and workflow progress until a task started or stopped
+- Fixed the Agent tool launching with no tools when a subagent's `tools` list resolves to nothing — it now returns a clear error naming the unrecognized entries
+- Fixed `/usage` showing stale cached bars over fresher data, and `/mcp` not reclassifying placeholder servers after config edits
+- Fixed "Change directory" in SDK hosts (e.g. Claude Desktop) failing with "A turn is in progress" on idle sessions that have a running background task
+- Fixed the workflow save dialog showing `~/.claude/workflows/` instead of the `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` location for user-scope saves
+- Fixed `/release-notes` adding the viewed notes to the model's context — "Show all" previously injected the entire changelog into every subsequent request
+- Fixed a memory leak in the agent view where pasted images were retained for the screen's lifetime after sending peek replies
+- Fixed SDK sessions losing agents defined via the initialize request when a plugin refresh ran before the client attached
+- Fixed several memory leaks in long sessions: MCP stdio server stderr accumulating up to 64 MB per server, LSP documents staying open indefinitely (now LRU with 50-doc cap), async hook output retained after backgrounding, and unbounded growth in headless/SDK sessions from large tool-result payloads
+- Fixed a memory blowup when reading files with extremely long single lines using offset/limit — the read now returns a clean error instead of loading the whole line
+- Fixed multi-second per-turn slowdowns in sessions with many permission deny/ask rules — rule matchers are now compiled once and cached
+- Improved input responsiveness while agent task lists update — task updates no longer re-render the entire UI
+- Reduced per-tool-call CPU overhead in print/SDK sessions with many MCP tools by caching tool-pool assembly (up to 7x faster tool rounds at high tool counts)
+- Reduced memory usage by bounding the file edit read cache to 16 MB instead of pinning up to 1,000 full files
+- Reduced session transcript size (up to 79x in edit-heavy sessions) and bounded checkpoint disk usage by pruning superseded file-history backups
+- Reduced memory usage when resuming sessions with background agents or forks spawned from large conversations
+- Completed background agents now stay listed in `/tasks` until cleanup instead of vanishing the moment they finish
+- Attaching to a stopped background agent now shows its transcript immediately while the session warms up, instead of a blank "Session is starting" screen
+- Background sessions: an older daemon no longer silently restarts workers spawned by a newer version onto the older binary
+- Agent view: Ctrl+X now deletes renamed-branch worktrees, never destroys unpushed commits, keeps the session row when a worktree is kept, and reused worktree names reset to the current base
+- Catastrophic removals (e.g. `rm -rf ~`) in commands containing `$(…)`/backticks/`<(…)` now prompt in `--dangerously-skip-permissions` and auto mode, matching the plain form
+- `/install-github-app` and the `/mcp` settings menu no longer open in background sessions
+- MCP servers configured with an empty URL now show as "not configured" in `/mcp` instead of a config error
+- `/usage` now shows your last-known usage bars with an "as of" note when the usage endpoint is rate-limited, instead of an error screen
+- Fixed Bedrock auth failing with "Session token not found or invalid" for AWS SSO profiles whose sso_region differs from the Bedrock region (2.1.207 regression)
+
+## 2.1.207
+
+- Auto mode is now available without `CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_AUTO_MODE` opt-in on Bedrock, Vertex AI, and Foundry; disable via `disableAutoMode` in settings
+- Fixed the terminal freezing and keystrokes lagging while streaming responses containing very long lists, tables, paragraphs, or code blocks
+- Fixed remote managed settings from a non-interactive run (`claude -p`, the SDK) being permanently recorded as consented without ever showing the security consent dialog
+- Fixed spurious prompt-injection warnings triggered by benign system-generated conversation updates
+- Fixed the auto-updater overwriting a custom launcher script or symlink at `~/.local/bin/claude` on every release; `/doctor` now reports an externally managed launcher
+- Fixed compound commands with `cd` prompting for permission when the only output redirect was to `/dev/null`
+- Fixed the transcript jumping above the start of the answer when a response finishes streaming
+- Fixed `extensions.worktreeConfig` being left in the repo's `.git/config` (breaking go-git tools like `tea`) after the last `worktree.sparsePaths` worktree was removed
+- Fixed malformed bracket patterns in rules globs, skill paths, `.ignore`, and `.worktreeinclude` breaking file reads, file suggestions, and worktree creation
+- Fixed a crash loop in agent teams where a malformed teammate mailbox message caused repeated errors every second until the mailbox file was manually deleted
+- Fixed background sessions auto-named by accepting a plan not showing that name on their agent-view row
+- Fixed background sessions that entered a git worktree resuming blank after a cold reopen from the agent list
+- Fixed Remote Control task status updates being lost when the connection recovered from a network interruption or credential refresh
+- Fixed Remote Control sessions hosted by the desktop app not showing background agent and workflow progress on mobile and web
+- Fixed Deep research runs labeling every Fetch-phase agent "unknown" — chips now show the source hostname
+- Fixed Bedrock repeatedly requesting fresh AWS SSO credentials from IAM Identity Center on every API request
+- Improved agent view: pasting the same text again now expands the collapsed `[Pasted text #N]` placeholder instead of adding a second one
+- Improved agent view: blocked session peeks now lead with the question and show a worded staleness clock (`waiting 3m`) instead of the same timestamp twice
+- Changed Bedrock, Vertex, and Claude Platform on AWS to default to Claude Opus 4.8
+- Changed auto mode to no longer read `autoMode` from `.claude/settings.local.json` (repo-resident); use `~/.claude/settings.json` instead
+- Fixed an indefinite hang on Windows when AWS credential resolution stalls (e.g. a stuck `credential_process`): the 60-second stall guard now fires instead of waiting forever.
+- Plugin hooks/monitors/MCP headersHelper: `${user_config.*}` in shell-form commands is now rejected (shell-injection fix). Hooks: use exec form (`args` array) or `$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_<KEY>`; monitors and headersHelper: read the value inside the script (config file or the server's `env` block).
+- Plugin option values (`pluginConfigs`) are no longer read from project-level `.claude/settings.json`; only user, `--settings`, and managed settings are honored
+- Fixed `/usage-credits` amount inputs silently stripping malformed values (e.g. a pasted timestamp) to digits; malformed amounts are now rejected with an error, and amounts over $1,000 require a typed confirmation
+
+## 2.1.206
+
+- Added directory path suggestions to `/cd`, matching `/add-dir` behavior
+- Added a `/doctor` check that proposes trimming checked-in `CLAUDE.md` files by cutting content Claude could derive from the codebase
+- `/commit-push-pr` now auto-allows `git push` to the repo's configured push remote (`remote.pushDefault`, or the sole remote when only one is configured) in addition to `origin`
+- Gateway: `/login` now supports Anthropic-operated public gateway endpoints
+- `EnterWorktree` now asks for confirmation before entering a git worktree outside the project's `.claude/worktrees/` directory
+- Background agents now upgrade to a new version in the background right after a Claude Code update, instead of paying a slow stale-session upgrade when you attach
+- Fixed an expired login failing every model with a misleading "There's an issue with the selected model" error instead of prompting to run `/login`
+- Fixed `claude --resume` and `--continue` not responding to keyboard input on startup
+- Fixed MCP servers configured via `--mcp-config` or `.mcp.json` ignoring a per-server `request_timeout_ms`, which caused long-running MCP tool calls to time out at the 60s default in fresh sessions
+- Fixed `CLAUDE_CODE_EXTRA_BODY` being silently ignored by `claude agents` / `--bg` background workers; the shell-exported override now follows the dispatching session
+- Fixed OAuth MCP servers requiring manual re-authentication after a single failed token refresh
+- Fixed `--permission-prompt-tool` pointing at an MCP server crashing with "MCP tool not found" on cold start before the server finishes connecting
+- Fixed `/model` picker rows printing a price for a different model than the row named, and stopped quoting first-party list prices on providers that don't bill them
+- Fixed server-provided model rows being misplaced in the `/model` picker when an entitlement or allowlist restriction drops the row they were positioned against
+- Fixed desktop sessions getting stuck showing "running" after a slash command was sent mid-turn
+- Fixed keyboard input being ignored in the agents view when a setup prompt appeared before a bare `claude --resume` on Windows
+- Fixed `claude rm` leaving the removed job in the daemon roster, causing the row to reappear in `claude agents`
+- Fixed `/remote-control` showing "Unknown command" when logged out — it now explains how to sign in
+- Fixed left arrow not stepping back out of a phase or agent in the workflow detail view
+- Fixed `/status` listing the same broken-install warning twice
+- Fixed false "disused plugin" tips and skewed disuse telemetry for LSP plugins
+- Fixed `/doctor`'s update check to compare Homebrew installs against their cask's channel instead of the settings channel
+- Fixed the fullscreen jump-to-bottom pill suggesting Ctrl+End on macOS, not showing rebound chords, and wrapping over the transcript
+- Bedrock: fixed a multi-minute startup hang when using an `awsCredentialExport` helper on networks with restricted egress
+- Improved `/code-review` findings quality on claude-opus-4-8 across all effort levels
+- Improved agents view: status column now uses full terminal width instead of truncating at 64 characters
+- Changed agents view: Ctrl+X now permanently removes a completed session, and sessions no longer render twice; deleted background jobs stay deleted
+
+## 2.1.205
+
+- Added an auto mode rule that blocks tampering with session transcript files
+- Fixed `--json-schema` silently producing unstructured output when the schema was invalid, and schemas using the `format` keyword being rejected
+- Fixed a message sent while Claude was working being silently lost when the turn ended at the `--max-turns` limit
+- Fixed Windows worktree removal deleting files outside the worktree when an NTFS junction or directory symlink existed inside it
+- Fixed background agents staying shown as "failed" or "completed" in the agent list after being resumed with `SendMessage`
+- Fixed background jobs flipping from "needs input" back to "working" in the agent list when the agent's turn contained no readable text
+- Fixed `claude attach` erroring when a background agent was mid-upgrade restart instead of waiting for it to come back
+- Fixed session-to-PR linking missing a PR created in a Bash call whose output exceeded the 30K inline limit
+- Fixed `claude mcp add-from-claude-desktop` getting stuck when a server name contains unsupported characters; invalid names are now reported and remaining servers still import
+- Fixed a plugin LSP server that fails to initialize preventing a valid LSP server from another plugin handling the same file extension
+- Fixed a Windows crash when the directory Claude was launched from is deleted, locked, or unmounted while a command is running
+- Fixed a crash when a file watcher was closed while a directory scan was still in flight
+- Fixed project verify skills being rewritten on every session instead of only when a documented command changed
+- Fixed the agent view rendering one line too high and clipping its header when the job list slightly overflowed the screen
+- Fixed background tasks in the web and mobile Remote Control panels showing stale "Running" status by forwarding full task state on every membership change
+- Improved auto mode to ask before running `rm -rf` on a variable it can't resolve from context
+- Auto-update binary downloads now stream to disk instead of buffering in memory, cutting the updater's peak memory usage by roughly 400 MB
+- Background task notifications now explicitly state that no human input has occurred, preventing fabricated in-transcript approvals from being acted on
+- Improved agent view: sessions that edit, merge, comment on, or push to an existing PR now link it in `claude agents`
+- Improved agent view: rows now show a colored state word and a classifier-written headline instead of raw tool call text, and the peek opens with full status including the exact ask for blocked sessions
+- `/doctor` is now a full setup checkup that can diagnose and fix issues; `/checkup` is its alias
+- Reserved the "Claude Browser" MCP server name (alongside "Claude Preview") ahead of the Claude Desktop pane rename; user-configured MCP servers can no longer register under either name
+- Fixed Cowork VM-mode local-agent sessions failing to start with "Not logged in · Please run /login" on CLI 2.1.203+
+
+## 2.1.204
+
+- Fixed hook events not streaming during SessionStart hooks in headless sessions, which could cause remote workers to be idle-reaped mid-hook
+
+## 2.1.203
+
+- Added a warning when your login is about to expire, so you can re-authenticate before background sessions are interrupted
+- Added a grey ⏸ badge to the footer when in manual permission mode, making the active mode always visible
+- Added the session's additional working directories to MCP `roots/list`, with `notifications/roots/list_changed` sent when the set changes
+- Fixed opening or switching background agent sessions on macOS stalling for 15–20 seconds due to a false low-memory detection (regression in 2.1.196)
+- Fixed background sessions becoming permanently unresponsive to attach, replies, and stop when the daemon's session token went stale — the session now recovers automatically
+- Fixed returning to `claude agents` silently stopping running subagents and re-running the prompt from scratch — their work now carries over
+- Fixed a memory and per-turn CPU regression in interactive sessions: the context-usage indicator no longer re-analyzes the entire transcript after every turn
+- Fixed background agents inheriting a stale `PATH` from the daemon instead of the dispatching shell, causing missing tools on Windows
+- Fixed background and agent-view sessions dropping a shell-exported `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`, which sent API keys to the default endpoint and failed with 401
+- Fixed Bash failing with "argument list too long" in repos with many git worktrees
+- Fixed worktree-isolated subagents sometimes running shell commands in the parent checkout instead of their own worktree
+- Fixed worktree creation rejecting nested repositories in multi-repo workspaces, leaving background sessions unable to isolate and edit
+- Fixed background agents crash-looping when their working directory was deleted, replaced by a file, or became an invalid path — they now fail once with a clear error
+- Fixed a background daemon auto-upgrade failure silently killing all running background sessions
+- Fixed `TaskStop` and `TaskOutput` failing to find background agents spawned by another agent — errors now list running agents by id and description
+- Fixed the `claude agents` composer discarding your typed message when a slash command isn't available there
+- Fixed the agent list crashing when opening a stopped session whose conversation was already open in another session
+- Fixed background sessions showing "Needs input" in the agent list after the question was already answered
+- Fixed background agent startup failures showing only "exit_with_message" instead of the actual error
+- Fixed background sessions ignoring `effortLevel` changes in settings.json when forked through the daemon
+- Fixed attached background sessions ignoring `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_MOUSE` and `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_MOUSE_CLICKS` opt-outs
+- Fixed `/exit` incorrectly warning about running background agents after all named agents had completed
+- Fixed background sessions started from a non-git directory unable to edit files when a `WorktreeCreate` hook was configured
+- Fixed the `@` directory picker in `claude agents` not showing registered git worktrees
+- Fixed background task output on Windows being permanently replaced by an empty file after `/clear`
+- Fixed content jumping when scrolling up through long transcript history
+- Fixed the terminal flickering and jumping while typing in bash mode when a shell-history suggestion was shown
+- Fixed literal `^[[I` / `^[[O` escape codes being printed when reattaching to a background session
+- Fixed LSP-only plugins being incorrectly flagged for disuse when their language servers deliver diagnostics or answer navigation requests
+- Improved responsiveness while long responses stream: live-preview updates no longer re-render the whole screen
+- Improved subagent behavior: agents are now less likely to re-delegate their entire task to another subagent
+- Reduced binary size by ~7 MB and startup memory by ~7 MB by loading a large bundled dependency lazily instead of inlining it
+- Changed left arrow to no longer close the background tasks, diff, and workflow detail views — press Esc instead
+- Changed the empty `claude agents` view to always show the organized sections (Needs input / Working / Completed) with descriptions
+- Removed the startup "claude command missing or broken" warnings — they now appear in `/doctor` and `/status` instead
+- Removed a redundant navigation hint from the `claude agents` footer
+- [VSCode] Added a Settings toggle for "Enable Remote Control for all sessions"
+
+## 2.1.202
+
+- Added a "Dynamic workflow size" setting in `/config` for controlling how large Claude generally makes dynamic workflows (small/medium/large agent counts) — an advisory guideline, not an enforced cap
+- Added `workflow.run_id` and `workflow.name` OpenTelemetry attributes to telemetry emitted by workflow-spawned agents, so a workflow run's activity can be reconstructed from OTel data
+- Fixed a crash in the inline Ctrl+R history search when accepting or cancelling while the search was still scanning the history file
+- Fixed `/rename` on background sessions being reverted when the job restarts, which broke addressing the session by its new name
+- Fixed transient mTLS handshake failures when settings were re-applied during an in-place client certificate rotation
+- Fixed commands sent from Remote Control (mobile/web) into an interactive session failing with "Unknown command"
+- Fixed images and files sent from the Remote Control mobile or web app without a caption being silently dropped
+- Fixed the sign-in URL printed by `claude auth login` and `claude mcp login --no-browser` not being reliably clickable when it wraps over SSH — it is now emitted as a single hyperlink
+- Fixed opening a chat from `claude agents` sometimes failing with "currently running as a background agent" followed by a worker crash/respawn loop
+- Fixed workflow scripts with unicode quote escapes in strings being corrupted before parsing; workflow parse errors now show the offending line instead of always blaming TypeScript
+- Fixed voice dictation retrying in an unbounded loop when the microphone or audio recorder fails — repeated capture failures now pause voice input
+- Fixed `/remote-control` sessions showing the wrong permission mode in the mobile and web apps
+- Fixed resuming a session by name, or opening the resume picker, taking minutes and using a large amount of memory in repositories with many git worktrees
+- Fixed installer and updater downloads failing immediately with "aborted" when a proxy or network drops the connection mid-download — transient connection drops now retry
+- Fixed re-invoking an already-loaded skill appending a duplicate copy of its instructions to context
+- Improved `/workflows` agent list layout: wider titles, a dedicated time column, shorter model names, and no per-row tool-call counts
+- Improved MCP error messages: clearer error when a server config has `url` but no `type`, suggesting `"type": "http"` instead of the misleading "command: expected string"
+- Changed `/review <pr>` back to a fast single-pass review; use `/code-review <level> <pr#>` for the multi-agent review at a chosen effort level
+
+## 2.1.201
+
+- Claude Sonnet 5 sessions no longer use the mid-conversation system role for harness reminders
+
+## 2.1.200
+
+- Changed `AskUserQuestion` dialogs to no longer auto-continue by default; opt into an idle timeout via `/config`
+- Changed the "default" permission mode to "Manual" across the CLI, `--help`, VS Code, and JetBrains; `--permission-mode manual` and `"defaultMode": "manual"` are accepted alongside `default`
+- Fixed a crash at startup when `disabledMcpServers` or `enabledMcpServers` in `.claude.json` is set to a non-array value
+- Fixed background sessions silently stopping mid-turn after sleep/wake or when reopening a stalled session
+- Fixed background sessions re-running a turn cancelled with Esc after a stall respawn
+- Fixed background agents never starting again after a crash left a stale `daemon.lock` whose PID the OS reused
+- Fixed background-agent daemon handover so a reinstalled older build can no longer take over the daemon; build recency is now judged by the version's embedded build timestamp
+- Fixed background-agent roster issues: transient corruption permanently disabling orphan cleanup, older binaries not preserving fields written by newer versions, and socket auth tokens being stripped during daemon restarts
+- Fixed subagents cut off by a rate limit before producing any text output returning an empty result instead of failing cleanly
+- Fixed control bytes from background-agent output reaching the terminal in the agent view
+- Fixed `claude agents --plugin-dir <dir>` not showing the plugin's agents and skills in the agent view when the flag is placed after `agents`
+- Fixed project-scoped plugins not loading correctly from git worktrees of the same repository
+- Fixed `/mcp` server list not tracking focus for screen readers and magnifiers
+- Fixed voice dictation showing a misleading "Voice connection failed" message when a recording captures no audio
+- Fixed rendering flicker under tmux 3.4+ by enabling synchronized terminal output
+- Improved screen-reader output: decorative glyphs are now hidden, transcript symbols read as short labels, and nested tables read as `Header: value.` lines
+- Improved the install script to explain when installation is killed by the system running out of memory
+
+## 2.1.199
+
+- Stacked slash-skill invocations like `/skill-a /skill-b do XYZ` now load all leading skills (up to 5), not just the first
+- Fixed SSL certificate errors (TLS-inspecting proxies, missing `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`, expired certs) burning retries before showing actionable guidance — they now fail immediately with the fix hint
+- Fixed streaming responses being discarded when the API emits a mid-stream overloaded/server error after partial output — the partial is now kept with an incomplete-response notice
+- Fixed subagents cut off by a rate limit or server error silently failing instead of returning their partial work to the parent
+- Fixed subagents reporting API errors (e.g. usage limit reached) as successful results — the error is now reported to the parent agent
+- Fixed the background-agent daemon on Linux killing itself and every running agent every ~50 seconds after an unclean shutdown left a corrupted worker record
+- Fixed background agents failing to cold-start over SSH on macOS with "Could not switch to audit session" (regression in 2.1.196)
+- Fixed `claude stop` being silently undone when it raced a background-agent respawn — the respawn now honors the stop
+- Fixed background job progress indicators stalling for minutes while the job ran long commands
+- Fixed background sessions on memory-starved machines showing a generic error — they now indicate low memory and suggest freeing resources
+- Fixed remote sessions briefly flapping between Working and Idle in the agent view when a background agent completes
+- Fixed idle subagents vanishing from the agent panel while other subagents were still working; surplus idle agents now collapse into an expandable summary row
+- Fixed typing `/model` or `/fast` while viewing a subagent silently opening the lead's model picker — a notice now explains the command applies to the lead
+- Fixed `SessionStart`, `Setup`, and `SubagentStart` hooks silently hiding stderr when exiting with code 2 — the error is now shown in the transcript
+- Fixed `claude --dangerously-skip-permissions daemon <subcommand>` being treated as a chat prompt instead of running the subcommand
+- Fixed `SendMessage` silently misrouting when a re-spawned agent reuses a previous agent's name — the tool now detects the mismatch and asks the caller to retarget
+- Fixed opening or resuming a session with no new messages needlessly growing the transcript file
+- Fixed backgrounding a session with `←` or `/background` dropping its `/color` from the agent view row
+- Fixed resetting a corrupted config file from the startup recovery dialog destroying it unrecoverably — it now backs up the file first
+- Fixed Claude in Chrome repeatedly opening the reconnect page when sessions run from different builds or config directories
+- Fixed plan mode not prompting for state-changing browser tool calls; read-only `browser_batch` calls are now correctly auto-allowed
+- Transient server rate-limit errors (429s unrelated to your usage limit) are now retried automatically with backoff for subscribers instead of failing the turn
+- `CLAUDE_CODE_RETRY_WATCHDOG` now raises the default retry count for non-capacity transient errors to 300 and lifts the cap of 15 on `CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_RETRIES`
+- `claude agents` session rows now show pull-request links as bare `#N` without the redundant "PR" label
+
+## 2.1.198
+
+- Subagents now run in the background by default, so Claude keeps working while they run and is notified when they finish (previously a gradual rollout)
+- Claude in Chrome is now generally available
+- Added background agent notifications in `claude agents` — sessions that need input or finish now fire the `Notification` hook (`agent_needs_input` / `agent_completed`)
+- Added `/dataviz` skill for chart and dashboard design guidance with a runnable color-palette validator
+- Gateway: added Claude Platform on AWS (anthropicAws) as an upstream provider; model-not-found responses now advance the failover chain
+- Background agents launched from `claude agents` now commit, push, and open a draft PR when they finish code work in a worktree, instead of stopping to ask
+- The built-in Explore agent now inherits the main session's model (capped at opus) instead of running on haiku
+- Subagents and context compaction now inherit the session's extended thinking configuration, improving output quality on delegated tasks
+- Fixed brief network drops mid-response aborting the turn — transient errors like ECONNRESET now retry with backoff instead of failing
+- Fixed excessive background classifier requests when sandboxed processes repeatedly accessed the same network host
+- Fixed background tasks in web, desktop, and VS Code task panels getting stuck on "Running" after they finish or after resuming a session
+- Fixed agent teams: a teammate that dies on an API error now reports "failed" to the lead, and messaging a stuck teammate wakes it to retry immediately
+- Fixed the `/diff` panel not refreshing when you switch branches or commit outside the session
+- Fixed markdown tables overflowing and wrapping their right border when rendered in fullscreen mode
+- Fixed Claude Platform on AWS and Mantle sessions dead-ending with "Please run /login" when the STS token expires — `awsAuthRefresh` now runs automatically
+- Fixed "no route to host" for local-network hosts in macOS background agent sessions by declaring Local Network entitlements
+- Fixed `/desktop` failing with "Cannot determine working directory" after entering and exiting a worktree
+- Fixed background agents repeatedly showing "Reconnecting…" every ~52 seconds on macOS while the agents view was open
+- Fixed pressing `←` inside `claude attach <id>` exiting to the shell instead of opening the agent view
+- Fixed `claude --bg` silently creating an unattachable session when combined with `--print`/`-p`; the conflicting flags are now rejected up front
+- Fixed the workflow progress view dropping the earliest agents from the list while the phase counter stayed correct in SDK and desktop-app sessions
+- Fixed `.claude/rules/` conditional rules not loading when the target file is reached via a symlinked path
+- Fixed Cmd+click not opening URLs in fullscreen mode in Warp on macOS
+- Fixed double-click word selection in fullscreen mode to select the entire URL including the scheme
+- Fixed plan mode not auto-allowing read-only tool calls when a session starts in plan mode
+- Fixed `/branch` deriving its default fork name from the compaction summary instead of the first real prompt
+- Improved focus mode: subagents launched in a turn now appear in its activity summary, and completed background notifications fold into a single count
+- Improved syntax highlighting accuracy in code blocks, diffs, and file previews by upgrading to highlight.js 11
+- Keyboard shortcut hints now show opt/cmd instead of alt/super when connected from a Mac over SSH
+- Improved API retry UX: the error reason is now shown after the second attempt, and a status page link replaces the spinner tip when the API is overloaded
+- `/login` now opens the sign-in dialog from the `claude agents` view instead of saying it isn't available
+- Subagents now treat messages from the agent that launched them as normal task direction; an agent's message is still never treated as the user's approval
+- Removed the `/agents` wizard; ask Claude to create or manage subagents, or edit `.claude/agents/` directly
+
+## 2.1.197
+
+- Introducing Claude Sonnet 5: now the default model in Claude Code, with a native 1M-token context window and promotional pricing of $2/$10 per Mtok through August 31. Update to version 2.1.197 for access. https://www.anthropic.com/news/claude-sonnet-5
+
+## 2.1.196
+
+- Added support for organization default models — admins set it in the org console; it shows as "Org default" (or "Role default") in `/model` when you haven't picked one yourself
+- Added readable default names for sessions at start, making them easier to identify and message
+- Added clickable file attachments in chat — Cmd/Ctrl-click reveals the file in Finder/Explorer
+- Security: `claude mcp list`/`get` no longer spawn `.mcp.json` servers that a repo self-approved via a committed `.claude/settings.json`; untrusted workspaces show `⏸ Pending approval`
+- Fixed waking a background job permanently deleting its conversation and re-running the original prompt when the transcript probe misread a real transcript; the file is now set aside, never deleted
+- Fixed the rate-limit warning flickering off and rate-limit telemetry being over-counted when multiple parallel requests were in flight at the moment a usage limit was hit
+- Fixed duplicate recap lines after a background session's turn: a schema-rejected StructuredOutput attempt no longer renders alongside its retry
+- Fixed PowerShell `git diff`/`git grep`, `egrep`/`fgrep`, and quoted search patterns containing `|` being reported as failures when they exit 1, matching Bash behavior
+- Fixed multiple `claude agents` side panel issues: keyboard focus getting stuck when opening an agent, background jobs losing their subagent types on every open, and sessions showing incorrect status while actively running
+- Fixed `claude agents --dangerously-skip-permissions` silently falling back to auto mode instead of showing the bypass disclaimer and applying bypass mode to spawned agents
+- Fixed mid-turn crash recovery for Remote sessions — sessions interrupted by a server restart now auto-resume on the next worker
+- Fixed sessions moved with `/cd` reappearing in the old directory's resume list after a non-graceful exit when the old path contained special characters
+- Fixed `claude plugin validate` skipping local plugins whose source is "." and stopping after the first error class
+- Fixed Esc Esc at an idle prompt not opening the rewind menu (regression); use Ctrl+C or Ctrl+X Ctrl+K to stop background agents
+- Fixed MCP OAuth requesting the authorization server's full `scopes_supported` catalog when no scope is specified, causing `invalid_scope` failures on GitLab self-hosted and other enterprise IdPs
+- Fixed `/context` showing 0 tokens for all tool groups on Bedrock
+- Fixed `/deep-research` misreporting verifier failures as "all claims refuted" instead of `unverified`
+- Fixed plugin dependency version pins not being honored when the marketplace was added as a local folder path backed by a git repo
+- Fixed `claude agents` session status: completed rows no longer flip between "Done" and "Needs your input", stalled agents are now labeled "Needs attention", and results that mention a PR show a clickable link
+- Fixed voice dictation swallowing spaces and spuriously starting a recording during very fast typing when voice mode is enabled
+- Improved background session reliability: long-running commands and workflows now survive the session's process being stopped, restarted, or updated — including on Windows, where background shells are handed off instead of being killed
+- Improved background agents: workers killed by a daemon restart are now automatically resumed from where they left off the next time the agents view opens
+- Improved `/code-review` workflow: merged five cleanup finders into one, cutting token usage by roughly 25%
+- Reduced per-frame rendering work in the terminal UI by skipping no-op subtree walks during streaming
+- The streaming idle watchdog is now on by default for all providers — it aborts and retries when a response stream produces no events for 5 minutes. Set `CLAUDE_ENABLE_STREAM_WATCHDOG=0` to disable.
+- Remote Control is now disabled when `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` points at a non-Anthropic host, matching the existing behavior under `CLAUDE_CODE_USE_BEDROCK`/`_VERTEX`/`_FOUNDRY`
+- Changed opening the agents view from a foreground session to require a single `←` press instead of two, matching the behavior in background sessions
+
+## 2.1.195
+
+- Added `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_MOUSE_CLICKS` to disable mouse click/drag/hover in fullscreen mode while keeping wheel scroll
+- Fixed hook matchers with hyphenated identifiers (e.g. `code-reviewer`, `mcp__brave-search`) accidentally substring-matching — they now exact-match. Use `mcp__brave-search__.*` to match all tools from a hyphenated MCP server.
+- Fixed voice dictation on macOS capturing silence in long-running sessions after the default input device changes
+- Fixed voice dictation auto-submit never firing for languages written without spaces (Japanese, Chinese, Thai)
+- Fixed external plugins enabled only by project `.claude/settings.json` not requiring explicit install consent on every loader path
+- Fixed `/plugin` Enable/Disable not working when a plugin's `plugin.json` `name` differs from its marketplace entry name
+- Fixed background jobs disappearing from `claude agents` or losing data when written by a newer Claude Code version
+- Fixed reopening a crashed background task showing a blank screen for up to 5 seconds instead of its restart
+- Fixed background agent daemons running unreachable when the control socket fails to start, blocking restarts
+- Improved voice mode on Linux: now distinguishes "no microphone" from "SoX not installed" when SoX is present but no audio capture device exists
+- Improved `claude agents` completed list to fill available vertical space; on short terminals the header compacts so live sessions stay visible
+- Improved Remote session startup with a provisioning checklist while the container starts
+
+## 2.1.193
+
+- Added `autoMode.classifyAllShell` setting to route all Bash/PowerShell commands through the auto-mode classifier instead of only arbitrary-code-execution patterns
+- Added auto-mode denial reasons to the transcript, the denial toast, and `/permissions` recent denials
+- Added `claude_code.assistant_response` OpenTelemetry log event containing the model's response text. Redacted unless `OTEL_LOG_ASSISTANT_RESPONSES=1`; when that var is unset it follows `OTEL_LOG_USER_PROMPTS`, so deployments that already log prompt content will start receiving response content on upgrade — set `OTEL_LOG_ASSISTANT_RESPONSES=0` to keep prompts-only.
+- Added live file path autocomplete to bash mode (`!`)
+- Added a startup notice when MCP servers need authentication, pointing at `/mcp`
+- Added automatic memory-pressure reaping for idle background shell commands (disable with `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_BG_SHELL_PRESSURE_REAP=1`)
+- Fixed `/model` and other client-data-gated UI showing stale/empty state immediately after `/login`
+- Fixed backgrounding (←←) spuriously cancelling with "N background tasks would be abandoned" when all running tasks carry over to the new session
+- Fixed pinned background agents being re-prompted to "Continue from where you left off" after every auto-update
+- Fixed backgrounding the main turn spawning a phantom "general-purpose (resumed)" subagent that re-ran the main conversation
+- Fixed agent panel hiding sibling agents when viewing a subagent
+- Improved background agents: the launch result no longer instructs Claude to "end your response" — it keeps working on other tasks while the agent runs
+- Improved MCP `headersHelper` auth: the helper now re-runs and reconnects automatically when a tool call returns 401/403
+- Improved plugin auto-rename: marketplace `renames` maps are now followed automatically, updating your settings to the new name
+- Improved `/add-dir` message when the directory is already a working directory
+
+## 2.1.191
+
+- Added `/rewind` support for resuming a conversation from before `/clear` was run
+- Fixed scroll position jumping to the bottom while reading earlier output during a streaming response
+- Fixed background agents resurrecting after being stopped — stopping an agent from the tasks panel is now permanent
+- Fixed `/voice` showing a generic "not available" message when disabled by an organization's policy — it now explains the restriction
+- Fixed `/login` URL opening truncated in Windows Terminal when it wraps across lines
+- Fixed Cmd+click on links in fullscreen mode for Ghostty over ssh/tmux
+- Fixed `claude agents` sending builtin slash commands like `/usage` to background sessions as prompt text instead of showing a hint
+- Fixed `claude agents` job rows showing full filesystem paths for pasted images instead of the `[Image #N]` placeholder
+- Fixed hooks with comma-separated matchers (e.g. `"Bash,PowerShell"`) silently never firing
+- Fixed `/permissions` Recently-denied tab: approving a denial now persists on close instead of being silently discarded
+- Fixed the agent panel jumping by one row when scrolling the roster past the overflow cap
+- Fixed the welcome splash art overflowing the default 80×24 macOS Terminal window
+- Fixed managed settings: `forceRemoteSettingsRefresh` now takes effect when set via MDM or file policy, and the fetch sends `Cache-Control: no-cache` to prevent proxies from serving stale responses
+- Improved sandbox network permission dialog: hosts you allow with "Yes" are now remembered for the rest of the session instead of re-prompting on every connection
+- Improved MCP server reliability: capability discovery (`tools/list`, `prompts/list`, `resources/list`) now retries transient network errors with short backoff
+- Improved MCP OAuth: discovery and token requests now retry once after transient network errors, and headless environments skip the browser popup and go straight to the paste-the-URL prompt
+- Improved MCP error messages: HTTP 404 errors now show the URL and point to your MCP config
+- Improved vim mode prompt-history search (NORMAL `/`) to hint how to reach slash commands
+- Reduced CPU usage during streaming responses by ~37% by coalescing text updates to 100ms
+- Reduced long-session memory growth from terminal output cache
+
+## 2.1.190
+
+- Bug fixes and reliability improvements
+
 ## 2.1.187
 
 - Added `sandbox.credentials` setting to block sandboxed commands from reading credential files and secret environment variables
@@ -3102,7 +3731,7 @@
 
 ## 2.1.15
 
-- Added deprecation notification for npm installations - run `claude install` or see https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code/getting-started for more options
+- Added deprecation notification for npm installations - run `claude install` or see https://code.claude.com/docs/en/setup for more options
 - Improved UI rendering performance with React Compiler
 - Fixed the "Context left until auto-compact" warning not disappearing after running `/compact`
 - Fixed MCP stdio server timeout not killing child process, which could cause UI freezes

examples/gateway/aws/.dockerignore

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# Keep secrets and generated artifacts out of the build context. The Dockerfile
+# COPYs the binary, gateway.yaml (unlike the GCP example, the config is baked
+# into the image — ECS injects only the secrets it references, as env vars),
+# and the RDS CA bundle. BuildKit (the default builder) only syncs the
+# referenced COPY sources anyway, so this is a denylist for the classic
+# builder (DOCKER_BUILDKIT=0) and a conventional signal that the .gitignore'd
+# secrets in this directory aren't part of the image build.
+terraform/
+**/.terraform/
+*.tfstate*
+terraform.tfvars
+secrets/
+*.pem
+# The RDS CA bundle is public trust-anchor material (no secret), and the
+# Dockerfile COPYs it — carve it out of the *.pem exclusion above.
+!rds-global-bundle.pem
+*.iam.json
+claude.download
+claude.bad

examples/gateway/aws/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# Local, environment-specific config — copy gateway.yaml.example -> gateway.yaml
+# (gateway.yaml.example IS committed; your filled-in gateway.yaml is not)
+gateway.yaml
+
+# Secrets / credentials — never commit. Also covers rds-global-bundle.pem:
+# not a secret, but downloaded by setup.sh when absent (delete it to refresh
+# after an RDS CA rotation), so it stays out of git.
+secrets/
+*.pem
+
+# Scratch IAM policy documents written by setup.sh (no secrets, but generated)
+*.iam.json
+
+# Vendored release binary — download per release (see setup.sh DIST_URL).
+# claude.bad is a checksum-mismatched binary that setup.sh set aside.
+claude
+claude.download
+claude.bad

examples/gateway/aws/Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# Runtime image for `claude gateway`.
+#
+# This image does NOT build the binary. It expects a prebuilt native
+# linux-x64 `claude` executable in the build context — the Claude Code release
+# binary, which includes the `gateway` subcommand. setup.sh places it at
+# ./claude (downloading and checksum-verifying it via DIST_URL/DIST_SHA256 if
+# missing). Override CLAUDE_BINARY to point at a different path.
+#
+# Unlike the GCP example (which mounts the config from Secret Manager at
+# runtime), this image BAKES gateway.yaml in at /etc/claude/gateway.yaml — on
+# ECS the task definition injects only the secrets the YAML references, as env
+# vars. gateway.yaml therefore must be fully filled in (no REPLACE_ME) before
+# building; setup.sh enforces this. A config edit means a rebuild under a new
+# tag. The file contains no secret values — every credential resolves at boot
+# via ${ENV_VAR} expansion.
+#
+# The image also bakes in the AWS RDS CA bundle (rds-global-bundle.pem —
+# setup.sh downloads it from https://truststore.pki.rds.amazonaws.com before
+# the build) and trusts it via NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, so the store connection
+# string's `?sslmode=verify-full` verifies the RDS server certificate chain
+# and hostname. NOTE the gateway's driver reads `sslmode` from the URL but NOT
+# a libpq-style `sslrootcert=` param — the CA must come from this env var.
+#
+# Build:
+#   docker build --platform=linux/amd64 --provenance=false \
+#     --build-arg CLAUDE_BINARY=./claude -t claude-gateway .
+#
+#   (For Fargate on ARM64/Graviton: build --platform=linux/arm64 with the
+#   linux-arm64 binary and set the task definition's cpuArchitecture to ARM64.)
+#
+# Run:
+#   docker run --rm -p 8080:8080 \
+#     -e OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET -e GATEWAY_JWT_SECRET -e GATEWAY_POSTGRES_URL \
+#     claude-gateway
+
+ARG CLAUDE_BINARY=./claude
+ARG GATEWAY_CONFIG=./gateway.yaml
+ARG RDS_CA_BUNDLE=./rds-global-bundle.pem
+
+# distroless/cc provides glibc + libstdc++ (required by the Bun-compiled
+# native binary). The :nonroot tag runs as uid/gid 65532. Pinned by digest so
+# the build never silently takes new upstream bytes (the digest is the
+# multi-arch OCI index, so --platform still selects amd64/arm64). To refresh
+# the pin after reviewing upstream changes:
+#   docker manifest inspect -v gcr.io/distroless/cc-debian12:nonroot   # prints the index digest
+FROM gcr.io/distroless/cc-debian12:nonroot@sha256:ce0d66bc0f64aae46e6a03add867b07f42cc7b8799c949c2e898057b7f75a151
+
+ARG CLAUDE_BINARY
+ARG GATEWAY_CONFIG
+ARG RDS_CA_BUNDLE
+COPY --chmod=0755 ${CLAUDE_BINARY} /usr/local/bin/claude
+# WORKDIR pre-creates /etc/claude with 0755 — without it, COPY --chmod would
+# also stamp the auto-created parent directory 0644 (no execute bit), making
+# the config unreadable for the nonroot user.
+WORKDIR /etc/claude
+COPY --chmod=0644 ${GATEWAY_CONFIG} /etc/claude/gateway.yaml
+COPY --chmod=0644 ${RDS_CA_BUNDLE} /etc/claude/rds-global-bundle.pem
+WORKDIR /
+
+ENV CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR=/tmp/.claude
+# Trust anchor for the store's sslmode=verify-full (see header comment).
+ENV NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=/etc/claude/rds-global-bundle.pem
+
+EXPOSE 8080
+USER nonroot
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/claude", "gateway", "--config", "/etc/claude/gateway.yaml"]

examples/gateway/aws/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# Claude apps gateway on AWS
+
+Reference deployment artifacts for running Claude apps gateway on AWS with
+Amazon Bedrock as the upstream: ECS on Fargate or EKS, Amazon RDS for
+PostgreSQL, AWS Secrets Manager, and IAM-role auth to Bedrock.
+
+These files are provided as a working example rather than a supported production
+deployment. Adapt them to your own environment.
+
+- **Walkthrough**: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-on-aws
+- **Related**: AWS-maintained samples for various customer environments at
+  https://github.com/aws-samples/anthropic-on-aws/tree/main/claude-apps-gateway
+
+| File | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| `setup.sh` | Scripts the walkthrough end to end via the `aws` CLI |
+| `Dockerfile` | Runtime image for the `claude gateway` binary (bakes in `gateway.yaml`) |
+| `gateway.yaml.example` | Gateway config template, AWS-shaped (Bedrock upstream, Okta IdP) |
+| `terraform/` | Provisions the full architecture (two-pass apply — see `terraform/README.md`) |

examples/gateway/aws/gateway.yaml.example

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+# gateway.yaml.example — Claude apps gateway config template, AWS-shaped (walkthrough §4).
+#
+# Okta IdP + Bedrock upstream, following the walkthrough at
+# https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-on-aws. The active sections
+# below are a strict subset of the full configuration reference at
+# https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-config; optional keys are
+# included commented-out.
+#
+# USAGE — this is the shippable TEMPLATE. Copy it to gateway.yaml and fill it in:
+#     cp gateway.yaml.example gateway.yaml
+#   setup.sh and terraform/ read gateway.yaml (your filled-in copy, which is
+#   gitignored). Unlike the GCP example it is NOT published to a secret store:
+#   the Dockerfile bakes it into the image at /etc/claude/gateway.yaml — the
+#   container ENTRYPOINT runs `claude gateway --config /etc/claude/gateway.yaml`.
+#   It holds no secret values; a config edit means an image rebuild (setup.sh
+#   tags images with a hash of this file, so a re-run rebuilds automatically).
+#
+# Secret expansion: ${ENV_VAR} reads an env var; ${file:/path} reads a mounted file.
+# On ECS, the task definition injects the JWT / OIDC / Postgres secrets as ENV
+# VARS via its `secrets` field (valueFrom -> Secrets Manager ARN). On EKS you
+# may mount them as files instead and use ${file:/secrets/...}.
+#
+# BEFORE BUILD — replace every REPLACE_ME placeholder below (setup.sh refuses to
+# build the image while any remain — the config is baked in, so a half-filled
+# config would ship), and create the referenced secrets:
+#   gateway-jwt-secret           (setup.sh generates this)
+#   gateway-oidc-client-secret   (from the Okta admin console OIDC web app)
+#   gateway-postgres-url         (setup.sh generates this)
+
+# ── Listener ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+listen:
+  host: 0.0.0.0
+  port: 8080                      # the target group forwards ALB :443 -> :8080
+  # Required. Fixes the IdP redirect_uri, the OIDC discovery doc, and the
+  # gateway-token issuer so none are derived from the client-controlled Host
+  # header (X-Forwarded-Host/-Proto are likewise never trusted). Set it to the
+  # internal hostname you picked in the prerequisites — the Route 53 private
+  # zone name your ACM certificate covers (e.g.
+  # https://claude-gateway.internal.example.com). Unlike Cloud Run there is no
+  # first-deploy placeholder dance: you choose the hostname up front, alias it
+  # to the internal ALB after the deploy, and register the same host's
+  # /oauth/callback on the Okta app.
+  public_url: REPLACE_ME
+  # Register this exact redirect URI on the Okta OIDC web application:
+  #   https://<public_url host>/oauth/callback
+  #
+  # Behind the internal ALB every request arrives via the load balancer, so the
+  # gateway sees ALB-node peer IPs for all developers — set trusted_proxies so
+  # X-Forwarded-For from those proxies is trusted and per-IP rate limiting /
+  # audit IPs record the real client. ALB nodes take addresses from the subnets
+  # the ALB is attached to, so list those subnets' CIDRs (the private subnets
+  # from the prerequisites).
+  #
+  # NOTE: listing the ALB subnets' CIDRs trusts every host in those subnets as a
+  # proxy — any co-located workload that can reach the ALB can then spoof the
+  # client IP via X-Forwarded-For (audit logs, per-IP rate limits, IP
+  # allowlists). Keep the ALB :443 ingress source (CORP_CIDR / corporate_cidr)
+  # from overlapping these subnets, and don't share the subnets with untrusted
+  # workloads.
+  trusted_proxies: [REPLACE_ME]   # e.g. [10.0.1.0/24, 10.0.2.0/24]
+  #
+  # Alternative — terminate TLS in the gateway itself instead of at the ALB:
+  # tls:
+  #   cert: /certs/gateway.crt
+  #   key:  /certs/gateway.key
+
+# ── Identity provider — Okta ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+oidc:
+  issuer: REPLACE_ME                                 # e.g. https://example.okta.com (or your custom auth server URL)
+  client_id: REPLACE_ME                              # Okta OIDC web app client ID (not secret)
+  client_secret: ${OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET}               # EKS file mounts: ${file:/secrets/oidc-client-secret}
+  allowed_email_domains: [REPLACE_ME]                # e.g. [example.com] — reject id_tokens outside your org
+  # The Okta org authorization server returns a thin id_token that omits email
+  # and groups; the gateway fills them from /userinfo.
+  userinfo_fallback: true
+  # offline_access yields refresh tokens (silent renewal + the deprovision
+  # leash); Okta emits groups only when the `groups` scope is requested AND the
+  # app's groups claim filter allows them (Okta admin console -> the app's
+  # Sign On tab -> OpenID Connect ID Token -> Groups claim filter).
+  scopes: [openid, profile, email, offline_access, groups]
+  # groups_claim: groups          # Okta default. Entra app roles=roles; see the config reference
+  # ca_cert_pem: ${file:/secrets/idp-ca.pem}   # only for an IdP behind a private CA
+
+# ── Sessions ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+session:
+  jwt_secret: ${GATEWAY_JWT_SECRET}   # >= 32 bytes; openssl rand -base64 32
+  # Okta issues refresh tokens (offline_access above), so sessions renew
+  # silently and this mainly bounds deprovision latency. 8 is a sane default;
+  # lower toward 1 for tighter revocation. Array form rotates keys:
+  # [new, old] (index 0 signs, all verify).
+  ttl_hours: 8
+
+# ── Store (REQUIRED — the gateway refuses to boot without it) ─────────────────
+store:
+  postgres_url: ${GATEWAY_POSTGRES_URL}   # private-subnet RDS; built with ?sslmode=verify-full by setup.sh
+                                          # (the image trusts the RDS CA bundle via NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS — see Dockerfile)
+
+# ── Upstreams — Amazon Bedrock ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+upstreams:
+  - provider: bedrock
+    # Must equal the region you provision in (setup.sh's AWS_REGION /
+    # terraform's region): the IAM policy's inference-profile ARNs are scoped
+    # to that region, and Bedrock model access is enabled there (cross-region
+    # us.anthropic.* profiles need access in every spanned region). NOTE: the
+    # walkthrough is scoped to US regions — the built-in model catalog maps to
+    # us.anthropic.* (US-geo) profiles; a non-US region also needs a models:
+    # list below (see the model catalog section).
+    region: REPLACE_ME            # e.g. us-east-1
+    auth: {}                      # AWS default credential chain: ECS task role / IRSA on EKS (preferred — no static keys)
+    # base_url: https://bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com   # bedrock-runtime interface VPC endpoint, to keep model traffic off the public path
+  # Add more upstreams for failover (tried top→bottom on 5xx/timeout/501): a
+  # second region, or an anthropic/vertex fallback. See
+  # https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway.
+
+# ── Telemetry fan-out (OPTIONAL) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+# The CLI sends OTLP/HTTP to the gateway; the gateway fans out, stamping
+# user.id/user.email/user.groups server-side. On AWS, point at an OpenTelemetry
+# Collector (e.g. the AWS Distro for OpenTelemetry -> CloudWatch / Managed
+# Prometheus). When forward_to and public_url are both configured the gateway
+# pushes CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_TELEMETRY and the OTEL exporter selectors to every
+# client automatically — no per-developer config needed.
+# telemetry:
+#   forward_to:
+#     - url: https://otel-collector.internal.example.com:4318
+#       headers:
+#         Authorization: ${file:/secrets/otlp-token}
+#       metrics: true     # safe aggregate counters (default)
+#       logs: false       # carries bash commands / tool inputs — opt in deliberately
+#       traces: false
+
+# ── RBAC + managed settings (OPTIONAL; first-match-wins, top -> bottom) ───────
+# With Okta as IdP, match on the group names the `groups` scope emits (subject
+# to the app's groups claim filter), or on email_domain.
+# managed:
+#   policies:
+#     - match: { groups: [engineering] }
+#       cli:
+#         availableModels: [claude-opus-4-8, claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-haiku-4-5]
+#         permissions: { deny: ["Read(./.env)", "Read(./secrets/**)"] }
+#     - match: {}        # catch-all floor — keep LAST
+#       cli:
+#         availableModels: [claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-haiku-4-5]
+
+# ── Admin API (OPTIONAL — enables db-mode runtime config + spend caps) ───────
+# admin_groups needs a groups claim — Okta provides one via the `groups` scope
+# above — or use the bootstrap keys below instead. Named keys for attribution
+# in the audit log; 32-char minimum on key values. On ECS add these to the task
+# definition's `secrets` field (valueFrom -> a Secrets Manager ARN), same as the
+# JWT/OIDC/Postgres secrets above; on EKS you may use ${file:...}.
+# admin:
+#   write_keys:
+#     - id: terraform
+#       key: ${GATEWAY_ADMIN_WRITE_KEY}
+#   read_keys:
+#     - id: reporting
+#       key: ${GATEWAY_ADMIN_READ_KEY}
+#   # admin_groups: [platform-finops]   # Okta group names via the groups scope
+
+# ── Model catalog (OPTIONAL for US regions) ──────────────────────────────────
+# Default true: every built-in Claude model is exposed and auto-translated per
+# upstream (the built-in table already maps to us.anthropic.* cross-region
+# inference profiles). Set false + a models: list to pin IDs (e.g. an
+# application or provisioned-throughput inference-profile ARN).
+# NON-US REGIONS: the built-in us.anthropic.* mappings do not exist outside
+# the US geo — set auto_include_builtin_models: false and list your region's
+# inference profiles (eu.anthropic.*, apac.anthropic.*, ...) here, and widen
+# the geo prefix in the deploy's bedrock-invoke IAM policy to match. See the
+# models: guidance in the config reference:
+# https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-config
+# auto_include_builtin_models: true
+# models:
+#   - id: claude-opus-4-8
+#     label: Claude Opus 4.8
+#     upstream_model: { bedrock: us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8 }

examples/gateway/aws/setup.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,964 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# setup.sh — AWS setup for Claude apps gateway (walkthrough §1–7, ECS track).
+#
+# Provisions, in this order: the three security groups (§1), the task +
+# execution IAM roles (§2), the gateway container image in Amazon ECR (§6),
+# an RDS for PostgreSQL instance in the private subnets with no public
+# address (§3), the JWT + postgres-url secrets (§5), and an ECS Fargate
+# service behind an internal Application Load Balancer (§7).
+#
+# gateway.yaml (§4 of the walkthrough) is BAKED INTO THE IMAGE on this track —
+# the task definition injects only the secrets it references, as env vars — so
+# the config step here lives inside the image build (§6): the build is gated on
+# a fully filled-in gateway.yaml and the image tag carries a hash of it, so a
+# config edit triggers a rebuild on the next run.
+#
+#   Section markers (§N) below map to the walkthrough:
+#   https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-on-aws
+#
+# Covers here:  security groups (§1) -> IAM roles + Bedrock model-access note (§2)
+#               -> build & push image, config baked in (§6 + §4) -> DB subnet group
+#               + RDS instance (§3) -> jwt + postgres-url secrets (§5) -> ECS
+#               cluster/task definition/service + internal ALB (§7, ECS Fargate tab).
+# Not covered:  EKS track (§7's EKS tab) — ECS Fargate is the lower-friction path here.
+#               Bedrock model access (§2) — console-only; the script reminds you.
+#               Route 53 alias — see the next steps it prints. Client MDM
+#               push (§8) is covered by the walkthrough, not this script.
+#
+# Idempotent: existing resources are detected and skipped, so it is safe to re-run.
+# Reuse is by NAME, so a pre-existing resource may not match what this script
+# would have created: reuse that would change the exposure model is fatal (an
+# ALB that is not internal/in ${VPC_ID}); upsert-able settings are converged on
+# every run; other posture drift (extra security group ingress, a public or
+# unencrypted RDS instance, wrong-VPC target group) is checked and warned
+# about, never silently adopted.
+# Override any default below via environment variable, e.g. `AWS_REGION=us-west-2 ./setup.sh`.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# ---- configuration (env-overridable) ----------------------------------------
+AWS_REGION="${AWS_REGION:-$(aws configure get region 2>/dev/null || true)}"   # guide uses us-east-1 (a region where Bedrock serves the Claude models you need)
+ACCOUNT_ID="${ACCOUNT_ID:-$(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Account --output text 2>/dev/null || true)}"
+
+VPC_ID="${VPC_ID:-}"                                       # REQUIRED — the VPC from the prerequisites
+PRIVATE_SUBNETS="${PRIVATE_SUBNETS:-}"                     # REQUIRED — two+ private subnet IDs in different AZs, space-separated
+CORP_CIDR="${CORP_CIDR:-}"                                 # REQUIRED — your corporate network CIDR (ALB :443 ingress source)
+                                                           # Must not overlap PRIVATE_SUBNETS: hosts there are trusted_proxies (gateway.yaml) and could spoof client IPs via X-Forwarded-For.
+
+# §1 security groups
+ALB_SG_NAME="${ALB_SG_NAME:-claude-gateway-alb}"
+GW_SG_NAME="${GW_SG_NAME:-claude-gateway-svc}"
+DB_SG_NAME="${DB_SG_NAME:-claude-gateway-db}"
+
+# §2 IAM roles (task role = the gateway's runtime AWS identity; execution role
+# = the ECS agent's identity for pulling the image and injecting secrets)
+TASK_ROLE="${TASK_ROLE:-claude-gateway-task}"
+EXEC_ROLE="${EXEC_ROLE:-claude-gateway-execution}"
+
+# §6 image
+ECR_REPO="${ECR_REPO:-claude-gateway}"                     # ECR repository name
+VERSION="${VERSION:-}"                                     # REQUIRED — the gateway release tag you build and push (e.g. the linux-x64 binary's version)
+DOCKERFILE="${DOCKERFILE:-./Dockerfile}"
+CLAUDE_BINARY="${CLAUDE_BINARY:-./claude}"                 # prebuilt linux-x64 Claude Code release binary (includes the gateway subcommand)
+DIST_URL="${DIST_URL:-}"                                   # optional: download URL, used only if $CLAUDE_BINARY is missing
+DIST_SHA256="${DIST_SHA256:-}"                             # REQUIRED with DIST_URL: expected sha256 of the binary (verified fail-closed)
+DIST_SHA256="${DIST_SHA256,,}"                                # normalize to lowercase — openssl emits lowercase hex; some tools (PowerShell Get-FileHash) publish uppercase
+# Obtain DIST_SHA256 out-of-band — never from the server that serves DIST_URL.
+# For binaries from the standard Claude Code release channel, verify the
+# release's GPG-signed manifest.json and copy the platform checksum from it:
+# https://code.claude.com/docs/en/setup#binary-integrity-and-code-signing
+# For any other distribution channel, use the checksum published alongside the
+# download link on that channel.
+GATEWAY_YAML="${GATEWAY_YAML:-./gateway.yaml}"             # §4 config file — BAKED into the image
+RDS_CA_BUNDLE="${RDS_CA_BUNDLE:-./rds-global-bundle.pem}"  # RDS CA trust anchor — BAKED into the image (downloaded below if missing)
+# Official AWS RDS truststore. AWS rotates this bundle (new regional CAs get
+# appended), so no checksum is pinned — a pinned hash would break on every
+# rotation. The script downloads it only when absent (an existing file is never
+# re-downloaded); to pick up a rotation, delete the file — and since the image
+# tag hashes only gateway.yaml, also bump VERSION or set IMAGE_TAG so the
+# next run rebuilds rather than reusing the existing tag. Operators who want
+# to pin may pre-place a reviewed copy at ${RDS_CA_BUNDLE}.
+RDS_CA_BUNDLE_URL="${RDS_CA_BUNDLE_URL:-https://truststore.pki.rds.amazonaws.com/global/global-bundle.pem}"
+REGISTRY="${ACCOUNT_ID}.dkr.ecr.${AWS_REGION}.amazonaws.com"
+
+# §3 RDS
+DB_SUBNET_GROUP="${DB_SUBNET_GROUP:-claude-gateway-db}"
+DB_PARAM_GROUP="${DB_PARAM_GROUP:-claude-gateway-db}"      # carries rds.force_ssl=1 (server-side TLS enforcement)
+DB_INSTANCE="${DB_INSTANCE:-claude-gateway-db}"
+DB_CLASS="${DB_CLASS:-db.t4g.micro}"
+DB_STORAGE_GB="${DB_STORAGE_GB:-20}"
+DB_NAME="${DB_NAME:-claude_gateway}"
+DB_USER="${DB_USER:-gateway}"
+# PG14+ supported; 16 is the recommended default (matches terraform/'s).
+# Always pinned: the instance's engine version and the parameter group's
+# family must name the same major, so both derive from this one value.
+DB_ENGINE_VERSION="${DB_ENGINE_VERSION:-16}"
+
+SECRET_NAME="${SECRET_NAME:-gateway-postgres-url}"         # §5 store.postgres_url
+JWT_SECRET_NAME="${JWT_SECRET_NAME:-gateway-jwt-secret}"   # §5 session.jwt_secret
+OIDC_SECRET_NAME="${OIDC_SECRET_NAME:-gateway-oidc-client-secret}"   # operator-created (Okta OIDC web app)
+# NOTE: the execution role's secrets-read policy (§2) is built from these
+# three names, one per-secret ARN prefix each — a rename is picked up on the
+# next run (put-role-policy is an upsert).
+
+# §7 ECS + internal ALB deploy
+CLUSTER="${CLUSTER:-claude-gateway}"
+SERVICE="${SERVICE:-claude-gateway}"
+TASK_FAMILY="${TASK_FAMILY:-claude-gateway}"
+LOG_GROUP="${LOG_GROUP:-/ecs/claude-gateway}"
+LOG_RETENTION_DAYS="${LOG_RETENTION_DAYS:-90}"             # CloudWatch retention — the group carries the gateway's audit events, so align with your audit retention policy
+ALB_NAME="${ALB_NAME:-claude-gateway}"
+TG_NAME="${TG_NAME:-claude-gateway}"
+# Explicit modern TLS policy — omitting it falls back to the legacy
+# ELBSecurityPolicy-2016-08 default, which still accepts TLS 1.0/1.1.
+ALB_SSL_POLICY="${ALB_SSL_POLICY:-ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-2021-06}"
+ACM_CERT_ARN="${ACM_CERT_ARN:-}"                           # REQUIRED for deploy — ACM cert for your internal gateway hostname
+TASK_CPU="${TASK_CPU:-1024}"
+TASK_MEMORY="${TASK_MEMORY:-2048}"
+DESIRED_COUNT="${DESIRED_COUNT:-1}"                        # each task opens a Postgres pool of up to 5 connections (store.max_connections default); keep DESIRED_COUNT × 5 below the DB class's max_connections (~80 on db.t4g.micro)
+DEPLOY="${DEPLOY:-1}"                                      # set DEPLOY=0 to provision only, no ECS/ALB deploy
+
+# ---- helpers ----------------------------------------------------------------
+log()  { printf '\n==> %s\n' "$*"; }
+skip() { printf '    (exists) %s\n' "$*"; }
+curl_https() { curl --proto '=https' --proto-redir '=https' --tlsv1.2 "$@"; }  # refuse plaintext/protocol-downgrade
+sha_of() { openssl dgst -sha256 "$1" | awk '{print $NF}'; }  # openssl avoids shasum/sha256sum portability gaps
+
+# authorize-security-group-ingress is NOT idempotent (re-adding a rule errors),
+# so tolerate exactly the duplicate-rule error and fail on anything else.
+authorize_ingress() {
+  local out
+  if out="$(aws ec2 authorize-security-group-ingress "$@" 2>&1)"; then
+    return 0
+  elif grep -q 'InvalidPermission.Duplicate' <<<"${out}"; then
+    skip "ingress rule already present"
+  else
+    printf '%s\n' "${out}" >&2
+    return 1
+  fi
+}
+
+# Security-group lookup by name within the VPC; prints the GroupId or "None".
+sg_id() {
+  aws ec2 describe-security-groups \
+    --filters "Name=group-name,Values=$1" "Name=vpc-id,Values=${VPC_ID}" \
+    --query 'SecurityGroups[0].GroupId' --output text 2>/dev/null || echo None
+}
+
+# Name-based reuse can adopt a pre-existing group carrying ingress this script
+# never added. Audit after the intended rule is ensured: each group's traffic
+# path is exactly one rule (tcp <port> from <cidr-or-source-group>), so anything
+# else is flagged on stderr. Non-fatal — an extra rule may be a deliberate
+# operator addition — but every one widens the path, so it must be visible.
+warn_unexpected_ingress() { # <group-id> <group-name> <port> <expected cidr or source group-id>
+  local perms
+  if ! perms="$(aws ec2 describe-security-groups --group-ids "$1" \
+      --query 'SecurityGroups[0].IpPermissions' --output json 2>/dev/null)"; then
+    echo "    WARN — could not audit ingress rules on $2 ($1)." >&2
+    return 0
+  fi
+  # `|| echo` keeps a parse hiccup non-fatal — this audit must never abort a run.
+  _SG_ID="$1" _SG_NAME="$2" _SG_PORT="$3" _SG_EXPECTED="$4" python3 -c "
+import json, os, sys
+perms = json.load(sys.stdin) or []
+port, expected = int(os.environ[\"_SG_PORT\"]), os.environ[\"_SG_EXPECTED\"]
+extras = []
+for p in perms:
+    proto, lo, hi = p.get(\"IpProtocol\"), p.get(\"FromPort\"), p.get(\"ToPort\")
+    scope_ok = proto == \"tcp\" and lo == port and hi == port
+    sources = (
+        [r.get(\"CidrIp\", \"?\") for r in p.get(\"IpRanges\", [])]
+        + [r.get(\"CidrIpv6\", \"?\") for r in p.get(\"Ipv6Ranges\", [])]
+        + [r.get(\"GroupId\", \"?\") for r in p.get(\"UserIdGroupPairs\", [])]
+        + [r.get(\"PrefixListId\", \"?\") for r in p.get(\"PrefixListIds\", [])]
+    )
+    extras += [(proto, lo, hi, s) for s in sources if not (scope_ok and s == expected)]
+if extras:
+    name, gid = os.environ[\"_SG_NAME\"], os.environ[\"_SG_ID\"]
+    print(f\"    WARN — security group {name} ({gid}) has ingress beyond the intended rule\", file=sys.stderr)
+    print(f\"           (tcp {port} from {expected}) — review it; remove anything you did not add deliberately:\", file=sys.stderr)
+    for proto, lo, hi, src in extras:
+        scope = \"all traffic\" if proto == \"-1\" else (f\"{proto} {lo}\" if lo == hi else f\"{proto} {lo}-{hi}\")
+        print(f\"             {scope} from {src}\", file=sys.stderr)
+" <<<"${perms}" || echo "    WARN — could not audit ingress rules on $2 ($1)." >&2
+}
+
+secret_arn() {
+  aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id "$1" \
+    --query ARN --output text 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+
+# Existence check that fails closed: 0 = exists, 1 = definitively absent
+# (ResourceNotFoundException), anything else ABORTS the run. Gating on a bare
+# exit status would let a transient failure (throttle, expired token, network
+# blip) masquerade as "secret missing" — and the missing-secret branches below
+# do destructive work (the §3 self-heal resets the DB password), so they must
+# run only on a definitive not-found.
+secret_exists() { # <secret-id>
+  local out
+  if out="$(aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id "$1" 2>&1 >/dev/null)"; then
+    return 0
+  elif grep -q 'ResourceNotFoundException' <<<"${out}"; then
+    return 1
+  else
+    echo "ERROR: could not determine whether secret $1 exists (transient AWS error?):" >&2
+    printf '%s\n' "${out}" >&2
+    echo "       Refusing to guess — re-run once the call succeeds." >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+}
+
+# Secret values must never appear on a process argv (argv is world-readable
+# via /proc and routinely recorded by EDR/auditd), so every aws call that
+# carries one takes it via --cli-input-json file://<0600 temp file> instead —
+# explicit flags on the same command line override/merge with the JSON, so
+# only the secret parameter needs to live in the file. secret_json writes
+# {"<Key>": "<value>"} to a fresh temp file and returns the path in the named
+# variable (printf -v, not command substitution — a subshell would lose the
+# SECRET_TMP_FILES bookkeeping below): the value crosses into python3 via the
+# environment (never argv) and json.dumps escapes it, so any characters
+# survive. Callers rm -f the file as soon as the aws call returns; the EXIT
+# trap sweeps whatever an aborted run leaves.
+SECRET_TMP_FILES=()
+cleanup_secret_tmp() { rm -f "${SECRET_TMP_FILES[@]+"${SECRET_TMP_FILES[@]}"}"; }
+trap cleanup_secret_tmp EXIT
+secret_json() { # secret_json <outvar> <JsonKey> <value>  -> path in <outvar>
+  local file
+  file="$(mktemp)"    # mktemp creates 0600
+  chmod 600 "${file}" # belt and braces if TMPDIR overrides umask semantics
+  SECRET_TMP_FILES+=("${file}")
+  _JSON_KEY="$2" _JSON_VALUE="$3" python3 -c \
+    'import json, os; print(json.dumps({os.environ["_JSON_KEY"]: os.environ["_JSON_VALUE"]}))' \
+    > "${file}"
+  printf -v "$1" '%s' "${file}"
+}
+
+for required in AWS_REGION ACCOUNT_ID VPC_ID PRIVATE_SUBNETS CORP_CIDR VERSION; do
+  if [[ -z "${!required}" ]]; then
+    echo "ERROR: ${required} is not set." >&2
+    case "${required}" in
+      AWS_REGION)      echo "       Set it to a region where Bedrock serves the Claude models you need, e.g. export AWS_REGION=us-east-1" >&2 ;;
+      ACCOUNT_ID)      echo "       Could not resolve it from STS — is the AWS CLI authenticated? (aws sts get-caller-identity)" >&2 ;;
+      VPC_ID)          echo "       Set it to the VPC from the prerequisites, e.g. export VPC_ID=vpc-..." >&2 ;;
+      PRIVATE_SUBNETS) echo "       Set it to two+ private subnet IDs in different AZs, e.g. export PRIVATE_SUBNETS='subnet-a subnet-b'" >&2 ;;
+      CORP_CIDR)       echo "       Set it to your corporate network CIDR (the ALB's :443 ingress source), e.g. export CORP_CIDR=10.0.0.0/8" >&2 ;;
+      VERSION)         echo "       Set it to the gateway release version — it tags the image you build and push, e.g. export VERSION=<version>" >&2 ;;
+    esac
+    exit 1
+  fi
+done
+
+# The walkthrough (and this bundle) is scoped to commercial US regions: the
+# task role's Bedrock policy (§2) and the gateway's built-in model catalog
+# both use the us.anthropic.* geo-prefixed cross-region inference profiles,
+# which only exist in the commercial US regions — an explicit list, not a
+# `us-*` prefix match, because GovCloud (us-gov-*) and ISO (us-iso-*) regions
+# share the prefix but live in different AWS partitions where those profiles
+# and this bundle's arn:aws: ARNs are wrong. Anywhere else the deploy
+# provisions fine and then every model call fails. Other-region deploys must
+# pin region-appropriate inference profiles via a models: block in
+# gateway.yaml (see the config reference:
+# https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-config) and adjust the
+# inference-profile ARN prefix in bedrock-invoke.iam.json below — set
+# ALLOW_NON_US_REGION=1 once that's done to proceed.
+case "${AWS_REGION}" in
+  us-east-1|us-east-2|us-west-1|us-west-2) ;;
+  *)
+    if [[ "${ALLOW_NON_US_REGION:-0}" != "1" ]]; then
+      echo "ERROR: AWS_REGION=${AWS_REGION} is not a commercial US region, but this bundle's IAM policy" >&2
+      echo "       and model IDs use the US-geo (us.anthropic.*) cross-region inference profiles" >&2
+      echo "       (GovCloud/ISO regions are different partitions — the profiles and arn:aws: ARNs" >&2
+      echo "       here do not exist there)." >&2
+      echo "       Either deploy to us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-1/us-west-2, or pin region-appropriate" >&2
+      echo "       inference profiles in a models: block in gateway.yaml" >&2
+      echo "       (https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-config), adjust the" >&2
+      echo "       inference-profile ARN in the bedrock-invoke policy, and re-run with" >&2
+      echo "       ALLOW_NON_US_REGION=1." >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+    ;;
+esac
+
+if ! command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "ERROR: python3 is required (it JSON-escapes secret values for --cli-input-json; the AWS CLI itself ships on Python)." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+# shellcheck disable=SC2086  # PRIVATE_SUBNETS is intentionally word-split everywhere below
+set -- ${PRIVATE_SUBNETS}
+if (( $# < 2 )); then
+  echo "ERROR: PRIVATE_SUBNETS must list at least two subnets in different AZs (the internal ALB requires two)." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+# Normalize whatever whitespace (spaces, tabs, newlines) separates the list —
+# `set --` above word-split on IFS, so join those same words with commas
+# rather than only converting single spaces.
+SUBNETS_CSV="$(printf '%s,' "$@")"; SUBNETS_CSV="${SUBNETS_CSV%,}"
+
+log "Account: ${ACCOUNT_ID}   Region: ${AWS_REGION}   VPC: ${VPC_ID}"
+
+# ---- 1 Security groups -----------------------------------------------------
+# Three groups chain the traffic path (walkthrough §1): corp network -> ALB :443,
+# ALB -> gateway :8080, gateway -> Postgres :5432. Nothing else is reachable.
+log "Creating security groups (§1)"
+ALB_SG="$(sg_id "${ALB_SG_NAME}")"
+if [[ "${ALB_SG}" != "None" ]]; then
+  skip "security group ${ALB_SG_NAME} (${ALB_SG})"
+else
+  ALB_SG="$(aws ec2 create-security-group --group-name "${ALB_SG_NAME}" \
+    --description "Claude gateway ALB" --vpc-id "${VPC_ID}" \
+    --query GroupId --output text)"
+fi
+
+GW_SG="$(sg_id "${GW_SG_NAME}")"
+if [[ "${GW_SG}" != "None" ]]; then
+  skip "security group ${GW_SG_NAME} (${GW_SG})"
+else
+  GW_SG="$(aws ec2 create-security-group --group-name "${GW_SG_NAME}" \
+    --description "Claude gateway service" --vpc-id "${VPC_ID}" \
+    --query GroupId --output text)"
+fi
+
+DB_SG="$(sg_id "${DB_SG_NAME}")"
+if [[ "${DB_SG}" != "None" ]]; then
+  skip "security group ${DB_SG_NAME} (${DB_SG})"
+else
+  DB_SG="$(aws ec2 create-security-group --group-name "${DB_SG_NAME}" \
+    --description "Claude gateway Postgres" --vpc-id "${VPC_ID}" \
+    --query GroupId --output text)"
+fi
+
+authorize_ingress --group-id "${ALB_SG}" --protocol tcp --port 443  --cidr "${CORP_CIDR}"
+authorize_ingress --group-id "${GW_SG}"  --protocol tcp --port 8080 --source-group "${ALB_SG}"
+authorize_ingress --group-id "${DB_SG}"  --protocol tcp --port 5432 --source-group "${GW_SG}"
+
+# Flag any ingress beyond the three rules above (pre-existing groups may carry more).
+warn_unexpected_ingress "${ALB_SG}" "${ALB_SG_NAME}" 443  "${CORP_CIDR}"
+warn_unexpected_ingress "${GW_SG}"  "${GW_SG_NAME}"  8080 "${ALB_SG}"
+warn_unexpected_ingress "${DB_SG}"  "${DB_SG_NAME}"  5432 "${GW_SG}"
+
+# ---- 2 IAM roles ------------------------------------------------------------
+# Task role: the gateway's runtime identity — its ONLY permission is invoking
+# Claude models on Bedrock (the upstream's `auth: {}` resolves to this role via
+# the AWS default credential chain). The policy must cover both the cross-region
+# inference-profile ARNs and the underlying foundation-model ARNs.
+# Execution role: the ECS agent's identity — pulls the image from ECR and
+# injects the Secrets Manager values; the gateway never uses it.
+log "Creating IAM roles ${TASK_ROLE} + ${EXEC_ROLE} (§2)"
+cat > ecs-trust.iam.json <<'EOF'
+{
+  "Version": "2012-10-17",
+  "Statement": [{
+    "Effect": "Allow",
+    "Principal": { "Service": "ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com" },
+    "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
+  }]
+}
+EOF
+cat > bedrock-invoke.iam.json <<EOF
+{
+  "Version": "2012-10-17",
+  "Statement": [{
+    "Effect": "Allow",
+    "Action": ["bedrock:InvokeModel", "bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream"],
+    "Resource": [
+      "arn:aws:bedrock:${AWS_REGION}:${ACCOUNT_ID}:inference-profile/us.anthropic.*",
+      "arn:aws:bedrock:*::foundation-model/anthropic.*"
+    ]
+  }]
+}
+EOF
+# One ARN per secret (never a bare gateway-* wildcard, which would also match
+# unrelated secrets in a shared account). The trailing -?????? matches exactly
+# the random 6-character suffix Secrets Manager appends to every secret's ARN
+# (AWS's documented pattern; a trailing -* would be a plain prefix glob and
+# also match longer names like ${SECRET_NAME}-prod) — the exact ARNs aren't
+# knowable here because the role is created before the secrets are.
+cat > secrets-read.iam.json <<EOF
+{
+  "Version": "2012-10-17",
+  "Statement": [{
+    "Effect": "Allow",
+    "Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
+    "Resource": [
+      "arn:aws:secretsmanager:${AWS_REGION}:${ACCOUNT_ID}:secret:${JWT_SECRET_NAME}-??????",
+      "arn:aws:secretsmanager:${AWS_REGION}:${ACCOUNT_ID}:secret:${OIDC_SECRET_NAME}-??????",
+      "arn:aws:secretsmanager:${AWS_REGION}:${ACCOUNT_ID}:secret:${SECRET_NAME}-??????"
+    ]
+  }]
+}
+EOF
+
+if aws iam get-role --role-name "${TASK_ROLE}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  skip "role ${TASK_ROLE}"
+else
+  aws iam create-role --role-name "${TASK_ROLE}" \
+    --assume-role-policy-document file://ecs-trust.iam.json >/dev/null
+fi
+# put-role-policy is an upsert — safe to re-run (it also picks up region changes).
+aws iam put-role-policy --role-name "${TASK_ROLE}" \
+  --policy-name bedrock-invoke --policy-document file://bedrock-invoke.iam.json
+
+if aws iam get-role --role-name "${EXEC_ROLE}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  skip "role ${EXEC_ROLE}"
+else
+  aws iam create-role --role-name "${EXEC_ROLE}" \
+    --assume-role-policy-document file://ecs-trust.iam.json >/dev/null
+fi
+# attach-role-policy is idempotent (re-attaching is a no-op).
+aws iam attach-role-policy --role-name "${EXEC_ROLE}" \
+  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AmazonECSTaskExecutionRolePolicy
+aws iam put-role-policy --role-name "${EXEC_ROLE}" \
+  --policy-name read-gateway-secrets --policy-document file://secrets-read.iam.json
+
+echo "    NOTE: Bedrock model access is console-only — enable it for the Claude models"
+echo "          you need (Bedrock console -> Model access), and submit the one-time use"
+echo "          case form for the account. Cross-region inference profiles"
+echo "          (us.anthropic.*) need access in EACH region the profile spans."
+
+# ---- 6 Build & push image to Amazon ECR (config baked in — §6 + §4) ---------
+log "Ensuring ECR repository and image (§6)"
+if aws ecr describe-repositories --repository-names "${ECR_REPO}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  skip "ECR repository ${ECR_REPO}"
+  # Integrity-critical settings: converge on re-runs so a pre-existing MUTABLE repo can't slip through.
+  aws ecr put-image-tag-mutability --repository-name "${ECR_REPO}" \
+    --image-tag-mutability IMMUTABLE >/dev/null
+  aws ecr put-image-scanning-configuration --repository-name "${ECR_REPO}" \
+    --image-scanning-configuration scanOnPush=true >/dev/null
+else
+  # IMMUTABLE tags + scan-on-push: the ECS service pulls whatever this repo
+  # serves under the deployed tag, so a pushed tag must never be silently
+  # re-pointed. For production, also restrict push rights on this repo to your
+  # CI / image-promotion pipeline rather than operator credentials — this
+  # walkthrough pushes directly for simplicity.
+  aws ecr create-repository --repository-name "${ECR_REPO}" \
+    --image-tag-mutability IMMUTABLE \
+    --image-scanning-configuration scanOnPush=true >/dev/null
+fi
+
+# The config is baked into the image, so the build is gated the way the GCP
+# example gates its config-secret publish: gateway.yaml must exist and be fully
+# filled in (REPLACE_ME checked on non-comment lines so commented examples and
+# the file's header don't trip the guard). The tag carries a hash of the config
+# so an edit produces a NEW tag (required by tag immutability) and a re-run
+# rebuilds automatically.
+IMAGE=""
+if [[ ! -f "${GATEWAY_YAML}" ]]; then
+  echo "    (skip) ${GATEWAY_YAML} not found — run 'cp gateway.yaml.example gateway.yaml', fill it in, then re-run (§4)."
+elif grep -vE '^[[:space:]]*#' "${GATEWAY_YAML}" | grep -q 'REPLACE_ME'; then
+  echo "    (skip) ${GATEWAY_YAML} still has REPLACE_ME placeholders to fill:"
+  grep -nE 'REPLACE_ME' "${GATEWAY_YAML}" | grep -vE '^[0-9]+:[[:space:]]*#' | sed 's/^/        /'
+  echo "        Fill them in, then re-run to build the image (the config is baked in)."
+else
+  CONFIG_SHA="$(sha_of "${GATEWAY_YAML}" | cut -c1-8)"
+  IMAGE_TAG="${IMAGE_TAG:-${VERSION}-cfg${CONFIG_SHA}}"
+  IMAGE="${REGISTRY}/${ECR_REPO}:${IMAGE_TAG}"
+
+  # Image is the expensive, already-done step: skip the build+push entirely if
+  # the tag already exists in the registry.
+  if aws ecr describe-images --repository-name "${ECR_REPO}" \
+       --image-ids "imageTag=${IMAGE_TAG}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    skip "image ${IMAGE}"
+  else
+    # When the expected checksum is known, verify a PRE-EXISTING binary too:
+    # the [[ ! -f ]] guard below otherwise trusts whatever is on disk, so a
+    # stale binary from an earlier VERSION (or a tampered one) would be baked
+    # into the image silently. On mismatch, set it aside (never delete — the
+    # mismatch may be a typo'd DIST_SHA256, not a bad binary) and fall through
+    # to the fail-closed download path. Without DIST_SHA256 the operator-
+    # provided-binary flow is unchanged — no checksum was declared, so none is
+    # checked.
+    QUARANTINED_SHA=""
+    if [[ -n "${DIST_SHA256}" && -f "${CLAUDE_BINARY}" ]]; then
+      existing_sha="$(sha_of "${CLAUDE_BINARY}")"
+      if [[ "${existing_sha}" != "${DIST_SHA256}" ]]; then
+        log "Existing ${CLAUDE_BINARY} sha256 ${existing_sha} does not match DIST_SHA256 — setting it aside as ${CLAUDE_BINARY}.bad"
+        mv -f "${CLAUDE_BINARY}" "${CLAUDE_BINARY}.bad"
+        QUARANTINED_SHA="${existing_sha}"
+      fi
+    fi
+    if [[ ! -f "${CLAUDE_BINARY}" ]]; then
+      if [[ -n "${DIST_URL}" ]]; then
+        # Fail closed: never download an executable we can't verify.
+        if [[ -z "${DIST_SHA256}" ]]; then
+          echo "ERROR: DIST_SHA256 must be set when DIST_URL is used — refusing to download an unverified binary." >&2
+          echo "       Set DIST_SHA256 to the expected sha256 of the binary at DIST_URL, obtained out-of-band:" >&2
+          echo "       for standard-release binaries, from the release's GPG-signed manifest.json (verify the" >&2
+          echo "       manifest signature first — see code.claude.com/docs/en/setup#binary-integrity-and-code-signing);" >&2
+          echo "       otherwise from the channel that published the download link, never from the download server." >&2
+          exit 1
+        fi
+        log "Downloading gateway binary from ${DIST_URL}"
+        # Download to a temp path and only mv into place after the checksum
+        # verifies, so an interrupted download can't leave a partial CLAUDE_BINARY
+        # that the [[ ! -f ]] guard above would skip — and silently push — on re-run.
+        # Refuse plaintext/protocol-downgrade; only follow HTTPS redirects.
+        dl_tmp="${CLAUDE_BINARY}.download"
+        rm -f "${dl_tmp}"
+        curl_https -fL -o "${dl_tmp}" "${DIST_URL}"
+        actual_sha="$(sha_of "${dl_tmp}")"
+        if [[ "${actual_sha}" != "${DIST_SHA256}" ]]; then
+          echo "ERROR: checksum mismatch for ${dl_tmp} (expected ${DIST_SHA256}, got ${actual_sha}) — refusing to build." >&2
+          rm -f "${dl_tmp}"
+          exit 1
+        fi
+        log "Verified binary sha256 ${actual_sha}"
+        chmod +x "${dl_tmp}"
+        mv -f "${dl_tmp}" "${CLAUDE_BINARY}"
+      else
+        echo "ERROR: build binary not found at ${CLAUDE_BINARY} and DIST_URL is not set." >&2
+        if [[ -n "${QUARANTINED_SHA}" ]]; then
+          echo "       The binary that WAS there had sha256 ${QUARANTINED_SHA}, which does not match" >&2
+          echo "       DIST_SHA256=${DIST_SHA256} — it was preserved as ${CLAUDE_BINARY}.bad." >&2
+          echo "       If DIST_SHA256 was a typo, fix it and move the file back:" >&2
+          echo "         mv '${CLAUDE_BINARY}.bad' '${CLAUDE_BINARY}'" >&2
+          echo "       Otherwise treat that file as untrusted and obtain a verified binary." >&2
+        fi
+        echo "       Provide the prebuilt linux-x64 Claude Code release binary at that path" >&2
+        echo "       or set DIST_URL to its download URL (see the walkthrough, §6)." >&2
+        exit 1
+      fi
+    fi
+    # The RDS CA bundle is baked into the image as the trust anchor for the
+    # connection string's sslmode=verify-full (§3/§5). Fail closed: no bundle,
+    # no build. AWS rotates the bundle, so no checksum is pinned (see the
+    # RDS_CA_BUNDLE_URL comment up top); the sanity check below catches an
+    # error page or truncated download.
+    if [[ ! -f "${RDS_CA_BUNDLE}" ]]; then
+      log "Downloading RDS CA bundle from ${RDS_CA_BUNDLE_URL}"
+      curl_https -fL -o "${RDS_CA_BUNDLE}" "${RDS_CA_BUNDLE_URL}"
+    fi
+    if ! grep -q 'BEGIN CERTIFICATE' "${RDS_CA_BUNDLE}" \
+       || (( "$(wc -c < "${RDS_CA_BUNDLE}")" < 10000 )); then
+      echo "ERROR: ${RDS_CA_BUNDLE} does not look like the RDS CA bundle (missing PEM blocks or implausibly small) — refusing to build." >&2
+      echo "       Delete it and re-run to re-download, or place the bundle from ${RDS_CA_BUNDLE_URL} there yourself." >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+    log "Building and pushing ${IMAGE}"
+    aws ecr get-login-password --region "${AWS_REGION}" \
+      | docker login --username AWS --password-stdin "${REGISTRY}"
+    # The task definition below runs linux/amd64 (cpuArchitecture X86_64);
+    # --platform forces it (e.g. when building on an Apple Silicon Mac), and
+    # --provenance=false keeps buildx from wrapping the result in an OCI image
+    # index that some pullers reject. For Fargate on ARM64 (Graviton), build
+    # linux/arm64 with the linux-arm64 binary and set cpuArchitecture to ARM64.
+    docker build --platform=linux/amd64 --provenance=false \
+      -f "${DOCKERFILE}" \
+      --build-arg CLAUDE_BINARY="${CLAUDE_BINARY}" \
+      --build-arg GATEWAY_CONFIG="${GATEWAY_YAML}" \
+      --build-arg RDS_CA_BUNDLE="${RDS_CA_BUNDLE}" \
+      -t "${IMAGE}" .
+    docker push "${IMAGE}"
+  fi
+fi
+
+# ---- 3 RDS for PostgreSQL (private subnets, no public address) --------------
+log "Creating DB subnet group ${DB_SUBNET_GROUP} (§3)"
+if aws rds describe-db-subnet-groups --db-subnet-group-name "${DB_SUBNET_GROUP}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  skip "DB subnet group ${DB_SUBNET_GROUP}"
+else
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2086  # subnet IDs are separate arguments by design
+  aws rds create-db-subnet-group --db-subnet-group-name "${DB_SUBNET_GROUP}" \
+    --db-subnet-group-description "Claude gateway" --subnet-ids ${PRIVATE_SUBNETS} >/dev/null
+fi
+
+# Parameter group with rds.force_ssl=1: the server side of TLS enforcement —
+# the client side is sslmode=verify-full in the connection string (§5). The
+# family must match the engine major version, so it derives from the same
+# DB_ENGINE_VERSION that create-db-instance pins below.
+log "Ensuring DB parameter group ${DB_PARAM_GROUP} (rds.force_ssl=1)"
+PG_FAMILY="postgres${DB_ENGINE_VERSION%%.*}"
+if aws rds describe-db-parameter-groups --db-parameter-group-name "${DB_PARAM_GROUP}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  skip "DB parameter group ${DB_PARAM_GROUP}"
+else
+  aws rds create-db-parameter-group --db-parameter-group-name "${DB_PARAM_GROUP}" \
+    --db-parameter-group-family "${PG_FAMILY}" \
+    --description "Claude gateway - require TLS on every connection" >/dev/null
+fi
+# modify-db-parameter-group is an upsert — applied every run so a pre-existing
+# group converges too. rds.force_ssl is dynamic; no reboot needed.
+aws rds modify-db-parameter-group --db-parameter-group-name "${DB_PARAM_GROUP}" \
+  --parameters "ParameterName=rds.force_ssl,ParameterValue=1,ApplyMethod=immediate" >/dev/null
+
+# hex (not base64) keeps the password URL-safe for the connection string below.
+# The password reaches every aws call via --cli-input-json (never argv — see
+# the secret_json helper); explicit flags merge with (and would override) the
+# JSON, so only the password lives in the temp file.
+log "Creating RDS instance ${DB_INSTANCE} (private subnets, --no-publicly-accessible)"
+DB_PASSWORD=""
+DB_POSTURE="$(aws rds describe-db-instances --db-instance-identifier "${DB_INSTANCE}" \
+  --query 'DBInstances[0].[PubliclyAccessible,StorageEncrypted]' --output text 2>/dev/null || true)"
+if [[ -n "${DB_POSTURE}" ]]; then
+  # Name-based reuse: a pre-existing instance may not carry the posture this
+  # script would have created it with. Non-fatal (the operator may be migrating
+  # an existing DB on purpose), but drift from the guide's baseline must be seen.
+  read -r DB_PUBLIC DB_ENCRYPTED <<<"${DB_POSTURE}"
+  if [[ "${DB_PUBLIC}" == "True" ]]; then
+    echo "    WARN — RDS instance ${DB_INSTANCE} is PubliclyAccessible; this script would have" >&2
+    echo "           created it with --no-publicly-accessible. Fix: aws rds modify-db-instance" >&2
+    echo "           --db-instance-identifier ${DB_INSTANCE} --no-publicly-accessible --apply-immediately" >&2
+  fi
+  if [[ "${DB_ENCRYPTED}" == "False" ]]; then
+    echo "    WARN — RDS instance ${DB_INSTANCE} has StorageEncrypted=false; this script would" >&2
+    echo "           have created it with --storage-encrypted (encryption cannot be enabled in" >&2
+    echo "           place — restore an encrypted snapshot copy to migrate)." >&2
+  fi
+  if secret_exists "${SECRET_NAME}"; then
+    skip "instance ${DB_INSTANCE} (password unchanged; secret not rewritten)"
+  else
+    # Self-heal: a previous run died after creating the instance but before
+    # writing the connection-string secret, losing the only copy of the
+    # password. The secret is the password's only consumer, so resetting it is
+    # safe and keeps re-runs able to recover from any partial state.
+    # secret_exists (not a bare exit-status check) gates this: only a
+    # definitive ResourceNotFoundException may trigger a password reset.
+    # ORDERING INVARIANT: the secret write (§5 below) is the heal's commit
+    # point — everything that can fail must happen BEFORE it, so a crash at
+    # any point leaves the secret still missing and the next run simply
+    # repeats the heal. Writing the secret first would invert that: a crash
+    # between secret write and modify-db-instance would leave an existing
+    # secret whose password the DB never received, and every later run would
+    # skip the heal while the gateway can't connect.
+    # NOTE: the parameter group is attached on create only — an instance that
+    # predates it keeps its current group (attach via modify-db-instance
+    # --db-parameter-group-name yourself if you want force_ssl retrofitted).
+    log "Instance ${DB_INSTANCE} exists but secret ${SECRET_NAME} is missing — resetting password"
+    DB_PASSWORD="$(openssl rand -hex 24)"
+    pw_json=""; secret_json pw_json MasterUserPassword "${DB_PASSWORD}"
+    aws rds modify-db-instance --db-instance-identifier "${DB_INSTANCE}" \
+      --cli-input-json "file://${pw_json}" --apply-immediately >/dev/null
+    rm -f "${pw_json}"
+  fi
+else
+  DB_PASSWORD="$(openssl rand -hex 24)"
+  pw_json=""; secret_json pw_json MasterUserPassword "${DB_PASSWORD}"
+  aws rds create-db-instance --db-instance-identifier "${DB_INSTANCE}" \
+    --engine postgres --engine-version "${DB_ENGINE_VERSION}" \
+    --db-instance-class "${DB_CLASS}" \
+    --allocated-storage "${DB_STORAGE_GB}" --db-name "${DB_NAME}" \
+    --master-username "${DB_USER}" --cli-input-json "file://${pw_json}" \
+    --db-subnet-group-name "${DB_SUBNET_GROUP}" \
+    --db-parameter-group-name "${DB_PARAM_GROUP}" \
+    --vpc-security-group-ids "${DB_SG}" \
+    --no-publicly-accessible \
+    --storage-encrypted >/dev/null
+  rm -f "${pw_json}"
+fi
+
+log "Waiting for ${DB_INSTANCE} to become available (first creation takes ~10 min)"
+aws rds wait db-instance-available --db-instance-identifier "${DB_INSTANCE}"
+DB_HOST="$(aws rds describe-db-instances --db-instance-identifier "${DB_INSTANCE}" \
+  --query 'DBInstances[0].Endpoint.Address' --output text)"
+
+# ---- 5 Connection string + JWT secret -> Secrets Manager --------------------
+# No per-secret IAM grants are needed: the execution role's read-gateway-secrets
+# policy (§2) names each of the three secrets by its ARN prefix.
+# Secret values go to aws via --cli-input-json temp files, never argv.
+if [[ -n "${DB_PASSWORD}" ]]; then
+  # RDS private endpoint (guide §3); the gateway connects directly over the
+  # VPC — the DB security group only admits ${GW_SG_NAME}.
+  # sslmode=verify-full: the gateway's driver honors sslmode from the URL and
+  # verifies the RDS certificate chain AND hostname against the CA bundle the
+  # image trusts via NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS (see the Dockerfile). Do NOT add a
+  # libpq-style `sslrootcert=` query param — the driver doesn't read it and
+  # forwards it to Postgres as a startup parameter, which the server rejects.
+  CONN="postgres://${DB_USER}:${DB_PASSWORD}@${DB_HOST}:5432/${DB_NAME}?sslmode=verify-full"
+  log "Storing connection string in Secrets Manager secret ${SECRET_NAME} (§5)"
+  conn_json=""; secret_json conn_json SecretString "${CONN}"
+  if secret_exists "${SECRET_NAME}"; then
+    aws secretsmanager put-secret-value --secret-id "${SECRET_NAME}" \
+      --cli-input-json "file://${conn_json}" >/dev/null
+  else
+    aws secretsmanager create-secret --name "${SECRET_NAME}" \
+      --cli-input-json "file://${conn_json}" >/dev/null
+  fi
+  rm -f "${conn_json}"
+else
+  log "Skipping postgres-url secret write (instance already existed, password not available this run)"
+fi
+
+# JWT signing secret — generated once (re-runs do NOT rotate it).
+log "Ensuring JWT signing secret ${JWT_SECRET_NAME} (§5)"
+if secret_exists "${JWT_SECRET_NAME}"; then
+  skip "secret ${JWT_SECRET_NAME}"
+else
+  jwt_json=""; secret_json jwt_json SecretString "$(openssl rand -base64 32)"
+  aws secretsmanager create-secret --name "${JWT_SECRET_NAME}" \
+    --cli-input-json "file://${jwt_json}" >/dev/null
+  rm -f "${jwt_json}"
+fi
+
+# OIDC client secret — operator-created (the script can't generate it; it comes
+# from the Okta OIDC web application). Checked here so the deploy step below can
+# gate on it with a clear message instead of a raw ECS secret-injection failure.
+OIDC_ARN="$(secret_arn "${OIDC_SECRET_NAME}")"
+
+# ---- 7 ECS Fargate service + internal ALB ----------------------------------
+# Self-gating: deploy only once its inputs exist (image pushed — i.e.
+# gateway.yaml was filled in — plus the operator-provided OIDC client secret
+# and the ACM certificate for the internal hostname). On a first run these are
+# usually missing and it cleanly skips.
+ALB_DNS=""
+missing=""
+[[ -n "${IMAGE}" ]] || missing="${missing} image(fill ${GATEWAY_YAML})"
+[[ -n "${OIDC_ARN}" ]] || missing="${missing} ${OIDC_SECRET_NAME}"
+[[ -n "${ACM_CERT_ARN}" ]] || missing="${missing} ACM_CERT_ARN"
+SECRET_ARN="$(secret_arn "${SECRET_NAME}")"
+JWT_ARN="$(secret_arn "${JWT_SECRET_NAME}")"
+[[ -n "${SECRET_ARN}" ]] || missing="${missing} ${SECRET_NAME}"
+[[ -n "${JWT_ARN}"    ]] || missing="${missing} ${JWT_SECRET_NAME}"
+
+if [[ "${DEPLOY}" != "1" ]]; then
+  log "Skipping ECS/ALB deploy (DEPLOY=${DEPLOY}) (§7)"
+elif [[ -n "${missing// }" ]]; then
+  log "Skipping ECS/ALB deploy — missing input(s):${missing} (§7)"
+  echo "        Fill ${GATEWAY_YAML} and re-run to build the image; create ${OIDC_SECRET_NAME}"
+  echo "        from the Okta client secret; set ACM_CERT_ARN to the certificate for your"
+  echo "        internal gateway hostname. Then re-run to deploy."
+else
+  log "Creating ECS cluster ${CLUSTER} and log group ${LOG_GROUP} (§7)"
+  if [[ "$(aws ecs describe-clusters --clusters "${CLUSTER}" \
+        --query 'clusters[0].status' --output text 2>/dev/null)" == "ACTIVE" ]]; then
+    skip "cluster ${CLUSTER}"
+  else
+    aws ecs create-cluster --cluster-name "${CLUSTER}" >/dev/null
+  fi
+  # The gateway's stderr carries both its audit events and operational logs.
+  if aws logs describe-log-groups --log-group-name-prefix "${LOG_GROUP}" \
+       --query 'logGroups[?logGroupName==`'"${LOG_GROUP}"'`]' --output text 2>/dev/null | grep -q .; then
+    skip "log group ${LOG_GROUP}"
+  else
+    aws logs create-log-group --log-group-name "${LOG_GROUP}"
+  fi
+  # Retention is a separate API (create-log-group has no retention flag) and an
+  # upsert — applied every run so pre-existing groups converge too. Without it
+  # the group keeps logs forever and cost grows unbounded.
+  aws logs put-retention-policy --log-group-name "${LOG_GROUP}" \
+    --retention-in-days "${LOG_RETENTION_DAYS}"
+
+  # Task definition: the task role carries the Bedrock permission; the
+  # execution role injects the secrets. Registering is an append (a new
+  # revision) — the service below always points at the latest.
+  log "Registering task definition ${TASK_FAMILY}"
+  taskdef_tmp="$(mktemp)"
+  cat > "${taskdef_tmp}" <<EOF
+{
+  "family": "${TASK_FAMILY}",
+  "networkMode": "awsvpc",
+  "requiresCompatibilities": ["FARGATE"],
+  "cpu": "${TASK_CPU}",
+  "memory": "${TASK_MEMORY}",
+  "runtimePlatform": { "cpuArchitecture": "X86_64", "operatingSystemFamily": "LINUX" },
+  "executionRoleArn": "arn:aws:iam::${ACCOUNT_ID}:role/${EXEC_ROLE}",
+  "taskRoleArn": "arn:aws:iam::${ACCOUNT_ID}:role/${TASK_ROLE}",
+  "containerDefinitions": [
+    {
+      "name": "gateway",
+      "image": "${IMAGE}",
+      "portMappings": [{ "containerPort": 8080 }],
+      "secrets": [
+        { "name": "GATEWAY_JWT_SECRET",   "valueFrom": "${JWT_ARN}" },
+        { "name": "OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET",   "valueFrom": "${OIDC_ARN}" },
+        { "name": "GATEWAY_POSTGRES_URL", "valueFrom": "${SECRET_ARN}" }
+      ],
+      "logConfiguration": {
+        "logDriver": "awslogs",
+        "options": {
+          "awslogs-group": "${LOG_GROUP}",
+          "awslogs-region": "${AWS_REGION}",
+          "awslogs-stream-prefix": "gateway"
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  ]
+}
+EOF
+  aws ecs register-task-definition --cli-input-json "file://${taskdef_tmp}" >/dev/null
+  rm -f "${taskdef_tmp}"
+
+  # Internal ALB. --ip-address-type ipv4: an internal dual-stack ALB publishes
+  # public-range AAAA records, which the CLI's /login private-network check
+  # rejects.
+  log "Creating internal ALB ${ALB_NAME} + target group + HTTPS listener"
+  read -r ALB_ARN ALB_SCHEME ALB_VPC ALB_IP_TYPE <<<"$(aws elbv2 describe-load-balancers --names "${ALB_NAME}" \
+    --query 'LoadBalancers[0].[LoadBalancerArn,Scheme,VpcId,IpAddressType]' --output text 2>/dev/null || true)"
+  if [[ -n "${ALB_ARN}" && "${ALB_ARN}" != "None" ]]; then
+    # Reuse is by name, and scheme/VPC are immutable on an ALB — so posture is
+    # asserted, fail-closed: attaching the gateway to an internet-facing or
+    # wrong-VPC load balancer would change the exposure model, not just drift.
+    if [[ "${ALB_SCHEME}" != "internal" || "${ALB_VPC}" != "${VPC_ID}" ]]; then
+      echo "ERROR: load balancer ${ALB_NAME} exists but is not the internal ALB this script expects:" >&2
+      echo "       scheme=${ALB_SCHEME} (need internal), vpc=${ALB_VPC} (need ${VPC_ID})." >&2
+      echo "       Refusing to deploy the gateway behind it. Delete that load balancer, or set" >&2
+      echo "       ALB_NAME to an unused name, then re-run." >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+    skip "load balancer ${ALB_NAME} (internal, ${ALB_VPC})"
+    # ip-address-type IS mutable (unlike scheme/VPC) — converge a reused
+    # dualstack ALB back to ipv4, matching the Terraform sibling: dual-stack
+    # publishes public-range AAAA records that /login rejects (see above).
+    if [[ "${ALB_IP_TYPE}" != "ipv4" ]]; then
+      aws elbv2 set-ip-address-type --load-balancer-arn "${ALB_ARN}" \
+        --ip-address-type ipv4 >/dev/null
+    fi
+  else
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2086
+    ALB_ARN="$(aws elbv2 create-load-balancer --name "${ALB_NAME}" \
+      --scheme internal --type application --ip-address-type ipv4 \
+      --subnets ${PRIVATE_SUBNETS} --security-groups "${ALB_SG}" \
+      --query 'LoadBalancers[0].LoadBalancerArn' --output text)"
+  fi
+
+  # The ALB closes a connection after 60 seconds with no data by default, which
+  # cuts off streams during quiet periods (long prompt processing before the
+  # first token, extended thinking). Attribute setting is idempotent.
+  aws elbv2 modify-load-balancer-attributes --load-balancer-arn "${ALB_ARN}" \
+    --attributes Key=idle_timeout.timeout_seconds,Value=3600 >/dev/null
+
+  read -r TG_ARN TG_VPC <<<"$(aws elbv2 describe-target-groups --names "${TG_NAME}" \
+    --query 'TargetGroups[0].[TargetGroupArn,VpcId]' --output text 2>/dev/null || true)"
+  if [[ -n "${TG_ARN}" && "${TG_ARN}" != "None" ]]; then
+    skip "target group ${TG_NAME}"
+    # VPC is immutable on a target group; a wrong-VPC one can't reach the tasks.
+    if [[ "${TG_VPC}" != "${VPC_ID}" ]]; then
+      echo "    WARN — target group ${TG_NAME} is in ${TG_VPC}, not ${VPC_ID}; the service's tasks" >&2
+      echo "           will not become healthy behind it. Delete it or set TG_NAME to an unused" >&2
+      echo "           name, then re-run." >&2
+    fi
+  else
+    # /readyz verifies the store is reachable, so a task that can't reach
+    # Postgres never enters rotation (the gateway also serves liveness-only
+    # /healthz — see the deploy guide's outage-behavior tradeoff).
+    TG_ARN="$(aws elbv2 create-target-group --name "${TG_NAME}" \
+      --protocol HTTP --port 8080 --vpc-id "${VPC_ID}" --target-type ip \
+      --health-check-path /readyz \
+      --query 'TargetGroups[0].TargetGroupArn' --output text)"
+  fi
+
+  # Select the HTTPS:443 listener specifically — a reused ALB may carry other
+  # listeners (say HTTP:80); those stay untouched, and the 443 listener is
+  # still created when it's the one that's missing.
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2016  # backticks are JMESPath literals, not expansion
+  LISTENER_ARN="$(aws elbv2 describe-listeners --load-balancer-arn "${ALB_ARN}" \
+    --query 'Listeners[?Port==`443`]|[0].ListenerArn' --output text 2>/dev/null || true)"
+  if [[ -n "${LISTENER_ARN}" && "${LISTENER_ARN}" != "None" ]]; then
+    skip "HTTPS:443 listener on ${ALB_NAME}"
+    # Converge everything this script owns on pre-existing listeners
+    # (modify-listener is an upsert): the TLS policy (so re-runs pick up an
+    # ALB_SSL_POLICY change, and listeners created before this script pinned
+    # one lose the legacy default), the certificate (so a changed ACM_CERT_ARN
+    # — e.g. a renewal under a new ARN — is not silently ignored), and the
+    # default action (so the listener always forwards to this target group).
+    aws elbv2 modify-listener --listener-arn "${LISTENER_ARN}" \
+      --ssl-policy "${ALB_SSL_POLICY}" \
+      --certificates "CertificateArn=${ACM_CERT_ARN}" \
+      --default-actions "Type=forward,TargetGroupArn=${TG_ARN}" >/dev/null
+  else
+    aws elbv2 create-listener --load-balancer-arn "${ALB_ARN}" \
+      --protocol HTTPS --port 443 \
+      --ssl-policy "${ALB_SSL_POLICY}" \
+      --certificates "CertificateArn=${ACM_CERT_ARN}" \
+      --default-actions "Type=forward,TargetGroupArn=${TG_ARN}" >/dev/null
+  fi
+
+  # Service: created once, then rolled forward — a re-run points it at the
+  # latest task-definition revision (which carries the current image tag, and
+  # therefore the current gateway.yaml) and forces a new deployment.
+  log "Creating/updating ECS service ${SERVICE} (Fargate, private subnets, no public IP)"
+  svc_status="$(aws ecs describe-services --cluster "${CLUSTER}" --services "${SERVICE}" \
+    --query 'services[0].status' --output text 2>/dev/null || true)"
+  if [[ "${svc_status}" == "ACTIVE" ]]; then
+    aws ecs update-service --cluster "${CLUSTER}" --service "${SERVICE}" \
+      --task-definition "${TASK_FAMILY}" --desired-count "${DESIRED_COUNT}" \
+      --deployment-configuration "deploymentCircuitBreaker={enable=true,rollback=true}" \
+      --health-check-grace-period-seconds 60 \
+      --force-new-deployment >/dev/null
+    echo "        service updated to the latest task-definition revision."
+  else
+    # All egress (Bedrock, the IdP, Secrets Manager, ECR, CloudWatch Logs) goes
+    # through the NAT gateway — assignPublicIp stays DISABLED.
+    # The deployment circuit breaker stops a rollout whose tasks keep failing
+    # (bad image, unbootable config) and rolls back to the last steady state
+    # instead of relaunching failing tasks forever. The health-check grace
+    # period gives a cold task (image pull + store connect + first /readyz)
+    # time before ECS counts it unhealthy — without it the circuit breaker can
+    # declare the very first rollout failed (matches terraform/'s
+    # health_check_grace_period_seconds).
+    aws ecs create-service --cluster "${CLUSTER}" --service-name "${SERVICE}" \
+      --task-definition "${TASK_FAMILY}" --desired-count "${DESIRED_COUNT}" \
+      --launch-type FARGATE \
+      --deployment-configuration "deploymentCircuitBreaker={enable=true,rollback=true}" \
+      --health-check-grace-period-seconds 60 \
+      --network-configuration "awsvpcConfiguration={subnets=[${SUBNETS_CSV}],securityGroups=[${GW_SG}],assignPublicIp=DISABLED}" \
+      --load-balancers "targetGroupArn=${TG_ARN},containerName=gateway,containerPort=8080" >/dev/null
+  fi
+
+  ALB_DNS="$(aws elbv2 describe-load-balancers --load-balancer-arns "${ALB_ARN}" \
+    --query 'LoadBalancers[0].DNSName' --output text)"
+  log "Internal ALB DNS: ${ALB_DNS}"
+
+  # Post-deploy smoke check: the ALB is internal (unreachable from this
+  # machine), but target health is visible through the API — poll until the
+  # /readyz health check passes. Non-fatal; a cold task needs a minute or two
+  # (image pull + store connect).
+  log "Smoke check: polling target health on ${TG_NAME} (health check: GET /readyz)"
+  tg_state="unknown"
+  for _ in $(seq 1 24); do
+    tg_state="$(aws elbv2 describe-target-health --target-group-arn "${TG_ARN}" \
+      --query 'TargetHealthDescriptions[0].TargetHealth.State' --output text 2>/dev/null || true)"
+    [[ "${tg_state}" == "healthy" ]] && break
+    sleep 10
+  done
+  if [[ "${tg_state}" == "healthy" ]]; then
+    echo "        OK — a gateway task is healthy behind the ALB (store reachable)."
+  else
+    echo "        WARN — last target state: ${tg_state:-none}; the task may still be starting."
+    echo "               Check the service events and the gateway's logs:"
+    echo "                 aws ecs describe-services --cluster ${CLUSTER} --services ${SERVICE} --query 'services[0].events[:5]'"
+    echo "                 aws logs tail ${LOG_GROUP} --since 10m"
+  fi
+
+  # public_url is baked into the image, so verify the operator's chosen
+  # hostname is in place (the redirect URI and discovery doc derive from it).
+  CFG_PUBLIC_URL="$(grep -E '^[[:space:]]*public_url:' "${GATEWAY_YAML}" 2>/dev/null \
+    | head -1 \
+    | sed -E 's/^[[:space:]]*public_url:[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]+#.*$//; s/[[:space:]]*$//' \
+    || true)"
+  CFG_PUBLIC_URL="${CFG_PUBLIC_URL#[\'\"]}"; CFG_PUBLIC_URL="${CFG_PUBLIC_URL%[\'\"]}"
+  CFG_PUBLIC_URL="${CFG_PUBLIC_URL%/}"
+  echo "        1. In your Route 53 private hosted zone, alias the host of"
+  echo "           ${CFG_PUBLIC_URL:-<public_url>} to the ALB: ${ALB_DNS}"
+  echo "           (the ALB's own *.elb.amazonaws.com name can't carry your ACM certificate)."
+  echo "        2. Register this redirect URI on the Okta OIDC web app: ${CFG_PUBLIC_URL:-<public_url>}/oauth/callback"
+  echo "        3. Verify from inside your corporate network:"
+  echo "             curl -s ${CFG_PUBLIC_URL:-<public_url>}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server"
+fi
+
+# ---- summary ----------------------------------------------------------------
+cat <<EOF
+
+==> Done.
+
+  Security groups       ${ALB_SG_NAME}=${ALB_SG}  ${GW_SG_NAME}=${GW_SG}  ${DB_SG_NAME}=${DB_SG}
+  IAM roles             ${TASK_ROLE} (bedrock-invoke), ${EXEC_ROLE} (pull + secrets)
+  Image                 ${IMAGE:-(not built yet — fill ${GATEWAY_YAML})}
+  RDS instance          ${DB_INSTANCE} -> ${DB_HOST}
+  Database / user       ${DB_NAME} / ${DB_USER}
+  Secrets               ${SECRET_NAME}, ${JWT_SECRET_NAME}, ${OIDC_SECRET_NAME}$( [[ -n "${OIDC_ARN}" ]] || printf ' (MISSING — create it)' )
+  ECS service           ${CLUSTER}/${SERVICE} behind ${ALB_DNS:-(not deployed yet)}
+
+Next steps (see https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-on-aws):
+  - Create the one operator-provided secret (from the Okta OIDC web app). Put the
+    client secret in a 0600 file first — passing it as a literal argument would
+    leave it readable in the process table and in audit/EDR logs:
+      aws secretsmanager create-secret --name ${OIDC_SECRET_NAME} \\
+        --secret-string file:///path/to/okta-client-secret.txt
+  - Fill in the REPLACE_ME values in ${GATEWAY_YAML}, then re-run: setup.sh builds the
+    image (config baked in) and deploys once the secret and ACM_CERT_ARN exist.
+  - Enable Bedrock model access in the console for the Claude models you need (per
+    region the us.anthropic.* profiles span) and submit the one-time use case form.
+  - Alias your internal hostname (gateway.yaml public_url) to the ALB in a Route 53
+    private hosted zone, and register <public_url>/oauth/callback on the Okta app.
+  - The gateway runs its own schema migrations at boot, so ${DB_USER} needs CREATE TABLE.
+EOF

examples/gateway/aws/terraform/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# Never commit state (contains secrets) or local var files
+*.tfstate
+*.tfstate.*
+.terraform/
+terraform.tfvars
+*.auto.tfvars
+crash.log
+
+# The lock file holds no secrets. It's ignored here so consumers who copy this
+# example into their own repo generate (and commit) their own platform-complete
+# lock at first init — committing one from this repo would carry only one
+# platform's provider hashes. In your copy, drop this line and commit the lock
+# produced by:
+#   terraform providers lock -platform=linux_amd64 -platform=linux_arm64 \
+#     -platform=darwin_amd64 -platform=darwin_arm64 -platform=windows_amd64
+# versions.tf pins by range only, so without a committed lock the registry
+# serves the newest in-range build; a platform-complete lock gives hash
+# continuity across machines/CI and makes provider upgrades reviewable diffs.
+.terraform.lock.hcl

examples/gateway/aws/terraform/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+# Claude apps gateway — Terraform (ECS Fargate)
+
+Terraform equivalent of `../setup.sh`. Lets end-users provision and manage
+the gateway with `terraform apply`. Covers the same scope ([walkthrough](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-on-aws) §1–7,
+ECS track): security groups → task + execution IAM roles → ECR repository →
+private-subnet RDS for PostgreSQL → Secrets Manager secrets → ECS Fargate
+service behind an internal ALB. The VPC and private subnets are walkthrough
+prerequisites, passed in as variables — unlike the GCP example, no network is
+created here.
+
+## Files
+
+| File | Purpose |
+|------|---------|
+| `versions.tf` | Provider pins (aws, random) |
+| `variables.tf` | All inputs (defaults match `setup.sh`'s) |
+| `main.tf` | Resources |
+| `outputs.tf` | ALB DNS name + zone ID, image, roles, DB endpoint |
+| `terraform.tfvars.example` | Copy to `terraform.tfvars` and edit |
+
+## Prerequisites
+
+1. **`../gateway.yaml` created and FULLY filled in** — copy the template first:
+   `cp ../gateway.yaml.example ../gateway.yaml`, then replace every `REPLACE_ME`
+   (Terraform reads this file and enforces no `REPLACE_ME` via a precondition).
+   Unlike the GCP example there is no placeholder-first-pass: the config is
+   **baked into the image**, and `public_url` is your own internal hostname,
+   which you choose up front (you already hold its ACM certificate).
+   `gateway.yaml` is gitignored; the committed template is `gateway.yaml.example`.
+2. The **prebuilt linux-x64 `claude` binary at `../claude`** — the Claude Code
+   release binary, which includes the `gateway` subcommand (see the
+   [walkthrough](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-on-aws)).
+   See `../setup.sh`'s `DIST_URL`/`DIST_SHA256` download path for a
+   checksum-verified fetch.
+3. A **VPC with two+ private subnets** in different AZs and NAT egress, an **ACM
+   certificate** for your internal gateway hostname, and **Bedrock model access**
+   enabled in the console (cross-region `us.anthropic.*` profiles need it in each
+   region the profile spans), with the one-time use case form submitted.
+4. A **remote backend** for shared use (see below). State holds secrets — never commit it.
+
+## Deploy
+
+Terraform creates the ECR repository but does **not** build/push the image, so
+the apply is two passes: a targeted apply to create the repo, then build/push,
+then the full apply.
+
+```bash
+cp terraform.tfvars.example terraform.tfvars   # edit it
+terraform init
+
+# Pin providers in your copy (once, then commit .terraform.lock.hcl and drop
+# its .gitignore line): versions.tf pins by range only, so without a committed
+# lock the registry serves the newest in-range build — a platform-complete
+# lock gives hash continuity across machines/CI and makes provider upgrades
+# reviewable diffs.
+terraform providers lock -platform=linux_amd64 -platform=linux_arm64 \
+  -platform=darwin_amd64 -platform=darwin_arm64 -platform=windows_amd64
+
+# 1. Create just the ECR repository (the -target warning is expected):
+terraform apply -target=aws_ecr_repository.repo
+
+# 2. Build and push the image (gateway.yaml and the RDS CA bundle are baked in;
+#    the COPY sources are context-relative — the build context `..` is aws/, so
+#    `claude`, `gateway.yaml`, and `rds-global-bundle.pem`).
+#    The CA bundle is the trust anchor for the connection string's
+#    sslmode=verify-full (AWS rotates it; download it when absent — don't commit it):
+curl -fL --proto '=https' -o ../rds-global-bundle.pem \
+  https://truststore.pki.rds.amazonaws.com/global/global-bundle.pem
+aws ecr get-login-password --region us-east-1 \
+  | docker login --username AWS --password-stdin <account-id>.dkr.ecr.us-east-1.amazonaws.com
+docker build --platform=linux/amd64 --provenance=false \
+  -f ../Dockerfile --build-arg CLAUDE_BINARY=claude --build-arg GATEWAY_CONFIG=gateway.yaml \
+  -t <account-id>.dkr.ecr.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/claude-gateway:<version> ..
+docker push <account-id>.dkr.ecr.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/claude-gateway:<version>
+
+# 3. Full apply:
+terraform apply
+```
+
+Set in `terraform.tfvars`:
+
+- `region`, `vpc_id`, `private_subnet_ids`, `corporate_cidr`
+- `acm_certificate_arn` — the certificate for your internal gateway hostname
+  (`gateway.yaml`'s `public_url` host), served by the ALB's HTTPS listener
+- `image_tag` (after building/pushing — step 2 above). The repo enforces
+  **immutable tags**, so a `gateway.yaml` edit means a rebuild under a **new**
+  tag and an `image_tag` bump (`../setup.sh` automates this by tagging
+  `<version>-cfg<sha8-of-gateway.yaml>`)
+- **`oidc_client_secret`** — required (the ECS tasks inject `latest` of this
+  secret at start; with no version they fail with
+  `ResourceInitializationError`). Terraform creates the secret + version from it.
+
+## Tear down
+
+Tear down a trial with `terraform destroy`: set `deletion_protection = false`,
+run `terraform apply` to record that on RDS and the ALB (and to flip RDS to
+`skip_final_snapshot` — the provider checks the value in **state**, not config,
+so destroy would still refuse otherwise), then `terraform destroy`.
+
+The same switch drives the Secrets Manager recovery window: the three secrets
+have **fixed names**, and a secret deleted with the default 30-day recovery
+window keeps its name reserved — a later `terraform apply` would fail with a
+name conflict until the window elapses. With `deletion_protection = false` the
+destroy deletes them immediately (`recovery_window_in_days = 0`). If you
+destroyed a deployment that still had `deletion_protection = true` (or tore
+down an older copy of this module), clear the scheduled deletions before
+re-applying:
+
+```bash
+for s in gateway-postgres-url gateway-jwt-secret gateway-oidc-client-secret; do
+  aws secretsmanager delete-secret --secret-id "$s" --force-delete-without-recovery
+done
+```
+
+## Guard rails
+
+Tuned so accidental deletion is hard but greenfield teardown stays easy:
+
+- `deletion_protection = true` (variable, default true) on RDS and the ALB —
+  blocks accidental deletion; set `false` when you intend to `terraform destroy`.
+  The same switch controls RDS `skip_final_snapshot`, so a protected instance
+  always leaves a final snapshot.
+- ECR tags are **immutable** and **scanned on push** — a deployed tag can never
+  be silently re-pointed at different bytes. For production, also restrict push
+  rights on the repo to your CI / image-promotion pipeline rather than operator
+  credentials.
+- The IAM roles carry only the walkthrough's least-privilege documents: Bedrock
+  invoke on the Anthropic model ARNs (task role) and `secretsmanager:GetSecretValue`
+  on exactly the three secrets this module creates (by ARN) plus the AWS-managed
+  ECS execution policy (execution role). Inline policies are scoped to these
+  roles, so nothing else in the account is touched.
+- TLS everywhere it terminates: the ALB listener pins
+  `ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-2021-06` (no TLS 1.0/1.1), and the store
+  connection uses `sslmode=verify-full` against the RDS CA bundle baked into
+  the image, with `rds.force_ssl=1` enforcing TLS server-side.
+
+## Private access
+
+The ALB is **internal** with `ip_address_type = "ipv4"` (a dual-stack internal
+ALB publishes public-range AAAA records, which the CLI's `/login`
+private-network check rejects), and its security group admits only
+`corporate_cidr` on 443. Reaching it from on-prem requires your existing
+routing into the VPC (Direct Connect / VPN) — **operator / network-team-owned**
+plumbing this module does not create.
+
+After the apply, give developers a privately resolvable hostname: in a Route 53
+private hosted zone, alias the host of `gateway.yaml`'s `public_url` to the ALB
+(`alb_dns_name` / `alb_zone_id` outputs). The ALB's own `*.elb.amazonaws.com`
+name can't carry your ACM certificate, so use your own name.
+
+The tasks run in the private subnets with no public IP; all egress (Bedrock,
+the IdP, Secrets Manager, ECR, CloudWatch Logs) goes through the NAT gateway.
+To keep Bedrock traffic off the public path, create a `bedrock-runtime`
+interface VPC endpoint and point the upstream's `base_url` at it (see
+`../gateway.yaml.example`); the IdP still needs internet egress.
+
+## Remote state (recommended for teams)
+
+Add a backend so state is shared and locked (and out of git):
+
+```hcl
+# backend.tf
+terraform {
+  backend "s3" {
+    bucket       = "<your-tf-state-bucket>"
+    key          = "claude-gateway/ecs"
+    region       = "us-east-1"
+    use_lockfile = true # S3-native locking (Terraform >= 1.10); or set dynamodb_table
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## After deploy
+
+- `terraform output alb_dns_name` / `alb_zone_id` — create the Route 53 alias.
+- Register `<public_url>/oauth/callback` on the Okta OIDC web app and make sure
+  `../gateway.yaml` `public_url` matches the host you aliased.
+- Notes: Terraform does not build the image. To ship a new gateway version **or
+  a config edit**, rerun the docker build/push under a new tag and bump
+  `image_tag` — secrets-only rotations roll the service without a rebuild (the
+  task definition stamps a hash of the managed secret values), but a
+  `gateway.yaml` edit reaches the container only through the rebuilt image.

examples/gateway/aws/terraform/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,510 @@
+# Claude apps gateway on ECS Fargate — Terraform equivalent of setup.sh.
+# Section markers (§N) map to setup.sh and the walkthrough:
+# https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-on-aws
+#
+# Unlike the GCP example this module does NOT create the network — the VPC and
+# private subnets are walkthrough prerequisites, passed in as variables.
+
+data "aws_caller_identity" "current" {}
+data "aws_region" "current" {}
+
+# Read (not created) so a typo'd VPC or subnet ID fails the plan up front
+# instead of half-applying.
+data "aws_vpc" "this" {
+  id = var.vpc_id
+}
+
+data "aws_subnet" "private" {
+  for_each = toset(var.private_subnet_ids)
+  id       = each.value
+}
+
+locals {
+  config_path    = var.gateway_config_path != "" ? var.gateway_config_path : "${path.module}/../gateway.yaml"
+  gateway_config = file(local.config_path)
+  image          = "${aws_ecr_repository.repo.repository_url}:${var.image_tag}"
+}
+
+# ── 1 Security groups ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Three groups chain the traffic path: corp network -> ALB :443, ALB ->
+# gateway :8080, gateway -> Postgres :5432. Nothing else is reachable.
+# Rules are separate resources (not inline) so they never fight other tooling.
+resource "aws_security_group" "alb" {
+  name        = "claude-gateway-alb"
+  description = "Claude gateway ALB"
+  vpc_id      = var.vpc_id
+}
+
+resource "aws_security_group" "gateway" {
+  name        = "claude-gateway-svc"
+  description = "Claude gateway service"
+  vpc_id      = var.vpc_id
+}
+
+resource "aws_security_group" "db" {
+  name        = "claude-gateway-db"
+  description = "Claude gateway Postgres"
+  vpc_id      = var.vpc_id
+}
+
+resource "aws_vpc_security_group_ingress_rule" "alb_https" {
+  security_group_id = aws_security_group.alb.id
+  description       = "HTTPS from the corporate network"
+  ip_protocol       = "tcp"
+  from_port         = 443
+  to_port           = 443
+  cidr_ipv4         = var.corporate_cidr
+}
+
+resource "aws_vpc_security_group_ingress_rule" "gateway_from_alb" {
+  security_group_id            = aws_security_group.gateway.id
+  description                  = "Gateway port from the ALB"
+  ip_protocol                  = "tcp"
+  from_port                    = 8080
+  to_port                      = 8080
+  referenced_security_group_id = aws_security_group.alb.id
+}
+
+resource "aws_vpc_security_group_ingress_rule" "db_from_gateway" {
+  security_group_id            = aws_security_group.db.id
+  description                  = "Postgres from the gateway"
+  ip_protocol                  = "tcp"
+  from_port                    = 5432
+  to_port                      = 5432
+  referenced_security_group_id = aws_security_group.gateway.id
+}
+
+# Egress: the ALB only needs to reach its targets; the gateway needs the NAT
+# path out (Bedrock, the IdP, Secrets Manager, ECR, CloudWatch Logs) plus
+# Postgres. The DB group needs no egress (security groups are stateful).
+resource "aws_vpc_security_group_egress_rule" "alb_to_gateway" {
+  security_group_id            = aws_security_group.alb.id
+  description                  = "Health checks + forwarding to gateway tasks"
+  ip_protocol                  = "tcp"
+  from_port                    = 8080
+  to_port                      = 8080
+  referenced_security_group_id = aws_security_group.gateway.id
+}
+
+resource "aws_vpc_security_group_egress_rule" "gateway_all" {
+  security_group_id = aws_security_group.gateway.id
+  description       = "Egress to Bedrock, the IdP, Secrets Manager, ECR, CloudWatch Logs, Postgres"
+  ip_protocol       = "-1"
+  cidr_ipv4         = "0.0.0.0/0"
+}
+
+# ── 2 IAM roles (least-privilege) ───────────────────────────────────────────
+# Task role: the gateway's runtime identity. Its ONLY permission is invoking
+# Claude models on Bedrock — the upstream's `auth: {}` resolves to this role
+# via the AWS default credential chain. The policy must cover both the
+# cross-region inference-profile ARNs and the underlying foundation-model ARNs.
+data "aws_iam_policy_document" "ecs_trust" {
+  statement {
+    effect  = "Allow"
+    actions = ["sts:AssumeRole"]
+    principals {
+      type        = "Service"
+      identifiers = ["ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com"]
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+resource "aws_iam_role" "task" {
+  name               = var.task_role_name
+  assume_role_policy = data.aws_iam_policy_document.ecs_trust.json
+}
+
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "bedrock_invoke" {
+  name = "bedrock-invoke"
+  role = aws_iam_role.task.id
+  policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [{
+      Effect = "Allow"
+      Action = ["bedrock:InvokeModel", "bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream"]
+      Resource = [
+        "arn:aws:bedrock:${data.aws_region.current.region}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:inference-profile/us.anthropic.*",
+        "arn:aws:bedrock:*::foundation-model/anthropic.*",
+      ]
+    }]
+  })
+
+  # The walkthrough is scoped to commercial US regions: this policy and the
+  # gateway's built-in model catalog both use the us.anthropic.* geo-prefixed
+  # cross-region inference profiles, which only exist in the commercial US
+  # regions — an explicit list, not a `us-` prefix match, because GovCloud
+  # (us-gov-*) and ISO (us-iso-*) regions share the prefix but live in
+  # different AWS partitions where those profiles and this module's arn:aws:
+  # ARNs are wrong. Anywhere else the deploy provisions fine and then every
+  # model call fails. Other-region deploys must pin region-appropriate
+  # profiles via a models: block in gateway.yaml (see the config reference's
+  # models: guidance: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-config),
+  # widen the inference-profile ARN geo prefix above, and set
+  # allow_non_us_region = true.
+  lifecycle {
+    precondition {
+      condition     = var.allow_non_us_region || contains(["us-east-1", "us-east-2", "us-west-1", "us-west-2"], var.region)
+      error_message = "region is not a commercial US region (GovCloud/ISO share the us- prefix but are different partitions), and this module's IAM policy and the built-in model catalog use the US-geo (us.anthropic.*) inference profiles. Pin your region's inference profiles in a models: block in gateway.yaml, adjust the bedrock-invoke ARN prefix, then set allow_non_us_region = true."
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+# Execution role: the ECS agent's identity — pulls the image from ECR and
+# injects the Secrets Manager values into the container; the gateway never
+# uses it. AmazonECSTaskExecutionRolePolicy covers the ECR pull + awslogs;
+# the inline policy adds read on exactly the three secrets this module
+# creates — their full ARNs, not a name-prefix wildcard, so nothing else
+# in a shared account (present or future) is readable through this role.
+resource "aws_iam_role" "execution" {
+  name               = var.execution_role_name
+  assume_role_policy = data.aws_iam_policy_document.ecs_trust.json
+}
+
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "execution_managed" {
+  role       = aws_iam_role.execution.name
+  policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AmazonECSTaskExecutionRolePolicy"
+}
+
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "secrets_read" {
+  name = "read-gateway-secrets"
+  role = aws_iam_role.execution.id
+  policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [{
+      Effect = "Allow"
+      Action = "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue"
+      Resource = [
+        aws_secretsmanager_secret.jwt.arn,
+        aws_secretsmanager_secret.oidc.arn,
+        aws_secretsmanager_secret.postgres_url.arn,
+      ]
+    }]
+  })
+}
+
+# ── 6 ECR repository ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# NOTE: image build/push is a separate step (see README) — Terraform only makes
+# the repo. IMMUTABLE tags + scan-on-push: the ECS service pulls whatever this
+# repo serves under the deployed tag, so a pushed tag must never be silently
+# re-pointed. For production, also restrict push rights on this repo to your
+# CI / image-promotion pipeline rather than operator credentials.
+resource "aws_ecr_repository" "repo" {
+  name                 = var.ecr_repo
+  image_tag_mutability = "IMMUTABLE"
+  image_scanning_configuration {
+    scan_on_push = true
+  }
+}
+
+# ── 3 RDS for PostgreSQL (private subnets, no public address) ───────────────
+resource "aws_db_subnet_group" "db" {
+  name        = var.db_instance
+  description = "Claude gateway"
+  subnet_ids  = var.private_subnet_ids
+}
+
+# rds.force_ssl: reject plaintext connections server-side — the client-side
+# counterpart is sslmode=verify-full in the connection string (§5). The family
+# tracks the major version in var.db_engine_version.
+#
+# name_prefix + create_before_destroy: a major engine bump changes `family`,
+# which forces replacement — with a static name that deadlocks (the new group
+# can't be created under the taken name; the old can't be destroyed while the
+# live instance uses it: "parameter group is currently in use"). With this
+# shape the replacement group gets a fresh unique name, the instance is
+# repointed, then the old group is destroyed. (The subnet group above needs
+# neither: subnet_ids update in place and an engine bump never touches it.)
+resource "aws_db_parameter_group" "db" {
+  name_prefix = "${var.db_instance}-"
+  family      = "postgres${split(".", var.db_engine_version)[0]}"
+  description = "Claude gateway - require TLS on every connection"
+
+  parameter {
+    name  = "rds.force_ssl"
+    value = "1"
+  }
+
+  lifecycle {
+    create_before_destroy = true
+  }
+}
+
+# URL-safe (alphanumeric) so it drops cleanly into the connection string.
+# nosemgrep: terraform-generic-secrets-in-state -- secrets in tfstate are inherent to TF; mitigated by the documented remote S3 backend (see README "Remote state")
+resource "random_password" "db" {
+  length  = 32
+  special = false
+}
+
+# nosemgrep: terraform-aws-secrets-in-state -- secrets in tfstate are inherent to TF; mitigated by the documented remote S3 backend (see README "Remote state")
+resource "aws_db_instance" "db" {
+  identifier            = var.db_instance
+  engine                = "postgres"
+  engine_version        = var.db_engine_version
+  instance_class        = var.db_instance_class
+  allocated_storage     = var.db_allocated_storage
+  db_name               = var.db_name
+  username              = var.db_user
+  password              = random_password.db.result
+  db_subnet_group_name  = aws_db_subnet_group.db.name
+  parameter_group_name  = aws_db_parameter_group.db.name
+  vpc_security_group_ids = [aws_security_group.db.id]
+  publicly_accessible   = false
+  storage_encrypted     = true
+  deletion_protection   = var.deletion_protection
+  # Greenfield teardown: skip the final snapshot only once deletion protection
+  # is deliberately turned off (the same switch — see README "Tear down").
+  skip_final_snapshot       = !var.deletion_protection
+  final_snapshot_identifier = "${var.db_instance}-final"
+}
+
+# ── 5 Secrets Manager ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# postgres-url: connection string built from the instance's private endpoint.
+# The execution role's policy (§2) grants read on these three secrets' ARNs
+# and nothing else.
+#
+# recovery_window_in_days rides the same switch as skip_final_snapshot: the
+# secrets have fixed names, so a destroy that leaves them in the default
+# 30-day scheduled-deletion state makes the next apply fail with a name
+# conflict. Greenfield teardown (deletion_protection = false) deletes them
+# immediately; a protected deployment keeps the 30-day recovery window.
+resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret" "postgres_url" {
+  name                    = var.secret_name
+  recovery_window_in_days = var.deletion_protection ? 30 : 0
+}
+
+# sslmode=verify-full: the gateway's driver (Bun.SQL) honors sslmode from the
+# URL and verifies the server certificate chain AND hostname. The trust anchor
+# is the AWS RDS CA bundle baked into the image at /etc/claude/rds-global-bundle.pem
+# and loaded via NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS (see ../Dockerfile) — do NOT add a
+# libpq-style `sslrootcert=` query param: the driver doesn't read it and
+# forwards it to Postgres as a startup parameter, which the server rejects.
+# nosemgrep: terraform-aws-secrets-in-state -- secrets in tfstate are inherent to TF; mitigated by the documented remote S3 backend (see README "Remote state")
+resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret_version" "postgres_url" {
+  secret_id     = aws_secretsmanager_secret.postgres_url.id
+  secret_string = "postgres://${var.db_user}:${random_password.db.result}@${aws_db_instance.db.address}:5432/${var.db_name}?sslmode=verify-full"
+}
+
+# jwt: session signing key.
+# nosemgrep: terraform-generic-secrets-in-state -- secrets in tfstate are inherent to TF; mitigated by the documented remote S3 backend (see README "Remote state")
+resource "random_password" "jwt" {
+  length  = 48
+  special = false
+}
+
+resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret" "jwt" {
+  name                    = var.jwt_secret_name
+  recovery_window_in_days = var.deletion_protection ? 30 : 0 # see postgres_url
+}
+
+# nosemgrep: terraform-aws-secrets-in-state -- secrets in tfstate are inherent to TF; mitigated by the documented remote S3 backend (see README "Remote state")
+resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret_version" "jwt" {
+  secret_id     = aws_secretsmanager_secret.jwt.id
+  secret_string = random_password.jwt.result
+}
+
+# oidc client secret: operator-provided (from the Okta OIDC web app).
+resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret" "oidc" {
+  name                    = var.oidc_secret_name
+  recovery_window_in_days = var.deletion_protection ? 30 : 0 # see postgres_url
+}
+
+# nosemgrep: terraform-aws-secrets-in-state -- secrets in tfstate are inherent to TF; mitigated by the documented remote S3 backend (see README "Remote state")
+resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret_version" "oidc" {
+  count         = var.oidc_client_secret != "" ? 1 : 0
+  secret_id     = aws_secretsmanager_secret.oidc.id
+  secret_string = var.oidc_client_secret
+}
+
+# Warn (not block) at plan time when the OIDC secret value isn't set: the task
+# definition references the secret unconditionally, so an empty value with no
+# out-of-band version means the tasks fail to start late, at container init
+# (ResourceInitializationError). A warning (not a precondition) keeps the
+# documented out-of-band-version mode usable.
+check "oidc_client_secret_set" {
+  assert {
+    condition     = var.oidc_client_secret != ""
+    error_message = "oidc_client_secret is empty — set it in terraform.tfvars, or add a version to the gateway-oidc-client-secret secret out-of-band before applying (the ECS tasks inject it at start and will fail without one)."
+  }
+}
+
+# ── 7 ECS Fargate service + internal ALB ────────────────────────────────────
+resource "aws_ecs_cluster" "cluster" {
+  name = var.cluster_name
+}
+
+# The gateway's stderr carries both its audit events and operational logs.
+# Bounded retention — without it the group keeps logs forever and cost grows
+# unbounded; the default (90 days) is sized for audit-trail review windows.
+resource "aws_cloudwatch_log_group" "gateway" {
+  name              = var.log_group_name
+  retention_in_days = var.log_retention_days
+}
+
+# Task definition. gateway.yaml ships INSIDE the image (unlike the GCP example,
+# which mounts it from Secret Manager), so Terraform reads ../gateway.yaml only
+# to (a) enforce the no-REPLACE_ME guard before a deploy and (b) stamp a hash
+# of the config + every managed secret value into the container environment —
+# secrets are injected at task start, so rotating one (tainting
+# random_password.db ALTERs the DB password; a new oidc_client_secret) would
+# otherwise leave running tasks on stale values with nothing forcing a roll.
+# NOTE the hash only forces a roll; a config EDIT still reaches the container
+# only via a rebuilt image — push under a new tag (the repo enforces
+# immutability) and bump image_tag, or the roll redeploys the old config.
+resource "aws_ecs_task_definition" "gateway" {
+  family                   = var.service_name
+  network_mode             = "awsvpc"
+  requires_compatibilities = ["FARGATE"]
+  cpu                      = tostring(var.task_cpu)
+  memory                   = tostring(var.task_memory)
+  execution_role_arn       = aws_iam_role.execution.arn
+  task_role_arn            = aws_iam_role.task.arn
+
+  runtime_platform {
+    cpu_architecture        = "X86_64" # build the image linux/amd64; ARM64 for Graviton (see ../Dockerfile)
+    operating_system_family = "LINUX"
+  }
+
+  container_definitions = jsonencode([
+    {
+      name  = "gateway"
+      image = local.image
+      portMappings = [{ containerPort = 8080 }]
+      environment = [
+        {
+          name = "GATEWAY_CONFIG_SHA"
+          value = substr(sha256(join("", [
+            local.gateway_config,
+            random_password.db.result,
+            random_password.jwt.result,
+            var.oidc_client_secret,
+          ])), 0, 16)
+        },
+      ]
+      secrets = [
+        { name = "GATEWAY_JWT_SECRET", valueFrom = aws_secretsmanager_secret.jwt.arn },
+        { name = "OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET", valueFrom = aws_secretsmanager_secret.oidc.arn },
+        { name = "GATEWAY_POSTGRES_URL", valueFrom = aws_secretsmanager_secret.postgres_url.arn },
+      ]
+      logConfiguration = {
+        logDriver = "awslogs"
+        options = {
+          awslogs-group         = aws_cloudwatch_log_group.gateway.name
+          awslogs-region        = data.aws_region.current.region
+          awslogs-stream-prefix = "gateway"
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  ])
+
+  # Guard mirrors setup.sh's REPLACE_ME check (non-comment lines): the config
+  # is baked into the image this task definition deploys, so a half-filled
+  # gateway.yaml at apply time means the pushed image is half-filled too.
+  lifecycle {
+    precondition {
+      condition = length([
+        for line in split("\n", local.gateway_config) :
+        line
+        if !startswith(trimspace(line), "#") && strcontains(line, "REPLACE_ME")
+      ]) == 0
+      error_message = "gateway.yaml still has REPLACE_ME on a non-comment line — fill it in (and rebuild/push the image) before applying."
+    }
+  }
+
+  depends_on = [
+    aws_secretsmanager_secret_version.postgres_url,
+    aws_secretsmanager_secret_version.jwt,
+  ]
+}
+
+# Internal ALB. ip_address_type ipv4: an internal dual-stack ALB publishes
+# public-range AAAA records, which the CLI's /login private-network check
+# rejects. idle_timeout 3600: the 60-second default closes a streaming
+# response at the first quiet period (long prompt processing before the first
+# token, extended thinking with no streamed output).
+resource "aws_lb" "gateway" {
+  name                       = var.service_name
+  internal                   = true
+  load_balancer_type         = "application"
+  ip_address_type            = "ipv4"
+  subnets                    = var.private_subnet_ids
+  security_groups            = [aws_security_group.alb.id]
+  idle_timeout               = 3600
+  enable_deletion_protection = var.deletion_protection
+}
+
+# /readyz verifies the store is reachable, so a task that can't reach Postgres
+# never enters rotation (the gateway also serves liveness-only /healthz — see
+# the deploy guide's outage-behavior tradeoff).
+resource "aws_lb_target_group" "gateway" {
+  name        = var.service_name
+  protocol    = "HTTP"
+  port        = 8080
+  vpc_id      = var.vpc_id
+  target_type = "ip"
+
+  health_check {
+    path = "/readyz"
+  }
+}
+
+resource "aws_lb_listener" "https" {
+  load_balancer_arn = aws_lb.gateway.arn
+  protocol          = "HTTPS"
+  port              = 443
+  # Explicit modern policy — omitting ssl_policy falls back to the legacy
+  # ELBSecurityPolicy-2016-08 default, which still accepts TLS 1.0/1.1.
+  ssl_policy      = "ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-2021-06"
+  certificate_arn = var.acm_certificate_arn
+
+  default_action {
+    type             = "forward"
+    target_group_arn = aws_lb_target_group.gateway.arn
+  }
+}
+
+resource "aws_ecs_service" "gateway" {
+  name            = var.service_name
+  cluster         = aws_ecs_cluster.cluster.id
+  task_definition = aws_ecs_task_definition.gateway.arn
+  desired_count   = var.desired_count
+  launch_type     = "FARGATE"
+
+  # Stop a rollout whose tasks keep failing (bad image, unbootable config) and
+  # roll back to the last steady state instead of relaunching failing tasks
+  # forever.
+  deployment_circuit_breaker {
+    enable   = true
+    rollback = true
+  }
+
+  network_configuration {
+    subnets         = var.private_subnet_ids
+    security_groups = [aws_security_group.gateway.id]
+    # All egress (Bedrock, the IdP, Secrets Manager, ECR, CloudWatch Logs)
+    # goes through the NAT gateway — tasks get no public IP.
+    assign_public_ip = false
+  }
+
+  load_balancer {
+    target_group_arn = aws_lb_target_group.gateway.arn
+    container_name   = "gateway"
+    container_port   = 8080
+  }
+
+  # Tasks register with the ALB at start — give a cold task (image pull +
+  # store connect + first /readyz) time before ECS replaces it as unhealthy.
+  health_check_grace_period_seconds = 60
+
+  # The listener must exist before targets register; the secrets must be
+  # readable before the first task starts.
+  depends_on = [
+    aws_lb_listener.https,
+    aws_iam_role_policy.secrets_read,
+    aws_iam_role_policy_attachment.execution_managed,
+    aws_secretsmanager_secret_version.postgres_url,
+    aws_secretsmanager_secret_version.jwt,
+    aws_secretsmanager_secret_version.oidc,
+    aws_db_instance.db,
+  ]
+}

examples/gateway/aws/terraform/outputs.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+output "alb_dns_name" {
+  description = "Internal ALB DNS name. Alias your gateway hostname (the host in gateway.yaml's public_url) to this in a Route 53 private hosted zone — the *.elb.amazonaws.com name itself can't carry your ACM certificate."
+  value       = aws_lb.gateway.dns_name
+}
+
+output "alb_zone_id" {
+  description = "ALB hosted zone ID, for the Route 53 alias record."
+  value       = aws_lb.gateway.zone_id
+}
+
+output "image" {
+  description = "Image the service runs (build/push this separately — see README)."
+  value       = local.image
+}
+
+output "ecr_repository_url" {
+  description = "ECR repository URL to push the gateway image to."
+  value       = aws_ecr_repository.repo.repository_url
+}
+
+output "task_role_arn" {
+  description = "Gateway runtime task role (Bedrock invoke)."
+  value       = aws_iam_role.task.arn
+}
+
+output "execution_role_arn" {
+  description = "ECS execution role (image pull + secret injection)."
+  value       = aws_iam_role.execution.arn
+}
+
+output "db_endpoint" {
+  description = "RDS private endpoint (host only; the connection string lives in the gateway-postgres-url secret)."
+  value       = aws_db_instance.db.address
+}

examples/gateway/aws/terraform/terraform.tfvars.example

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Copy to terraform.tfvars and edit. terraform.tfvars is gitignored (see .gitignore).
+
+region = "us-east-1" # a region where Bedrock serves the Claude models you need
+
+# Prerequisite networking (NOT created by this module): the VPC and two+ private
+# subnets in different AZs with outbound internet via a NAT gateway.
+vpc_id             = "vpc-..."
+private_subnet_ids = ["subnet-...a", "subnet-...b"]
+
+# The only source the ALB admits on 443. Must not overlap the private subnets
+# above — hosts in the ALB subnets are trusted_proxies (gateway.yaml) and could
+# spoof client IPs via X-Forwarded-For.
+corporate_cidr = "10.0.0.0/8"
+
+# ACM certificate for your internal gateway hostname (the host in gateway.yaml's
+# public_url), imported or issued by AWS Private CA.
+acm_certificate_arn = "arn:aws:acm:..."
+
+image_tag = "<version>" # REQUIRED — the tag you build and push as linux/amd64 with
+                        # gateway.yaml baked in (setup.sh tags <version>-cfg<sha8>;
+                        # see README Deploy)
+
+# Okta OIDC client secret: REQUIRED — uncomment and set it (Terraform creates the
+# secret version; the ECS tasks inject `gateway-oidc-client-secret` at start, so
+# without a version they fail with ResourceInitializationError). Leave empty only
+# if you add the secret version out-of-band.
+# oidc_client_secret = "..."

examples/gateway/aws/terraform/variables.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+# Inputs — mirror the env-overridable knobs in setup.sh (same defaults).
+
+variable "region" {
+  description = "AWS region for everything this module creates. Pick one where Bedrock serves the Claude models you need. (The Bedrock region the gateway calls is set separately inside gateway.yaml — keep the two equal.) The walkthrough is scoped to the commercial US regions (us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-1/us-west-2 — GovCloud and ISO regions are different partitions); see allow_non_us_region."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "us-east-1"
+}
+
+variable "allow_non_us_region" {
+  description = "The bedrock-invoke IAM policy and the gateway's built-in model catalog use the US-geo (us.anthropic.*) cross-region inference profiles, so any region outside the commercial US four (including GovCloud/ISO, which are different partitions) fails a plan-time precondition. Set true ONLY after pinning region-appropriate inference profiles via a models: block in gateway.yaml (see the config reference) and widening the ARN geo prefix in main.tf's bedrock-invoke policy."
+  type        = bool
+  default     = false
+}
+
+# ── Networking inputs (prerequisites — NOT created here) ────────────────────
+variable "vpc_id" {
+  description = "Existing VPC ID (the walkthrough's prerequisite VPC). Unlike the GCP example, this module does not create the network."
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "private_subnet_ids" {
+  description = "Two+ private subnet IDs in different AZs, with outbound internet via a NAT gateway. The internal ALB, the ECS tasks, and the RDS subnet group all attach here."
+  type        = list(string)
+  validation {
+    condition     = length(var.private_subnet_ids) >= 2
+    error_message = "private_subnet_ids needs at least two subnets in different AZs (the internal ALB requires two)."
+  }
+}
+
+variable "corporate_cidr" {
+  description = "Your corporate network CIDR — the only source the ALB security group admits on 443. Must not overlap private_subnet_ids: hosts there are trusted_proxies (gateway.yaml) and could spoof client IPs via X-Forwarded-For."
+  type        = string
+}
+
+# ── IAM (§2) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+variable "task_role_name" {
+  description = "ECS task role name (the gateway's runtime identity; its only permission is Bedrock invoke)."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "claude-gateway-task"
+}
+
+variable "execution_role_name" {
+  description = "ECS execution role name (the ECS agent's identity: pulls the image, injects the secrets)."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "claude-gateway-execution"
+}
+
+# ── Image (§6) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Terraform creates the ECR repository but does NOT build/push the image (that's
+# a docker build step — see README). It references the image by tag.
+variable "ecr_repo" {
+  description = "ECR repository name."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "claude-gateway"
+}
+
+variable "image_tag" {
+  description = "Image tag — the tag you built and pushed (must already exist in the repo as linux/amd64, with gateway.yaml baked in). setup.sh tags as <version>-cfg<sha8 of gateway.yaml>; see the README Deploy section for the build command."
+  type        = string
+  validation {
+    condition     = can(regex("^[A-Za-z0-9_][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}$", var.image_tag))
+    error_message = "image_tag must be a valid OCI tag — set it to the tag you pushed (the '<version>' in terraform.tfvars.example is a placeholder)."
+  }
+}
+
+variable "gateway_config_path" {
+  description = "Path to gateway.yaml. Empty = ../gateway.yaml relative to this module. Read for the REPLACE_ME guard and the config-sha that rolls the service; the file itself ships inside the image."
+  type        = string
+  default     = ""
+}
+
+# ── RDS (§3) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+variable "db_instance" {
+  description = "RDS instance identifier."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "claude-gateway-db"
+}
+
+variable "db_engine_version" {
+  description = "Postgres major version. The gateway supports PostgreSQL 14 or newer; 16 is the recommended default."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "16"
+}
+
+variable "db_instance_class" {
+  description = "RDS instance class."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "db.t4g.micro"
+}
+
+variable "db_allocated_storage" {
+  description = "RDS allocated storage in GiB."
+  type        = number
+  default     = 20
+}
+
+variable "db_name" {
+  description = "Database name."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "claude_gateway"
+}
+
+variable "db_user" {
+  description = "Database master user (the gateway connects as this role)."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "gateway"
+}
+
+# ── Secrets (§5) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# The execution role's secrets-read policy grants read on exactly these three
+# secrets' ARNs, so renames are picked up automatically on the next apply.
+variable "secret_name" {
+  description = "Secrets Manager secret holding the Postgres connection string."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "gateway-postgres-url"
+}
+
+variable "jwt_secret_name" {
+  description = "Secrets Manager secret holding the session JWT signing key."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "gateway-jwt-secret"
+}
+
+variable "oidc_secret_name" {
+  description = "Secrets Manager secret holding the Okta OIDC client secret."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "gateway-oidc-client-secret"
+}
+
+variable "oidc_client_secret" {
+  description = "Okta OIDC client secret value. Leave empty to NOT manage the version via Terraform (only if you add the secret version out-of-band — without one the tasks fail to start)."
+  type        = string
+  default     = ""
+  sensitive   = true
+}
+
+# ── ECS + ALB (§7) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+variable "cluster_name" {
+  description = "ECS cluster name."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "claude-gateway"
+}
+
+variable "service_name" {
+  description = "ECS service name (also used for the ALB and target group)."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "claude-gateway"
+}
+
+variable "log_group_name" {
+  description = "CloudWatch Logs group for the gateway's stderr (audit events + operational logs)."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "/ecs/claude-gateway"
+}
+
+variable "log_retention_days" {
+  description = "CloudWatch Logs retention in days. The group carries the gateway's audit events, so align with your audit retention policy."
+  type        = number
+  default     = 90
+}
+
+variable "acm_certificate_arn" {
+  description = "ACM certificate ARN for the internal gateway hostname (the host in gateway.yaml's public_url), served by the ALB's HTTPS listener."
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "task_cpu" {
+  description = "Fargate task CPU units."
+  type        = number
+  default     = 1024
+}
+
+variable "task_memory" {
+  description = "Fargate task memory (MiB)."
+  type        = number
+  default     = 2048
+}
+
+variable "desired_count" {
+  description = "ECS service desired task count. Each task opens a Postgres pool of up to 5 connections (the gateway's store.max_connections default) and db.t4g.micro caps at ~80 max_connections — keep desired_count × 5 below the DB class's limit, or raise the class before raising this."
+  type        = number
+  default     = 1
+}
+
+variable "deletion_protection" {
+  description = "Deletion protection on RDS and the ALB (and whether RDS skips the final snapshot on destroy). Keep true to avoid accidental deletion of the running deployment."
+  type        = bool
+  default     = true
+}

examples/gateway/aws/terraform/versions.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# Provider + version pins for the Claude apps gateway ECS Fargate deployment.
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.5"
+  required_providers {
+    aws = {
+      source  = "hashicorp/aws"
+      version = ">= 6.0, < 7.0" # 6.0 renames data.aws_region's attribute to `region`
+    }
+    random = {
+      source  = "hashicorp/random"
+      version = ">= 3.5"
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+provider "aws" {
+  region = var.region
+}

examples/gateway/gcp/.dockerignore

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# Keep the build context to just the binary the Dockerfile COPYs. BuildKit (the
+# default, selected via the Dockerfile's syntax directive) only syncs the
+# referenced COPY source anyway, so this is a no-op there — it matters for the
+# classic builder (DOCKER_BUILDKIT=0) and as a conventional signal that the
+# .gitignore'd secrets in this directory aren't part of the image build.
+terraform/
+**/.terraform/
+*.tfstate*
+terraform.tfvars
+gateway.yaml
+secrets/
+*.pem
+client_secret_*.json

examples/gateway/gcp/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# Local, environment-specific config — copy gateway.yaml.example -> gateway.yaml
+# (gateway.yaml.example IS committed; your filled-in gateway.yaml is not)
+gateway.yaml
+
+# Secrets / credentials — never commit
+secrets/
+client_secret_*.json
+*.pem
+
+# Release binary and pinned version — setup.sh downloads/writes these per release
+claude
+.claude-version

examples/gateway/gcp/Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1
+
+# Runtime image for `claude gateway`.
+#
+# This image does NOT build the binary. It expects a prebuilt native
+# linux-x64 `claude` executable in the build context — the public Claude Code
+# release binary, which includes the `gateway` subcommand. setup.sh places it
+# at ./claude (downloading it from the public release endpoint and verifying
+# it against the release manifest if missing). Override CLAUDE_BINARY to
+# point at a different path.
+#
+# Build (with the binary at ./claude; otherwise add --build-arg CLAUDE_BINARY=<path>):
+#   docker build --platform=linux/amd64 --provenance=false -t claude-gateway .
+#
+# Run:
+#   docker run --rm -p 8080:8080 \
+#     -v "$PWD/gateway.yaml:/etc/claude/gateway.yaml:ro" \
+#     -e OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET -e GATEWAY_JWT_SECRET -e GATEWAY_POSTGRES_URL \
+#     claude-gateway
+
+ARG CLAUDE_BINARY=./claude
+
+# distroless/cc provides glibc + libstdc++ (required by the Bun-compiled
+# native binary). The :nonroot tag runs as uid/gid 65532.
+FROM gcr.io/distroless/cc-debian12:nonroot
+
+ARG CLAUDE_BINARY
+COPY --chmod=0755 ${CLAUDE_BINARY} /usr/local/bin/claude
+
+ENV CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR=/tmp/.claude
+
+EXPOSE 8080
+USER nonroot
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/claude", "gateway", "--config", "/etc/claude/gateway.yaml"]

examples/gateway/gcp/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Claude Gateway on Google Cloud
+
+Reference deployment artifacts for running Claude Gateway on GCP with Agent
+Platform (formerly Vertex AI) as the upstream: Cloud Run or GKE, Cloud SQL for
+PostgreSQL, Secret Manager, and service-account auth to Agent Platform.
+
+These files are provided as a working example rather than a supported production
+deployment. Adapt them to your own environment.
+
+- **Walkthrough**: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-on-gcp
+
+| File | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| `setup.sh` | Scripts the walkthrough end to end via `gcloud` |
+| `Dockerfile` | Runtime image for the `claude gateway` binary |
+| `gateway.yaml.example` | Gateway config template, GCP-shaped (Agent Platform upstream, Google Workspace IdP) |
+| `terraform/` | Provisions the full architecture (two-pass apply — see `terraform/README.md`) |

examples/gateway/gcp/gateway.yaml.example

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+# gateway.yaml.example — Claude Gateway config template, GCP-shaped (walkthrough §6).
+#
+# Google Workspace IdP + Agent Platform (formerly Vertex AI) upstream, following
+# the walkthrough at https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-on-gcp.
+# The active sections
+# below are a strict subset of the full configuration reference at
+# https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway; optional keys are included
+# commented-out.
+#
+# USAGE — this is the shippable TEMPLATE. Copy it to gateway.yaml and fill it in:
+#     cp gateway.yaml.example gateway.yaml
+#   setup.sh and terraform/ read gateway.yaml (your filled-in copy, which is
+#   gitignored). It is published as the Secret Manager secret `gateway-config`
+#   (§6) and mounted at /etc/claude/gateway.yaml — the container ENTRYPOINT runs
+#   `claude gateway --config /etc/claude/gateway.yaml`.
+#
+# Secret expansion: ${ENV_VAR} reads an env var; ${file:/path} reads a mounted file.
+# On Cloud Run, setup.sh injects the JWT / OIDC / Postgres secrets as ENV VARS
+# (Cloud Run can't mount multiple secrets into a single directory), and mounts
+# only gateway.yaml itself as a file at /etc/claude. On GKE you may use file mounts.
+#
+# BEFORE DEPLOY — replace every REPLACE_ME placeholder below (setup.sh refuses to
+# publish the config secret while any remain), and create the referenced secrets:
+#   gateway-jwt-secret           (setup.sh generates this)
+#   gateway-oidc-client-secret   (from the Google Cloud Console OAuth client)
+#   gateway-postgres-url         (setup.sh generates this)
+
+# ── Listener ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+listen:
+  host: 0.0.0.0
+  port: 8080                      # Cloud Run sets PORT=8080; leave as-is
+  # Required. Fixes the IdP redirect_uri, the OIDC discovery doc, and the
+  # gateway-token issuer so none are derived from the client-controlled Host
+  # header (X-Forwarded-Host/-Proto are likewise never trusted). On Cloud Run
+  # the run.app URL is only assigned on the first deploy, so this starts as a
+  # placeholder for the provisioning-only first pass (login does NOT work until
+  # the real URL is set). After the first deploy, setup.sh prints the run.app
+  # URL: set it here (or your LB hostname) and re-run; setup.sh republishes the
+  # config and redeploys. Register the same host's /oauth/callback on the
+  # Google OAuth client.
+  public_url: https://set-after-first-deploy.invalid
+  # Register this exact redirect URI on the Google OAuth client:
+  #   https://<public_url host>/oauth/callback
+  #
+  # On Cloud Run (or behind any L7 LB) every request arrives via Google's front
+  # end, so the gateway sees one peer IP for all developers — set trusted_proxies
+  # so X-Forwarded-For from those proxies is trusted and per-IP rate limiting /
+  # audit IPs record the real client. 169.254.0.0/16 is Cloud Run's fixed
+  # link-local serving range; the proxy-only subnet is the one your internal ALB
+  # uses in this VPC.
+  # trusted_proxies:
+  #   - 169.254.0.0/16              # Cloud Run serving proxy (link-local peer)
+  #   - <proxy-only-subnet-cidr>    # add if fronted by your internal ALB (its proxy-only subnet)
+  #
+  # Alternative — terminate TLS in the gateway itself instead of at a proxy:
+  # tls:
+  #   cert: /certs/gateway.crt
+  #   key:  /certs/gateway.key
+
+# ── Identity provider — Google Workspace ─────────────────────────────────────
+oidc:
+  issuer: https://accounts.google.com
+  client_id: REPLACE_ME                              # Google OAuth client ID (not secret; from Cloud Console)
+  client_secret: ${OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET}
+  allowed_email_domains: [REPLACE_ME]                # e.g. [example.com] — reject id_tokens outside your org
+  # Google ignores the default offline_access scope; these two are what actually
+  # yield refresh tokens (silent renewal + the deprovision leash) from Google.
+  scopes: [openid, profile, email]
+  extra_auth_params: { access_type: offline, prompt: consent }
+  # NOTE: Google id_tokens carry NO groups claim. For group-based RBAC with
+  # Google as IdP, set `google_groups` (below) and the gateway fetches each
+  # user's Workspace groups at login via the Admin SDK Directory API.
+  # Otherwise, use email_domain matching (see managed.policies below).
+  # google_groups:
+  #   service_account_json_path: /secrets/google-sa.json  # SA with domain-wide delegation on admin.directory.group.readonly
+  #   admin_email: admin@example.com                       # a Workspace admin the SA impersonates
+  # groups_claim: groups          # Okta=groups, Entra app roles=roles — NOT Google
+  # ca_cert_pem: ${file:/secrets/idp-ca.pem}   # only for an IdP behind a private CA
+
+# ── Sessions ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+session:
+  jwt_secret: ${GATEWAY_JWT_SECRET}   # >= 32 bytes; openssl rand -base64 32
+  # Google issues refresh tokens (above), so sessions renew silently and this
+  # mainly bounds deprovision latency. 8 is a sane default; lower toward 1 for
+  # tighter revocation. Array form rotates keys: [new, old] (index 0 signs, all verify).
+  ttl_hours: 8
+
+# ── Store (REQUIRED — the gateway refuses to boot without it) ─────────────────
+store:
+  postgres_url: ${GATEWAY_POSTGRES_URL}   # private-IP Cloud SQL; built with ?sslmode=require by setup.sh
+
+# ── Upstreams — Agent Platform ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+upstreams:
+  - provider: vertex
+    region: us-east5              # a region where the Claude models you need are published in Model Garden
+    project_id: REPLACE_ME        # your GCP project ID for Agent Platform access
+    auth: {}                      # ADC via Cloud Run SA / GKE Workload Identity (preferred — no static keys)
+    # base_url: https://us-east5-aiplatform.p.googleapis.com   # Private Service Connect endpoint
+  # Add more upstreams for failover (tried top→bottom on 5xx/timeout/501): a
+  # second region, or an anthropic/bedrock fallback. See
+  # https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway.
+
+# ── Telemetry fan-out (OPTIONAL) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+# The CLI sends OTLP/HTTP to the gateway; the gateway fans out, stamping
+# user.id/user.email/user.groups server-side. On GCP, point at an OpenTelemetry
+# Collector with the googlecloud exporter (-> Cloud Trace / Managed Prometheus).
+# Takes effect after the second pass (once public_url is the real URL, not the
+# placeholder): when forward_to and public_url are both configured the gateway pushes
+# CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_TELEMETRY and the OTEL exporter selectors to every client
+# automatically — no per-developer config needed.
+# telemetry:
+#   forward_to:
+#     - url: https://otel-collector.internal.example.com:4318
+#       headers:
+#         Authorization: ${file:/secrets/otlp-token}
+#       metrics: true     # safe aggregate counters (default)
+#       logs: false       # carries bash commands / tool inputs — opt in deliberately
+#       traces: false
+
+# ── RBAC + managed settings (OPTIONAL; first-match-wins, top -> bottom) ───────
+# With Google as IdP, match on email_domain, or on group email addresses
+# (e.g. eng@example.com) once oidc.google_groups is configured above.
+# managed:
+#   policies:
+#     - match: { email_domain: example.com }
+#       cli:
+#         availableModels: [claude-opus-4-8, claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-haiku-4-5]
+#         permissions: { deny: ["Read(./.env)", "Read(./secrets/**)"] }
+#     - match: {}        # catch-all floor — keep LAST
+#       cli:
+#         availableModels: [claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-haiku-4-5]
+
+# ── Admin API (OPTIONAL — enables db-mode runtime config + spend caps) ───────
+# admin_groups needs a groups claim — with Google as IdP, set
+# oidc.google_groups (above) so Workspace group email addresses populate the
+# claim, or use the bootstrap keys below instead. Named keys for
+# attribution in the audit log; 32-char minimum on key values. On Cloud Run add
+# these as env vars to --set-secrets (or terraform env value_source blocks),
+# same as the JWT/OIDC/Postgres secrets above; on GKE you may use ${file:...}.
+# admin:
+#   write_keys:
+#     - id: terraform
+#       key: ${GATEWAY_ADMIN_WRITE_KEY}
+#   read_keys:
+#     - id: reporting
+#       key: ${GATEWAY_ADMIN_READ_KEY}
+#   # admin_groups: [platform-finops@example.com]   # group emails via oidc.google_groups, or any groups-capable IdP
+
+# ── Model catalog (OPTIONAL) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Default true: every built-in Claude model is exposed and auto-translated per
+# upstream. Set false + a models: list to pin IDs (e.g. provisioned throughput).
+# auto_include_builtin_models: true
+# models:
+#   - id: claude-opus-4-8
+#     label: Claude Opus 4.8
+#     upstream_model: { vertex: claude-opus-4-8 }

examples/gateway/gcp/setup.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,558 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# setup.sh — GCP setup for Claude Gateway (walkthrough §1–7b).
+#
+# Provisions, in doc order: APIs (§1), service account + IAM (§2), the gateway
+# container image in Artifact Registry (§3), a Cloud SQL (PostgreSQL) backend
+# with PRIVATE IP only (§4), the JWT + postgres-url secrets (§5), the
+# gateway.yaml config secret (§6), and a Cloud Run deploy with Direct VPC
+# egress (§7b).
+#
+# Private IP is required because public IP is disallowed by the org-policy constraint
+# `constraints/sql.restrictPublicIp`. A Cloud SQL private IP is an address inside a VPC,
+# so §4 here also provisions the prerequisite VPC + Private Services Access — the
+# one-time, irreducible networking required for private IP.
+#
+#   Section markers (§N) below map to the walkthrough:
+#   https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-on-gcp
+#
+# Covers here:  APIs (§1) -> service account + IAM (§2) -> build & push image (§3)
+#               -> VPC + Private Services Access -> Cloud SQL (private IP only) -> database
+#               + user (§4) -> jwt + postgres-url secrets (§5) -> gateway-config
+#               secret from gateway.yaml (§6) -> Cloud Run deploy (§7b).
+# Not covered:  GKE track (§7a) — Cloud Run is the lower-friction path here.
+#
+# Idempotent: existing resources are detected and skipped, so it is safe to re-run.
+# Override any default below via environment variable, e.g. `REGION=us-east5 ./setup.sh`.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# ---- configuration (env-overridable) ----------------------------------------
+PROJECT_ID="${PROJECT_ID:-$(gcloud config get-value project 2>/dev/null)}"
+REGION="${REGION:-${CLOUDSDK_COMPUTE_REGION:-us-east5}}"   # guide §1 uses us-east5 (Agent Platform model region)
+
+SA_NAME="${SA_NAME:-claude-gateway}"                       # §2 service account
+SA_EMAIL="${SA_NAME}@${PROJECT_ID}.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
+
+# §3 image
+AR_REPO="${AR_REPO:-claude-gateway}"                       # Artifact Registry repository
+IMAGE_NAME="${IMAGE_NAME:-gateway}"
+RELEASES_URL="${RELEASES_URL:-https://downloads.claude.ai/claude-code-releases}"   # public Claude Code release endpoint
+VERSION="${VERSION:-}"                                     # Claude Code release to deploy; empty = latest release (resolved below)
+VERSION_FILE="${VERSION_FILE:-./.claude-version}"          # pins the resolved release across re-runs; delete it (or set VERSION) to upgrade
+DOCKERFILE="${DOCKERFILE:-./Dockerfile}"
+CLAUDE_BINARY="${CLAUDE_BINARY:-./claude}"                 # linux-x64 Claude Code binary; downloaded from RELEASES_URL if missing
+CLAUDE_SHA256="${CLAUDE_SHA256:-}"                         # optional: out-of-band sha256 pin for the downloaded binary, checked in addition to the release manifest
+
+VPC_NETWORK="${VPC_NETWORK:-cc-gateway-vpc}"
+SUBNET="${SUBNET:-cc-gateway-subnet}"
+SUBNET_RANGE="${SUBNET_RANGE:-10.0.0.0/24}"
+
+PSA_RANGE_NAME="${PSA_RANGE_NAME:-google-managed-services-${VPC_NETWORK}}"
+PSA_PREFIX_LENGTH="${PSA_PREFIX_LENGTH:-16}"               # /16 is GCP's recommendation; reserved, not consumed
+
+DB_INSTANCE="${DB_INSTANCE:-claude-gateway-db}"
+DB_VERSION="${DB_VERSION:-POSTGRES_16}"   # PG14+ supported; 16 is the recommended default (§4)
+DB_TIER="${DB_TIER:-db-g1-small}"
+DB_NAME="${DB_NAME:-claude_gateway}"
+DB_USER="${DB_USER:-gateway}"
+
+SECRET_NAME="${SECRET_NAME:-gateway-postgres-url}"         # §5 store.postgres_url
+JWT_SECRET_NAME="${JWT_SECRET_NAME:-gateway-jwt-secret}"   # §5 session.jwt_secret
+
+GATEWAY_YAML="${GATEWAY_YAML:-./gateway.yaml}"             # §6 config file
+CONFIG_SECRET="${CONFIG_SECRET:-gateway-config}"           # §6 mounted at /etc/claude/gateway.yaml
+
+# §7 Cloud Run deploy
+SERVICE_NAME="${SERVICE_NAME:-claude-gateway}"
+OIDC_SECRET_NAME="${OIDC_SECRET_NAME:-gateway-oidc-client-secret}"   # operator-created (Google OAuth client)
+DEPLOY="${DEPLOY:-1}"                                      # set DEPLOY=0 to provision only, no Cloud Run deploy
+INGRESS="${INGRESS:-internal}"                             # internal (default; no public URL) | internal-and-cloud-load-balancing (only if you front it with your own internal ALB)
+MAX_INSTANCES="${MAX_INSTANCES:-8}"                        # keep MAX_INSTANCES × store.max_connections (default 5) below the DB tier's max_connections (~50 on db-g1-small); raise the tier before raising this
+
+# ---- helpers ----------------------------------------------------------------
+log()  { printf '\n==> %s\n' "$*"; }
+skip() { printf '    (exists) %s\n' "$*"; }
+curl_https() { curl --proto '=https' --proto-redir '=https' --tlsv1.2 "$@"; }  # refuse plaintext/protocol-downgrade
+sha_of() { openssl dgst -sha256 "$1" | awk '{print $NF}'; }  # openssl avoids shasum/sha256sum portability gaps
+
+if [[ -z "${PROJECT_ID}" ]]; then
+  echo "ERROR: PROJECT_ID is not set and no gcloud default project is configured." >&2
+  echo "       Set it with: export PROJECT_ID=<your-project>   (or 'gcloud config set project ...')" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+# VERSION tags the image and selects the public Claude Code release to download.
+# The first resolved value is pinned to ${VERSION_FILE} so the documented
+# re-runs (fill gateway.yaml -> re-run; set public_url -> re-run) don't silently
+# build and deploy a newer release mid-bootstrap.
+if [[ -z "${VERSION}" && -f "${VERSION_FILE}" ]]; then
+  VERSION="$(< "${VERSION_FILE}")"
+  log "Using release pinned in ${VERSION_FILE}: ${VERSION}   (delete the file or set VERSION to change it)"
+elif [[ -z "${VERSION}" ]]; then
+  # /latest is the channel the official installer (claude.ai/install.sh) uses.
+  VERSION="$(curl_https -fsSL "${RELEASES_URL}/latest" | tr -d '[:space:]' || true)"
+  if [[ -z "${VERSION}" ]]; then
+    echo "ERROR: could not resolve the latest release from ${RELEASES_URL}/latest." >&2
+    echo "       Set VERSION to a Claude Code release version, e.g. export VERSION=2.1.195" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  log "VERSION not set — using latest Claude Code release: ${VERSION}"
+fi
+# Reject non-version content (e.g. an HTML error page served with HTTP 200)
+# before it reaches the image tag and download URLs.
+if [[ ! "${VERSION}" =~ ^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+ ]]; then
+  echo "ERROR: '${VERSION}' is not a release version (from VERSION, ${VERSION_FILE}, or ${RELEASES_URL}/latest)." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+printf '%s' "${VERSION}" > "${VERSION_FILE}"
+IMAGE="${REGION}-docker.pkg.dev/${PROJECT_ID}/${AR_REPO}/${IMAGE_NAME}:${VERSION}"
+# Claude Code only connects to a gateway whose hostname resolves to private
+# addresses (a client-side /login check), so public ingress can never serve
+# clients — mirror the terraform module's validation and refuse it up front.
+if [[ "${INGRESS}" != "internal" && "${INGRESS}" != "internal-and-cloud-load-balancing" ]]; then
+  echo "ERROR: INGRESS must be 'internal' or 'internal-and-cloud-load-balancing' — Claude Code's" >&2
+  echo "       /login only accepts gateway hosts on private addresses, so public ingress cannot serve clients." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+log "Project: ${PROJECT_ID}   Region: ${REGION}   VPC: ${VPC_NETWORK}"
+
+# ---- 1 Project & API setup ------------------------------------------------
+# walkthrough §1 list (aiplatform, artifactregistry, sqladmin, secretmanager, iamcredentials)
+# plus iam/compute/servicenetworking required for the SA + private-IP networking below.
+# container.googleapis.com is for the GKE track (§7a) — harmless if you stay on Cloud Run.
+# We pass --project on every call rather than mutating your gcloud config.
+log "Enabling required APIs (§1)"
+gcloud services enable \
+  aiplatform.googleapis.com \
+  artifactregistry.googleapis.com \
+  sqladmin.googleapis.com \
+  secretmanager.googleapis.com \
+  iamcredentials.googleapis.com \
+  iam.googleapis.com \
+  compute.googleapis.com \
+  container.googleapis.com \
+  servicenetworking.googleapis.com \
+  run.googleapis.com \
+  --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+
+# ---- 2 Service account & IAM ----------------------------------------------
+log "Creating service account ${SA_EMAIL} and granting project roles (§2)"
+if gcloud iam service-accounts describe "${SA_EMAIL}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  skip "service account ${SA_EMAIL}"
+else
+  gcloud iam service-accounts create "${SA_NAME}" \
+    --display-name="Claude Gateway" --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+fi
+
+# add-iam-policy-binding is idempotent (re-adding an existing binding is a no-op).
+# --condition=None avoids the interactive condition prompt in non-interactive runs.
+#
+# Only aiplatform.user is granted: the gateway reaches Cloud SQL over the VPC at
+# its PRIVATE IP with a password user (§4/§7b — direct TCP, not the Cloud SQL
+# Auth Proxy / connector), so it never calls cloudsql.instances.connect and no
+# roles/cloudsql.client grant is needed. Direct private-IP is used because the
+# gateway's store is a plain postgres_url — no proxy sidecar/socket plumbing,
+# one less moving part, and the connection string is portable across Cloud Run
+# and GKE.
+gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding "${PROJECT_ID}" \
+  --member="serviceAccount:${SA_EMAIL}" \
+  --role="roles/aiplatform.user" --condition=None >/dev/null    # Agent Platform inference (§2)
+
+# ---- 3 Build & push image to Artifact Registry ----------------------------
+log "Ensuring Artifact Registry repo and image (§3)"
+if gcloud artifacts repositories describe "${AR_REPO}" \
+     --location="${REGION}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  skip "Artifact Registry repo ${AR_REPO}"
+else
+  gcloud artifacts repositories create "${AR_REPO}" \
+    --repository-format=docker --location="${REGION}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+fi
+
+# Image is the expensive, already-done step: skip the build+push entirely if the
+# tag already exists in the registry.
+if gcloud artifacts docker images describe "${IMAGE}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  skip "image ${IMAGE}"
+else
+  # The public Claude Code release includes the gateway subcommand, so the
+  # binary comes straight from the release endpoint, verified against the
+  # release manifest's sha256. A pre-existing ${CLAUDE_BINARY} (stale version,
+  # interrupted download, hand-placed file) is verified the same way and
+  # re-downloaded on mismatch, so an unverified binary can never reach the image.
+  manifest="$(curl_https -fsSL "${RELEASES_URL}/${VERSION}/manifest.json" | tr -d '[:space:]' || true)"
+  sha_re='"linux-x64"[^}]*"checksum":"([a-f0-9]{64})"'  # structure-based: survives pretty-printed, minified, and one-line-per-platform manifests
+  if [[ ! "${manifest}" =~ ${sha_re} ]]; then
+    echo "ERROR: could not read the linux-x64 sha256 from ${RELEASES_URL}/${VERSION}/manifest.json — refusing to build." >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  expected_sha="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"
+  if [[ -f "${CLAUDE_BINARY}" && "$(sha_of "${CLAUDE_BINARY}")" == "${expected_sha}" ]]; then
+    skip "binary ${CLAUDE_BINARY} (sha256 matches release ${VERSION})"
+  else
+    if [[ -f "${CLAUDE_BINARY}" ]]; then
+      log "Existing ${CLAUDE_BINARY} does not match release ${VERSION} — re-downloading"
+    else
+      log "Downloading Claude Code ${VERSION} (linux-x64) from ${RELEASES_URL}"
+    fi
+    # Until verification passes, ANY exit (curl failure, set -e, signal, the
+    # error exit below) removes the file, so a partial download can't be
+    # silently picked up by a later run.
+    trap 'rm -f "${CLAUDE_BINARY}"' EXIT INT TERM
+    curl_https -fL -o "${CLAUDE_BINARY}" "${RELEASES_URL}/${VERSION}/linux-x64/claude"
+    actual_sha="$(sha_of "${CLAUDE_BINARY}")"
+    if [[ "${actual_sha}" != "${expected_sha}" ]]; then
+      echo "ERROR: sha256 of ${CLAUDE_BINARY} is ${actual_sha} but the release manifest says ${expected_sha} — refusing to build." >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+    trap - EXIT INT TERM
+    log "Verified binary sha256 ${actual_sha}"
+  fi
+  # Optional out-of-band pin, checked even for a pre-existing binary: the
+  # manifest shares an origin with the binary, so it can't defend against a
+  # compromised endpoint — CLAUDE_SHA256 can.
+  if [[ -n "${CLAUDE_SHA256}" && "$(sha_of "${CLAUDE_BINARY}")" != "${CLAUDE_SHA256}" ]]; then
+    echo "ERROR: sha256 of ${CLAUDE_BINARY} does not match CLAUDE_SHA256 (${CLAUDE_SHA256}) — refusing to build." >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  chmod +x "${CLAUDE_BINARY}"
+  log "Building and pushing ${IMAGE}"
+  gcloud auth configure-docker "${REGION}-docker.pkg.dev" --quiet
+  # Cloud Run requires linux/amd64. --platform forces it (e.g. when building on an
+  # Apple Silicon Mac), and --provenance=false keeps buildx from wrapping the result
+  # in an OCI image index that Cloud Run rejects ("manifest ... must support amd64/linux").
+  docker build --platform=linux/amd64 --provenance=false \
+    -f "${DOCKERFILE}" --build-arg CLAUDE_BINARY="${CLAUDE_BINARY}" -t "${IMAGE}" .
+  docker push "${IMAGE}"
+fi
+
+# ---- 4 VPC + Private Services Access (private-IP prerequisite) -------------
+log "Creating VPC network and subnet"
+if gcloud compute networks describe "${VPC_NETWORK}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  skip "network ${VPC_NETWORK}"
+else
+  gcloud compute networks create "${VPC_NETWORK}" \
+    --subnet-mode=custom --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+fi
+
+if gcloud compute networks subnets describe "${SUBNET}" \
+     --region="${REGION}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  skip "subnet ${SUBNET}"
+else
+  gcloud compute networks subnets create "${SUBNET}" \
+    --network="${VPC_NETWORK}" --region="${REGION}" \
+    --range="${SUBNET_RANGE}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+fi
+
+log "Configuring Private Services Access (allocated range + VPC peering)"
+if gcloud compute addresses describe "${PSA_RANGE_NAME}" \
+     --global --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  skip "allocated range ${PSA_RANGE_NAME}"
+else
+  gcloud compute addresses create "${PSA_RANGE_NAME}" \
+    --global --purpose=VPC_PEERING --prefix-length="${PSA_PREFIX_LENGTH}" \
+    --network="${VPC_NETWORK}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+fi
+
+if gcloud services vpc-peerings list --network="${VPC_NETWORK}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" \
+     --format='value(peering)' 2>/dev/null | grep -q servicenetworking; then
+  skip "servicenetworking VPC peering"
+else
+  gcloud services vpc-peerings connect \
+    --service=servicenetworking.googleapis.com \
+    --ranges="${PSA_RANGE_NAME}" \
+    --network="${VPC_NETWORK}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+fi
+
+# ---- 4 Cloud SQL instance (private IP only) -------------------------------
+log "Creating Cloud SQL instance ${DB_INSTANCE} (private IP only)"
+if gcloud sql instances describe "${DB_INSTANCE}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  skip "instance ${DB_INSTANCE}"
+else
+  gcloud sql instances create "${DB_INSTANCE}" \
+    --database-version="${DB_VERSION}" \
+    --tier="${DB_TIER}" \
+    --region="${REGION}" \
+    --network="projects/${PROJECT_ID}/global/networks/${VPC_NETWORK}" \
+    --no-assign-ip \
+    --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+fi
+
+log "Creating database ${DB_NAME}"
+if gcloud sql databases describe "${DB_NAME}" \
+     --instance="${DB_INSTANCE}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  skip "database ${DB_NAME}"
+else
+  gcloud sql databases create "${DB_NAME}" \
+    --instance="${DB_INSTANCE}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+fi
+
+# hex (not base64) keeps the password URL-safe for the connection string below.
+log "Creating database user ${DB_USER}"
+DB_PASSWORD=""
+if gcloud sql users list --instance="${DB_INSTANCE}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" \
+     --format='value(name)' 2>/dev/null | grep -qx "${DB_USER}"; then
+  if gcloud secrets describe "${SECRET_NAME}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    skip "user ${DB_USER} (password unchanged; secret not rewritten)"
+  else
+    # Self-heal: a previous run died after creating the user but before writing
+    # the connection-string secret, losing the only copy of the password. The
+    # secret is the password's only consumer, so resetting it is safe and keeps
+    # re-runs able to recover from any partial state.
+    log "User ${DB_USER} exists but secret ${SECRET_NAME} is missing — resetting password"
+    DB_PASSWORD="$(openssl rand -hex 24)"
+    gcloud sql users set-password "${DB_USER}" \
+      --instance="${DB_INSTANCE}" --password="${DB_PASSWORD}" \
+      --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+  fi
+else
+  DB_PASSWORD="$(openssl rand -hex 24)"
+  gcloud sql users create "${DB_USER}" \
+    --instance="${DB_INSTANCE}" --password="${DB_PASSWORD}" \
+    --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+fi
+
+# ---- 5 Connection string -> Secret Manager + secretAccessor ---------------
+PRIVATE_IP="$(gcloud sql instances describe "${DB_INSTANCE}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" \
+  --format='value(ipAddresses[0].ipAddress)')"
+
+if [[ -n "${DB_PASSWORD}" ]]; then
+  # direct private-IP form, ?sslmode=require (guide §4)
+  CONN="postgres://${DB_USER}:${DB_PASSWORD}@${PRIVATE_IP}:5432/${DB_NAME}?sslmode=require"
+  log "Storing connection string in Secret Manager secret ${SECRET_NAME}"
+  if gcloud secrets describe "${SECRET_NAME}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    printf '%s' "${CONN}" | gcloud secrets versions add "${SECRET_NAME}" \
+      --data-file=- --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+  else
+    printf '%s' "${CONN}" | gcloud secrets create "${SECRET_NAME}" \
+      --replication-policy=automatic --data-file=- --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+  fi
+else
+  log "Skipping secret write (user already existed, password not available this run)"
+fi
+
+if gcloud secrets describe "${SECRET_NAME}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  log "Granting ${SA_EMAIL} secretAccessor on ${SECRET_NAME}"
+  gcloud secrets add-iam-policy-binding "${SECRET_NAME}" \
+    --member="serviceAccount:${SA_EMAIL}" \
+    --role="roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor" \
+    --condition=None --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null
+fi
+
+# JWT signing secret — generated once (re-runs do NOT rotate it).
+log "Ensuring JWT signing secret ${JWT_SECRET_NAME} (§5)"
+if gcloud secrets describe "${JWT_SECRET_NAME}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  skip "secret ${JWT_SECRET_NAME}"
+else
+  openssl rand -base64 32 | tr -d '\n' | gcloud secrets create "${JWT_SECRET_NAME}" \
+    --replication-policy=automatic --data-file=- --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+fi
+gcloud secrets add-iam-policy-binding "${JWT_SECRET_NAME}" \
+  --member="serviceAccount:${SA_EMAIL}" \
+  --role="roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor" \
+  --condition=None --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null
+
+# OIDC client secret — operator-created (the script can't generate it). Grant
+# accessor here once it exists so the deploy step doesn't fail on permission.
+if gcloud secrets describe "${OIDC_SECRET_NAME}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  log "Granting ${SA_EMAIL} secretAccessor on ${OIDC_SECRET_NAME}"
+  gcloud secrets add-iam-policy-binding "${OIDC_SECRET_NAME}" \
+    --member="serviceAccount:${SA_EMAIL}" \
+    --role="roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor" \
+    --condition=None --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null
+fi
+
+# ---- 6 gateway.yaml -> Secret Manager (gateway-config) --------------------
+# Published only when fully filled in: refuse to push a config that still has
+# REPLACE_ME placeholders (checked on non-comment lines so commented examples
+# and this file's header don't trip the guard).
+log "Publishing ${GATEWAY_YAML} as Secret Manager secret ${CONFIG_SECRET} (§6)"
+if [[ ! -f "${GATEWAY_YAML}" ]]; then
+  echo "    (skip) ${GATEWAY_YAML} not found — run 'cp gateway.yaml.example gateway.yaml', fill it in, then re-run (§6)."
+elif grep -vE '^[[:space:]]*#' "${GATEWAY_YAML}" | grep -q 'REPLACE_ME'; then
+  echo "    (skip) ${GATEWAY_YAML} still has REPLACE_ME placeholders to fill:"
+  grep -nE 'REPLACE_ME' "${GATEWAY_YAML}" | grep -vE '^[0-9]+:[[:space:]]*#' | sed 's/^/        /'
+  echo "        Fill them in, then re-run to publish ${CONFIG_SECRET}."
+else
+  if gcloud secrets describe "${CONFIG_SECRET}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    gcloud secrets versions add "${CONFIG_SECRET}" \
+      --data-file="${GATEWAY_YAML}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+  else
+    gcloud secrets create "${CONFIG_SECRET}" --replication-policy=automatic \
+      --data-file="${GATEWAY_YAML}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+  fi
+  gcloud secrets add-iam-policy-binding "${CONFIG_SECRET}" \
+    --member="serviceAccount:${SA_EMAIL}" \
+    --role="roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor" \
+    --condition=None --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null
+fi
+
+# ---- 7 Cloud Run deploy (Direct VPC egress) -------------------------------
+# Direct VPC egress (--network/--subnet/--vpc-egress) puts the service on the
+# VPC so it reaches the Cloud SQL PRIVATE IP directly — matching the private-IP
+# connection string in the postgres-url secret. private-ranges-only keeps public
+# egress (Agent Platform, accounts.google.com) off the VPC, so no Cloud NAT is needed.
+# We deliberately do NOT use --add-cloudsql-instances (that's the Auth Proxy /
+# socket path, which would need a different connection string).
+#
+# Secrets: gateway.yaml is mounted as a FILE at /etc/claude (alone in its dir).
+# The JWT / OIDC / Postgres secrets are injected as ENV VARS — Cloud Run cannot
+# mount multiple secrets into one directory, and gateway.yaml references them via
+# ${ENV_VAR}. (See the env-var names in gateway.yaml: GATEWAY_JWT_SECRET etc.)
+#
+# Self-gating: deploy only once its inputs exist (config secret published + the
+# operator-provided OIDC client secret). On a first run these are missing and it
+# cleanly skips.
+RUN_URL=""
+missing=""
+gcloud secrets describe "${CONFIG_SECRET}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || missing="${missing} ${CONFIG_SECRET}"
+gcloud secrets describe "${OIDC_SECRET_NAME}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || missing="${missing} ${OIDC_SECRET_NAME}"
+# Also gate on the postgres-url secret (referenced by --set-secrets below): if it
+# is somehow absent, skip with a clear message rather than failing the deploy with
+# a raw Cloud Run missing-secret error.
+gcloud secrets describe "${SECRET_NAME}" --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || missing="${missing} ${SECRET_NAME}"
+
+if [[ "${DEPLOY}" != "1" ]]; then
+  log "Skipping Cloud Run deploy (DEPLOY=${DEPLOY}) (§7)"
+elif [[ -n "${missing// }" ]]; then
+  log "Skipping Cloud Run deploy — missing secret(s):${missing} (§7)"
+  echo "        Fill ${GATEWAY_YAML} and re-run to publish ${CONFIG_SECRET}; create ${OIDC_SECRET_NAME}"
+  echo "        from the Google OAuth client. Then re-run to deploy."
+else
+  SECRET_MOUNTS="/etc/claude/gateway.yaml=${CONFIG_SECRET}:latest"          # file mount (alone in /etc/claude)
+  SECRET_MOUNTS="${SECRET_MOUNTS},GATEWAY_JWT_SECRET=${JWT_SECRET_NAME}:latest"        # env var
+  SECRET_MOUNTS="${SECRET_MOUNTS},OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=${OIDC_SECRET_NAME}:latest"       # env var
+  SECRET_MOUNTS="${SECRET_MOUNTS},GATEWAY_POSTGRES_URL=${SECRET_NAME}:latest"          # env var
+
+  log "Deploying Cloud Run service ${SERVICE_NAME} (§7b, Direct VPC egress)"
+  # Deploy private (--no-allow-unauthenticated avoids the interactive prompt and
+  # keeps allUsers OUT of the deploy, so a Domain-Restricted-Sharing org doesn't
+  # fail the deploy on the IAM step). Public access is attempted separately below.
+  #
+  # --ingress is passed EXPLICITLY because it is sticky across redeploys (omitting
+  # it keeps the previous value). The default, internal, keeps the *.run.app URL
+  # off the public internet — reachable only from this VPC, or from corp networks
+  # with the PSC endpoint + private run.app DNS plumbing (see terraform/README.md
+  # "Private access"). Public ingress cannot serve clients (see the INGRESS
+  # guard at the top of this script), so the two-pass OAuth bootstrap has to be
+  # completed from inside the VPC (or a PSC-connected corp network). Use
+  # internal-and-cloud-load-balancing instead if you front the service with
+  # your own internal ALB.
+  #
+  # --timeout=3600 raises Cloud Run's default 300s request timeout, which would
+  # otherwise cut off long streaming /v1/messages responses mid-stream.
+  #
+  # --max-instances bounds the Postgres connection footprint: each instance
+  # opens a pool of up to 5 connections (store.max_connections default) and
+  # db-g1-small caps at ~50 max_connections, so the default ceiling of 100
+  # instances would crash-loop new instances under load. Keep
+  # max-instances × 5 below the DB tier's max_connections; raise the DB tier
+  # (or set store.max_connections lower) before raising this.
+  gcloud run deploy "${SERVICE_NAME}" \
+    --image="${IMAGE}" \
+    --region="${REGION}" \
+    --service-account="${SA_EMAIL}" \
+    --min-instances=1 \
+    --max-instances="${MAX_INSTANCES}" \
+    --port=8080 \
+    --timeout=3600 \
+    --ingress="${INGRESS}" \
+    --network="${VPC_NETWORK}" \
+    --subnet="${SUBNET}" \
+    --vpc-egress=private-ranges-only \
+    --set-secrets="${SECRET_MOUNTS}" \
+    --no-allow-unauthenticated \
+    --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+
+  # The gateway runs its OWN OIDC, so the Cloud Run IAM layer must allow
+  # unauthenticated. Attempt it separately and tolerate failure: Domain Restricted
+  # Sharing (iam.allowedPolicyMemberDomains) blocks allUsers in hardened orgs.
+  log "Granting public invoker (allUsers) — required for the gateway's OIDC login"
+  if gcloud run services add-iam-policy-binding "${SERVICE_NAME}" \
+       --region="${REGION}" --member=allUsers --role=roles/run.invoker \
+       --project="${PROJECT_ID}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "        public invoker granted."
+  else
+    echo "        WARN: allUsers rejected (likely Domain Restricted Sharing). The service is"
+    echo "              deployed but the invoker IAM check is still enabled, so requests 403"
+    echo "              before reaching the container. Preferred fix (where available):"
+    echo "                gcloud run services update ${SERVICE_NAME} --no-invoker-iam-check \\"
+    echo "                  --region=${REGION} --project=${PROJECT_ID}"
+    echo "              Alternatively: request a DRS exception for ${SERVICE_NAME}, or use the GKE"
+    echo "              track, which exposes the gateway at the network layer with no allUsers"
+    echo "              binding. An LB is NOT a fix — it does not bypass the invoker IAM check."
+  fi
+
+  RUN_URL="$(gcloud run services describe "${SERVICE_NAME}" --region="${REGION}" \
+    --project="${PROJECT_ID}" --format='value(status.url)')"
+  log "Cloud Run URL: ${RUN_URL}"
+
+  # public_url is now required (config validation refuses a non-loopback bind
+  # without it), so the template ships a placeholder for the first pass. Once we
+  # know the real URL, warn on any mismatch so the operator doesn't leave the
+  # placeholder — or a stale hostname — in place. Normalize quotes / inline
+  # comments / a trailing slash so schema-equivalent spellings compare equal.
+  # Only checked with internal ingress, where public_url should be the run.app
+  # URL; behind an internal ALB it is the ALB hostname, which this script
+  # cannot know.
+  CFG_PUBLIC_URL="$(grep -E '^[[:space:]]*public_url:' "${GATEWAY_YAML}" 2>/dev/null \
+    | head -1 \
+    | sed -E 's/^[[:space:]]*public_url:[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]+#.*$//; s/[[:space:]]*$//' \
+    || true)"
+  CFG_PUBLIC_URL="${CFG_PUBLIC_URL#[\'\"]}"; CFG_PUBLIC_URL="${CFG_PUBLIC_URL%[\'\"]}"
+  CFG_PUBLIC_URL="${CFG_PUBLIC_URL%/}"
+  if [[ "${INGRESS}" == "internal" && -n "${RUN_URL}" && "${CFG_PUBLIC_URL}" != "${RUN_URL%/}" ]]; then
+    echo "        NOTE — ${GATEWAY_YAML} has public_url: ${CFG_PUBLIC_URL:-<unset>}"
+    echo "               but this service's URL is ${RUN_URL}."
+    echo "               Set listen.public_url to ${RUN_URL} (or your LB hostname) and re-run."
+  fi
+
+  if [[ -n "${RUN_URL}" ]]; then
+    # gcloud run deploy already fails the script if the revision can't boot (it
+    # waits for the Ready condition), so what's left to verify is that the
+    # gateway is serving. The OAuth discovery document below returns 200 only
+    # after config load, OIDC discovery, upstream construction, and Postgres
+    # migration all succeed, so it doubles as an end-to-end boot check (the
+    # readiness probe proper is GET /readyz). With internal ingress the URL is
+    # reachable only from inside the VPC (or a PSC-connected corp network), so
+    # verification is left to the operator rather than attempted from here.
+    log "Verify the gateway is serving (from inside the VPC, or a PSC-connected corp network):"
+    echo "          curl -s ${RUN_URL}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server"
+    echo "        If it isn't responding yet, check logs:"
+    echo "          gcloud run services logs read ${SERVICE_NAME} --region=${REGION} --project=${PROJECT_ID}"
+
+    log "Finish the OAuth bootstrap:"
+    echo "        1. Register this redirect URI on the Google OAuth client: ${RUN_URL}/oauth/callback"
+    echo "        2. Set listen.public_url in ${GATEWAY_YAML} to ${RUN_URL}, then re-run: INGRESS=${INGRESS} ./setup.sh"
+    echo "           (republishes ${CONFIG_SECRET} and redeploys so the IdP redirect_uri matches)."
+    echo "           With INGRESS=internal-and-cloud-load-balancing, use your internal ALB hostname"
+    echo "           instead of the run.app URL in both steps."
+  fi
+fi
+
+# ---- summary ----------------------------------------------------------------
+cat <<EOF
+
+==> Done.
+
+  Service account       ${SA_EMAIL}
+                        roles: aiplatform.user, secretmanager.secretAccessor
+  Image                 ${IMAGE}
+  Instance              ${DB_INSTANCE}
+  Connection name       ${PROJECT_ID}:${REGION}:${DB_INSTANCE}
+  Private IP            ${PRIVATE_IP}
+  Database / user       ${DB_NAME} / ${DB_USER}
+  Secrets               ${SECRET_NAME}, ${JWT_SECRET_NAME}, ${CONFIG_SECRET}
+  Cloud Run service     ${SERVICE_NAME} -> ${RUN_URL:-(not deployed yet)}   (ingress: ${INGRESS})
+
+Next steps (see https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-on-gcp):
+  - Create the one operator-provided secret (from the Google Cloud Console OAuth client):
+      printf '%s' "<client-secret>" | gcloud secrets create ${OIDC_SECRET_NAME} \\
+        --data-file=- --project="${PROJECT_ID}"
+    setup.sh grants ${SA_EMAIL} secretAccessor on it on the next re-run.
+  - Fill in the REPLACE_ME values in ${GATEWAY_YAML}, then re-run: setup.sh publishes
+    ${CONFIG_SECRET} and deploys ${SERVICE_NAME} once both secrets exist.
+  - After the first deploy: set listen.public_url to the Cloud Run URL above (or your
+    internal ALB hostname) and register <url>/oauth/callback on the Google OAuth client,
+    then re-run to redeploy.
+  - The gateway runs its own schema migrations at boot, so ${DB_USER} needs CREATE TABLE.
+EOF

examples/gateway/gcp/terraform/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# Never commit state (contains secrets) or local var files
+*.tfstate
+*.tfstate.*
+.terraform/
+terraform.tfvars
+*.auto.tfvars
+crash.log
+
+# The lock file holds no secrets. It's ignored here so consumers who copy this
+# example into their own repo generate (and commit) their own platform-complete
+# lock at first init — committing one from this repo would carry only one
+# platform's provider hashes.
+.terraform.lock.hcl

examples/gateway/gcp/terraform/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+# Claude Gateway — Terraform (Cloud Run)
+
+Terraform equivalent of `../setup.sh`. Lets end-users provision and manage
+the gateway with `terraform apply`. Covers the same scope ([walkthrough](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-on-gcp) §1–7): APIs →
+service account + IAM → Artifact Registry repo → VPC + Private Services Access →
+private-IP Cloud SQL (PG16) → secrets → Cloud Run with Direct VPC egress.
+
+## Files
+
+| File | Purpose |
+|------|---------|
+| `versions.tf` | Provider pins (google, random) |
+| `variables.tf` | All inputs (defaults match `setup.sh`'s) |
+| `main.tf` | Resources |
+| `outputs.tf` | Service URL, OAuth redirect URI, SA, DB info |
+| `terraform.tfvars.example` | Copy to `terraform.tfvars` and edit |
+
+## Prerequisites
+
+1. **`../gateway.yaml` created and filled in** — copy the template first:
+   `cp ../gateway.yaml.example ../gateway.yaml`, then replace every `REPLACE_ME`
+   (Terraform reads this file and enforces no `REPLACE_ME` via a precondition).
+   Leave `public_url` at its placeholder for the first apply; set it to the
+   `run.app` URL (the `service_url` output) or your LB hostname and re-apply.
+   `gateway.yaml` is gitignored; the committed template is `gateway.yaml.example`.
+2. A **remote backend** for shared use (see below). State holds secrets — never commit it.
+
+## Deploy
+
+Terraform creates the Artifact Registry repo but does **not** build/push the
+image, so the apply is two passes: a targeted apply to create the repo, then
+build/push, then the full apply.
+
+```bash
+cp terraform.tfvars.example terraform.tfvars   # edit it
+terraform init
+
+# 1. Create just the Artifact Registry repo (the -target warning is expected):
+terraform apply -target=google_artifact_registry_repository.repo
+
+# 2. Download the public Claude Code linux-x64 release binary (it includes the
+#    `gateway` subcommand; the Dockerfile picks it up at gcp/claude), verify its
+#    sha256 against the release manifest, then build and push the image:
+BASE="https://downloads.claude.ai/claude-code-releases"
+VERSION="$(curl -fsSL --proto '=https' "${BASE}/latest")"
+curl -fL --proto '=https' --proto-redir '=https' -o ../claude \
+  "${BASE}/${VERSION}/linux-x64/claude"
+WANT="$(curl -fsSL --proto '=https' "${BASE}/${VERSION}/manifest.json" \
+  | tr -d '[:space:]' | grep -oE '"linux-x64"[^}]*' | grep -oE '[a-f0-9]{64}' | head -1)"
+[ "$(openssl dgst -sha256 ../claude | awk '{print $NF}')" = "${WANT}" ] \
+  && echo "sha256 OK" || { echo "checksum mismatch" >&2; rm -f ../claude; }
+gcloud auth configure-docker us-east5-docker.pkg.dev --quiet
+docker build --platform=linux/amd64 --provenance=false \
+  -f ../Dockerfile -t "us-east5-docker.pkg.dev/<project>/claude-gateway/gateway:${VERSION}" ..
+docker push "us-east5-docker.pkg.dev/<project>/claude-gateway/gateway:${VERSION}"
+
+# 3. Full apply:
+terraform apply
+```
+
+(`../setup.sh` §3 automates the same download-and-verify.)
+
+Set in `terraform.tfvars`:
+
+- `project_id`, `region`
+- `image_tag` (after building/pushing — step 2 above)
+- **`oidc_client_secret`** — required (the Cloud Run service mounts `latest` of
+  this secret; with no version the deploy fails). Terraform creates the
+  secret + version from it.
+- `invoker_iam_disabled` / `allow_unauthenticated` — the gateway runs its own
+  OIDC, so the Cloud Run invoker IAM check must be opened or disabled.
+  **Preferred:** `invoker_iam_disabled = true` (no `allUsers` binding; works
+  under Domain Restricted Sharing). **Fallback:** `allow_unauthenticated = true`
+  grants `allUsers` `run.invoker` — fine on a normal org, but DRS orgs reject
+  `allUsers` (set it `false` there, since an LB does **not** bypass the IAM
+  check). If both paths are blocked by org policy, use the GKE track.
+- `ingress` — defaults to **internal-only** (no public URL). Claude Code's `/login`
+  only accepts gateway hosts on private addresses, so public ingress cannot serve
+  clients; the two-pass OAuth bootstrap must be completed from inside the VPC (or a
+  PSC-connected corp network). See "Private access" below.
+
+Tear down a trial with `terraform destroy`: set `deletion_protection = false`,
+run `terraform apply` to record that in state (the provider checks the value in
+**state**, not config, so destroy would still refuse otherwise), then `terraform
+destroy`. The destroy will stop at the VPC network
+because the Private Services Access peering is intentionally left in place
+(`deletion_policy = ABANDON` — see Guard rails below); finish by deleting the
+peering manually once the Cloud SQL instance is gone, then re-run destroy:
+
+```bash
+gcloud services vpc-peerings delete --service=servicenetworking.googleapis.com \
+  --network=cc-gateway-vpc --project=<project>
+terraform destroy
+```
+
+## Guard rails
+
+Tuned so accidental deletion is hard but greenfield teardown stays easy:
+
+- `deletion_protection = true` (variable, default true) on Cloud SQL and Cloud Run —
+  blocks accidental deletion; set `false` when you intend to `terraform destroy`.
+- `disable_on_destroy = false` on APIs — tearing down config never disables APIs.
+- `deletion_policy = ABANDON` on the PSA peering — never tears down the
+  service-networking peering automatically (it's shared by every private-IP
+  service on the VPC). On the dedicated VPC this module creates, that means
+  `terraform destroy` stops at the network step; delete the peering manually
+  per the teardown note above.
+- IAM uses non-authoritative `_member` resources, so other project/secret bindings
+  are never clobbered.
+
+## Private access (internal ingress) — the default
+
+By default the service has **no public URL** (`ingress = "INGRESS_TRAFFIC_INTERNAL_ONLY"`),
+and there is no public-ingress option: Claude Code's `/login` rejects gateway hosts that
+resolve to public addresses, so public exposure cannot serve clients. Reach the service
+from inside the VPC, or via the private-access plumbing below.
+
+With internal-only ingress, `public_url` stays the `run.app` URL (Google-managed cert) —
+**no load balancer or your own certificate required**. But internal ingress alone does
+**not** let corporate on-prem clients reach `run.app`; that needs **operator /
+network-team-owned** plumbing that Cloud Run does **not** create for you (validate it's in
+place before relying on internal ingress):
+
+1. A **Private Service Connect endpoint** for Google APIs (an internal VIP in the VPC).
+2. A **Cloud DNS private zone for `run.app`** resolving `*.run.app` to that endpoint IP.
+3. **On-prem routing** to the endpoint over Cloud VPN / Interconnect.
+
+This is normally managed centrally in the network/hub project, so the module does not
+provision it. See [Private networking and Cloud Run](https://cloud.google.com/run/docs/securing/private-networking).
+For a greenfield trial without this plumbing, complete the OAuth bootstrap from inside
+the VPC — e.g. a browser proxied through an in-VPC VM (SSH SOCKS tunnel over IAP).
+
+For a **custom internal hostname or your own TLS cert**, use
+`INGRESS_TRAFFIC_INTERNAL_LOAD_BALANCER` and front the service with your own internal
+Application Load Balancer (also not provisioned by this module).
+
+## Remote state (recommended for teams)
+
+Add a backend so state is shared and locked (and out of git):
+
+```hcl
+# backend.tf
+terraform {
+  backend "gcs" {
+    bucket = "<your-tf-state-bucket>"
+    prefix = "claude-gateway/cloudrun"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## After deploy
+
+- `terraform output service_url` / `oauth_redirect_uri`.
+- Register the redirect URI on the Google OAuth client and make sure
+  `../gateway.yaml` `public_url` matches the host.
+- Notes: Terraform does not build the image. To ship a new gateway version,
+  rerun the docker build/push under a new tag and bump `image_tag` — a bare
+  re-apply under an unchanged tag does **not** roll a new revision (Cloud Run
+  resolves the tag to a digest only at revision creation, and an unchanged
+  `image` attribute means no new revision).

examples/gateway/gcp/terraform/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+# Claude Gateway on Cloud Run — Terraform equivalent of setup.sh.
+# Section markers (§N) map to setup.sh and the walkthrough:
+# https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-apps-gateway-on-gcp
+
+locals {
+  config_path    = var.gateway_config_path != "" ? var.gateway_config_path : "${path.module}/../gateway.yaml"
+  gateway_config = file(local.config_path)
+  image          = "${var.region}-docker.pkg.dev/${var.project_id}/${var.ar_repo}/${var.image_name}:${var.image_tag}"
+
+  apis = [
+    "aiplatform.googleapis.com",
+    "artifactregistry.googleapis.com",
+    "cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com",
+    "sqladmin.googleapis.com",
+    "secretmanager.googleapis.com",
+    "iamcredentials.googleapis.com",
+    "iam.googleapis.com",
+    "compute.googleapis.com",
+    "servicenetworking.googleapis.com",
+    "run.googleapis.com",
+  ]
+}
+
+# ── 1 Project & API setup ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+resource "google_project_service" "apis" {
+  for_each = toset(local.apis)
+  project  = var.project_id
+  service  = each.value
+  # Don't disable APIs (or delete anything) when this config is torn down.
+  disable_on_destroy         = false
+  disable_dependent_services = false
+}
+
+# ── 2 Service account & IAM (least-privilege) ───────────────────────────────
+resource "google_service_account" "gateway" {
+  project      = var.project_id
+  account_id   = var.sa_name
+  display_name = "Claude Gateway"
+  depends_on   = [google_project_service.apis]
+}
+
+# Non-authoritative (_member) so we never clobber other project bindings.
+#
+# Only aiplatform.user is granted: the gateway reaches Cloud SQL over the VPC at
+# its private IP with a password user (direct TCP via Direct VPC egress — see §7
+# below), not via the Cloud SQL Auth Proxy / connector, so it never calls
+# cloudsql.instances.connect and no roles/cloudsql.client grant is needed.
+# Direct private-IP keeps the gateway's store a plain postgres_url with no proxy
+# sidecar/socket plumbing, and the connection string is portable across Cloud
+# Run and GKE.
+resource "google_project_iam_member" "vertex" {
+  project = var.project_id
+  role    = "roles/aiplatform.user" # Agent Platform inference
+  member  = "serviceAccount:${google_service_account.gateway.email}"
+}
+
+# ── 3 Artifact Registry repo ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# NOTE: image build/push is a separate step (see README) — Terraform only makes the repo.
+resource "google_artifact_registry_repository" "repo" {
+  project       = var.project_id
+  location      = var.region
+  repository_id = var.ar_repo
+  format        = "DOCKER"
+  description   = "Claude Gateway container images"
+  depends_on    = [google_project_service.apis]
+}
+
+# ── 4 VPC + Private Services Access ──────────────────────────────────────────
+resource "google_compute_network" "vpc" {
+  project                 = var.project_id
+  name                    = var.vpc_network
+  auto_create_subnetworks = false
+  depends_on              = [google_project_service.apis]
+}
+
+resource "google_compute_subnetwork" "subnet" {
+  project       = var.project_id
+  name          = var.subnet
+  region        = var.region
+  network       = google_compute_network.vpc.id
+  ip_cidr_range = var.subnet_range
+}
+
+resource "google_compute_global_address" "psa_range" {
+  project       = var.project_id
+  name          = "google-managed-services-${var.vpc_network}"
+  purpose       = "VPC_PEERING"
+  address_type  = "INTERNAL"
+  prefix_length = var.psa_prefix_length
+  network       = google_compute_network.vpc.id
+}
+
+resource "google_service_networking_connection" "psa" {
+  network                 = google_compute_network.vpc.id
+  service                 = "servicenetworking.googleapis.com"
+  reserved_peering_ranges = [google_compute_global_address.psa_range.name]
+  # ABANDON: on destroy, leave the producer peering in place (deleting it can hang
+  # and would affect any other private-IP service on this VPC).
+  deletion_policy = "ABANDON"
+  # If the peering already exists (e.g. a previous apply failed partway), patch it
+  # instead of failing the create.
+  update_on_creation_fail = true
+  depends_on              = [google_project_service.apis]
+}
+
+# ── 4 Cloud SQL (private IP only) ───────────────────────────────────────────
+resource "google_sql_database_instance" "db" {
+  project             = var.project_id
+  name                = var.db_instance
+  region              = var.region
+  database_version    = var.db_version
+  deletion_protection = var.deletion_protection
+  depends_on          = [google_service_networking_connection.psa]
+
+  settings {
+    tier = var.db_tier
+    ip_configuration {
+      ipv4_enabled    = false # private IP only (org policy: sql.restrictPublicIp)
+      private_network = google_compute_network.vpc.id
+      ssl_mode        = "ENCRYPTED_ONLY"
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+resource "google_sql_database" "db" {
+  project  = var.project_id
+  name     = var.db_name
+  instance = google_sql_database_instance.db.name
+}
+
+# URL-safe (alphanumeric) so it drops cleanly into the connection string.
+# nosemgrep: terraform-generic-secrets-in-state -- secrets in tfstate are inherent to TF; mitigated by the documented remote GCS backend (see README "Remote state")
+resource "random_password" "db" {
+  length  = 32
+  special = false
+}
+
+# nosemgrep: terraform-gcp-secrets-in-state -- secrets in tfstate are inherent to TF; mitigated by the documented remote GCS backend (see README "Remote state")
+resource "google_sql_user" "gateway" {
+  project  = var.project_id
+  name     = var.db_user
+  instance = google_sql_database_instance.db.name
+  password = random_password.db.result
+  # On destroy the role owns the tables it migrated at boot, so DROP ROLE can
+  # fail (and races google_sql_database.db). ABANDON is harmless on the
+  # greenfield teardown — the whole instance is deleted anyway.
+  deletion_policy = "ABANDON"
+}
+
+# ── 5/6 Secrets + secretAccessor ────────────────────────────────────────────
+# postgres-url: connection string built from the instance's private IP.
+resource "google_secret_manager_secret" "postgres_url" {
+  project   = var.project_id
+  secret_id = var.secret_name
+  replication {
+    auto {}
+  }
+  depends_on = [google_project_service.apis]
+}
+
+# nosemgrep: terraform-gcp-secrets-in-state -- secrets in tfstate are inherent to TF; mitigated by the documented remote GCS backend (see README "Remote state")
+resource "google_secret_manager_secret_version" "postgres_url" {
+  secret      = google_secret_manager_secret.postgres_url.id
+  secret_data = "postgres://${var.db_user}:${random_password.db.result}@${google_sql_database_instance.db.private_ip_address}:5432/${var.db_name}?sslmode=require"
+}
+
+# jwt: session signing key.
+# nosemgrep: terraform-generic-secrets-in-state -- secrets in tfstate are inherent to TF; mitigated by the documented remote GCS backend (see README "Remote state")
+resource "random_password" "jwt" {
+  length  = 48
+  special = false
+}
+
+resource "google_secret_manager_secret" "jwt" {
+  project   = var.project_id
+  secret_id = var.jwt_secret_name
+  replication {
+    auto {}
+  }
+  depends_on = [google_project_service.apis]
+}
+
+# nosemgrep: terraform-gcp-secrets-in-state -- secrets in tfstate are inherent to TF; mitigated by the documented remote GCS backend (see README "Remote state")
+resource "google_secret_manager_secret_version" "jwt" {
+  secret      = google_secret_manager_secret.jwt.id
+  secret_data = random_password.jwt.result
+}
+
+# oidc client secret: operator-provided (from the Google OAuth client).
+resource "google_secret_manager_secret" "oidc" {
+  project   = var.project_id
+  secret_id = var.oidc_secret_name
+  replication {
+    auto {}
+  }
+  depends_on = [google_project_service.apis]
+}
+
+# nosemgrep: terraform-gcp-secrets-in-state -- secrets in tfstate are inherent to TF; mitigated by the documented remote GCS backend (see README "Remote state")
+resource "google_secret_manager_secret_version" "oidc" {
+  count       = var.oidc_client_secret != "" ? 1 : 0
+  secret      = google_secret_manager_secret.oidc.id
+  secret_data = var.oidc_client_secret
+}
+
+# Warn (not block) at plan time when the OIDC secret value isn't set: the Cloud
+# Run service mounts gateway-oidc-client-secret:latest unconditionally, so an
+# empty value with no out-of-band version means the apply fails late at
+# revision creation. A warning (not a precondition) keeps the documented
+# out-of-band-version mode usable.
+check "oidc_client_secret_set" {
+  assert {
+    condition     = var.oidc_client_secret != ""
+    error_message = "oidc_client_secret is empty — set it in terraform.tfvars, or add a version to the gateway-oidc-client-secret secret out-of-band before applying (the Cloud Run revision mounts it at :latest and will fail without one)."
+  }
+}
+
+# config: gateway.yaml. Guard mirrors the bash REPLACE_ME check (non-comment lines).
+resource "google_secret_manager_secret" "config" {
+  project   = var.project_id
+  secret_id = var.config_secret_name
+  replication {
+    auto {}
+  }
+  depends_on = [google_project_service.apis]
+}
+
+# nosemgrep: terraform-gcp-secrets-in-state -- secrets in tfstate are inherent to TF; mitigated by the documented remote GCS backend (see README "Remote state")
+resource "google_secret_manager_secret_version" "config" {
+  secret      = google_secret_manager_secret.config.id
+  secret_data = local.gateway_config
+
+  lifecycle {
+    precondition {
+      condition = length([
+        for line in split("\n", local.gateway_config) :
+        line
+        if !startswith(trimspace(line), "#") && strcontains(line, "REPLACE_ME")
+      ]) == 0
+      error_message = "gateway.yaml still has REPLACE_ME on a non-comment line — fill it in before applying."
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+resource "google_secret_manager_secret_iam_member" "postgres_url" {
+  project   = var.project_id
+  secret_id = google_secret_manager_secret.postgres_url.secret_id
+  role      = "roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor"
+  member    = "serviceAccount:${google_service_account.gateway.email}"
+}
+
+resource "google_secret_manager_secret_iam_member" "jwt" {
+  project   = var.project_id
+  secret_id = google_secret_manager_secret.jwt.secret_id
+  role      = "roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor"
+  member    = "serviceAccount:${google_service_account.gateway.email}"
+}
+
+resource "google_secret_manager_secret_iam_member" "oidc" {
+  project   = var.project_id
+  secret_id = google_secret_manager_secret.oidc.secret_id
+  role      = "roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor"
+  member    = "serviceAccount:${google_service_account.gateway.email}"
+}
+
+resource "google_secret_manager_secret_iam_member" "config" {
+  project   = var.project_id
+  secret_id = google_secret_manager_secret.config.secret_id
+  role      = "roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor"
+  member    = "serviceAccount:${google_service_account.gateway.email}"
+}
+
+# ── 7 Cloud Run (Direct VPC egress) ─────────────────────────────────────────
+resource "google_cloud_run_v2_service" "gateway" {
+  project              = var.project_id
+  name                 = var.service_name
+  location             = var.region
+  ingress              = var.ingress
+  invoker_iam_disabled = var.invoker_iam_disabled
+  deletion_protection  = var.deletion_protection
+
+  template {
+    service_account = google_service_account.gateway.email
+    scaling {
+      min_instance_count = var.min_instances
+      max_instance_count = var.max_instances
+    }
+    # Secrets are mounted at version=latest, so a config edit or secret
+    # rotation alone wouldn't diff this resource and the warm min_instances=1
+    # revision would keep the old values. Stamping a hash of the rendered
+    # config + every managed secret value forces a new revision whenever any
+    # of them change — without this, tainting random_password.db ALTERs the
+    # SQL role to the new password while the running revision keeps the old
+    # connection string and breaks on its next reconnect, and rotating the
+    # OIDC client secret leaves login failing invalid_client.
+    labels = {
+      config-sha = substr(sha256(join("", [
+        local.gateway_config,
+        random_password.db.result,
+        random_password.jwt.result,
+        var.oidc_client_secret,
+      ])), 0, 63)
+    }
+    # Cloud Run's default 300s request timeout would cut off long streaming
+    # /v1/messages responses mid-stream.
+    timeout = "3600s"
+
+    vpc_access {
+      network_interfaces {
+        network    = google_compute_network.vpc.id
+        subnetwork = google_compute_subnetwork.subnet.id
+      }
+      egress = "PRIVATE_RANGES_ONLY" # public egress (Agent Platform, accounts.google.com) bypasses the VPC -> no Cloud NAT needed
+    }
+
+    containers {
+      image = local.image
+      ports { container_port = 8080 }
+
+      # gateway.yaml mounted as a file at /etc/claude/gateway.yaml (alone in its dir).
+      volume_mounts {
+        name       = "config"
+        mount_path = "/etc/claude"
+      }
+
+      # Cloud Run can't mount multiple secrets in one dir, so the rest are env vars
+      # (gateway.yaml references them via ${ENV_VAR}).
+      env {
+        name = "GATEWAY_JWT_SECRET"
+        value_source {
+          secret_key_ref {
+            secret  = google_secret_manager_secret.jwt.secret_id
+            version = "latest"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      env {
+        name = "OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET"
+        value_source {
+          secret_key_ref {
+            secret  = google_secret_manager_secret.oidc.secret_id
+            version = "latest"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      env {
+        name = "GATEWAY_POSTGRES_URL"
+        value_source {
+          secret_key_ref {
+            secret  = google_secret_manager_secret.postgres_url.secret_id
+            version = "latest"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    volumes {
+      name = "config"
+      secret {
+        secret = google_secret_manager_secret.config.secret_id
+        items {
+          path    = "gateway.yaml"
+          version = "latest"
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  depends_on = [
+    google_secret_manager_secret_iam_member.config,
+    google_secret_manager_secret_iam_member.jwt,
+    google_secret_manager_secret_iam_member.oidc,
+    google_secret_manager_secret_iam_member.postgres_url,
+    google_secret_manager_secret_version.config,
+    google_secret_manager_secret_version.postgres_url,
+    google_secret_manager_secret_version.jwt,
+    google_secret_manager_secret_version.oidc,
+    google_sql_database.db,
+    google_sql_user.gateway,
+    google_project_service.apis,
+  ]
+}
+
+# Public access at the Cloud Run IAM layer — the gateway runs its own OIDC, so the
+# invoker check must be opened or disabled (real auth stays the gateway's SSO):
+#   Preferred — disable it: invoker_iam_disabled=true on the service above. No allUsers
+#     binding at all, and it works under Domain Restricted Sharing.
+#   Fallback  — open it: this allUsers run.invoker grant. Domain Restricted Sharing orgs
+#     reject allUsers, and an LB does NOT bypass that (ingress is network-layer; the IAM
+#     check still runs) — use invoker_iam_disabled, a DRS exception, or GKE.
+# Skipped when invoker_iam_disabled=true (the grant would be redundant, and DRS rejects it).
+resource "google_cloud_run_v2_service_iam_member" "public" {
+  count    = var.allow_unauthenticated && !var.invoker_iam_disabled ? 1 : 0
+  project  = var.project_id
+  location = var.region
+  name     = google_cloud_run_v2_service.gateway.name
+  role     = "roles/run.invoker"
+  member   = "allUsers"
+}

examples/gateway/gcp/terraform/outputs.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+output "service_url" {
+  description = "Cloud Run service URL."
+  value       = google_cloud_run_v2_service.gateway.uri
+}
+
+output "oauth_redirect_uri" {
+  description = "Register this exact URI on the Google OAuth client, and ensure gateway.yaml public_url matches the host."
+  value       = "${google_cloud_run_v2_service.gateway.uri}/oauth/callback"
+}
+
+output "service_account_email" {
+  description = "Gateway runtime service account."
+  value       = google_service_account.gateway.email
+}
+
+output "image" {
+  description = "Image the service runs (build/push this separately — see README)."
+  value       = local.image
+}
+
+output "db_connection_name" {
+  description = "Cloud SQL instance connection name (project:region:instance)."
+  value       = google_sql_database_instance.db.connection_name
+}
+
+output "db_private_ip" {
+  description = "Cloud SQL private IP."
+  value       = google_sql_database_instance.db.private_ip_address
+}
+
+output "public_invoker_granted" {
+  description = "Whether the allUsers run.invoker binding was applied (false when invoker_iam_disabled handles public access instead, or on Domain-Restricted-Sharing orgs)."
+  value       = length(google_cloud_run_v2_service_iam_member.public) > 0
+}

examples/gateway/gcp/terraform/terraform.tfvars.example

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# Copy to terraform.tfvars and edit. terraform.tfvars is gitignored (see .gitignore).
+
+project_id = "your-gcp-project-id"
+region     = "us-east5"
+
+image_tag = "<version>" # REQUIRED — the Claude Code release version you build and push as linux/amd64 (see README Deploy)
+
+# Public access at the Cloud Run IAM layer (the gateway runs its own OIDC):
+#   Preferred — disable the invoker check: no allUsers binding, works under Domain
+#   Restricted Sharing. Needs google provider >= 6.8 and the feature enabled for your org:
+# invoker_iam_disabled = true
+#   Fallback — grant allUsers (fine on a normal org; Domain Restricted Sharing rejects it,
+#   so there prefer invoker_iam_disabled, or use a DRS exception / GKE):
+allow_unauthenticated = true
+
+# Network reachability — a separate axis from the IAM choice above. Default is internal-only:
+# no public URL (Claude Code's /login only accepts gateway hosts on private addresses, so
+# public ingress cannot serve clients); corp on-prem reaches run.app via a PSC endpoint +
+# private run.app DNS — see README "Private access" for the prerequisites. The only
+# alternative to the internal-only default:
+# ingress = "INGRESS_TRAFFIC_INTERNAL_LOAD_BALANCER"   # only if you front it with your OWN internal ALB (custom hostname/cert; not provisioned here)
+
+# Google OAuth client secret: REQUIRED — uncomment and set it (Terraform creates the
+# secret version; the Cloud Run service mounts `latest`, so without a version the
+# deploy fails). Leave empty only if you add the secret version out-of-band.
+# oidc_client_secret = "GOCSPX-..."

examples/gateway/gcp/terraform/variables.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+# Inputs — mirror the env-overridable knobs in setup.sh (same defaults).
+
+variable "project_id" {
+  description = "GCP project ID."
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "region" {
+  description = "Infra region for Artifact Registry, Cloud SQL, subnet, and Cloud Run. (Agent Platform region is set separately inside gateway.yaml.)"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "us-east5"
+}
+
+# ── Service account (§2) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+variable "sa_name" {
+  description = "Service account account_id (the part before @)."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "claude-gateway"
+}
+
+# ── Image (§3) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Terraform creates the Artifact Registry repo but does NOT build/push the image
+# (that's a docker build step — see README). It references the image by tag.
+variable "ar_repo" {
+  description = "Artifact Registry Docker repository ID."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "claude-gateway"
+}
+
+variable "image_name" {
+  description = "Image name within the repo."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "gateway"
+}
+
+variable "image_tag" {
+  description = "Image tag — the Claude Code release version you build and push (must already be pushed as linux/amd64). See the README Deploy section for the build command."
+  type        = string
+  validation {
+    condition     = can(regex("^[A-Za-z0-9_][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}$", var.image_tag))
+    error_message = "image_tag must be a valid OCI tag — set it to the Claude Code release version you pushed (the '<version>' in terraform.tfvars.example is a placeholder)."
+  }
+}
+
+# ── Networking (§4) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+variable "vpc_network" {
+  description = "Custom VPC network name."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "cc-gateway-vpc"
+}
+
+variable "subnet" {
+  description = "Subnet name (Cloud Run Direct VPC egress attaches here)."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "cc-gateway-subnet"
+}
+
+variable "subnet_range" {
+  description = "Subnet primary CIDR."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "10.0.0.0/24"
+}
+
+variable "psa_prefix_length" {
+  description = "Prefix length for the Private Services Access allocated range (/16 is GCP's recommendation)."
+  type        = number
+  default     = 16
+}
+
+# ── Cloud SQL (§4) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+variable "db_instance" {
+  description = "Cloud SQL instance name."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "claude-gateway-db"
+}
+
+variable "db_version" {
+  description = "Postgres major version. The gateway supports PostgreSQL 14 or newer; 16 is the recommended default."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "POSTGRES_16"
+}
+
+variable "db_tier" {
+  description = "Cloud SQL machine tier."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "db-g1-small"
+}
+
+variable "db_name" {
+  description = "Database name."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "claude_gateway"
+}
+
+variable "db_user" {
+  description = "Database user (the gateway connects as this role)."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "gateway"
+}
+
+# ── Secrets (§5 / §6) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+variable "secret_name" {
+  description = "Secret Manager secret holding the Postgres connection string."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "gateway-postgres-url"
+}
+
+variable "jwt_secret_name" {
+  description = "Secret Manager secret holding the session JWT signing key."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "gateway-jwt-secret"
+}
+
+variable "oidc_secret_name" {
+  description = "Secret Manager secret holding the Google OAuth client secret."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "gateway-oidc-client-secret"
+}
+
+variable "config_secret_name" {
+  description = "Secret Manager secret holding gateway.yaml (mounted at /etc/claude/gateway.yaml)."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "gateway-config"
+}
+
+variable "oidc_client_secret" {
+  description = "Google OAuth client secret value. Leave empty to NOT manage the version via Terraform (only if you add the secret version out-of-band — without one the deploy fails)."
+  type        = string
+  default     = ""
+  sensitive   = true
+}
+
+variable "gateway_config_path" {
+  description = "Path to gateway.yaml. Empty = ../gateway.yaml relative to this module."
+  type        = string
+  default     = ""
+}
+
+# ── Cloud Run (§7) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+variable "service_name" {
+  description = "Cloud Run service name."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "claude-gateway"
+}
+
+variable "min_instances" {
+  description = "Minimum Cloud Run instances (1 avoids cold OIDC discovery)."
+  type        = number
+  default     = 1
+}
+
+variable "max_instances" {
+  description = "Maximum Cloud Run instances. Each instance opens a Postgres pool of up to 5 connections (the gateway's store.max_connections default) and db-g1-small caps at ~50 max_connections — keep max_instances × 5 below the DB tier's limit, or raise the tier before raising this."
+  type        = number
+  default     = 8
+}
+
+variable "ingress" {
+  description = "Cloud Run ingress — Claude Code's /login only accepts gateway hosts on private addresses, so public ingress cannot serve clients: INGRESS_TRAFFIC_INTERNAL_ONLY (default; no public URL — VPC-only; reaches corp on-prem only with the private-access prerequisites in the README; public_url stays the run.app URL, so no LB or custom cert needed) or INGRESS_TRAFFIC_INTERNAL_LOAD_BALANCER (front with your own internal ALB for a custom hostname/cert)."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "INGRESS_TRAFFIC_INTERNAL_ONLY"
+  validation {
+    condition     = contains(["INGRESS_TRAFFIC_INTERNAL_ONLY", "INGRESS_TRAFFIC_INTERNAL_LOAD_BALANCER"], var.ingress)
+    error_message = "ingress must be INGRESS_TRAFFIC_INTERNAL_ONLY or INGRESS_TRAFFIC_INTERNAL_LOAD_BALANCER — Claude Code only connects to gateways on private addresses."
+  }
+}
+
+variable "invoker_iam_disabled" {
+  description = "PREFERRED public-access path: disable the Cloud Run invoker IAM check so requests reach the container with no allUsers binding (works under Domain Restricted Sharing). Real auth stays the gateway's own OIDC. When true, the allUsers grant below is skipped. May be blocked by org policy constraints/run.managed.requireInvokerIam, or unavailable for the org (\"invoker_iam_disabled is not currently available for your organization\") — then fall back to allow_unauthenticated. Requires google provider >= 6.8."
+  type        = bool
+  default     = false
+}
+
+variable "allow_unauthenticated" {
+  description = "Fallback public-access path: grant allUsers run.invoker (the gateway needs the IAM layer open for its own OIDC). Prefer invoker_iam_disabled. Domain Restricted Sharing orgs reject allUsers — set false there and use invoker_iam_disabled, a DRS exception, or GKE."
+  type        = bool
+  default     = true
+}
+
+variable "deletion_protection" {
+  description = "Provider-level deletion protection on Cloud SQL and Cloud Run. Keep true to avoid accidental deletion of the running deployment."
+  type        = bool
+  default     = true
+}

examples/gateway/gcp/terraform/versions.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# Provider + version pins for the Claude Gateway Cloud Run deployment.
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.5"
+  required_providers {
+    google = {
+      source  = "hashicorp/google"
+      version = ">= 6.8, < 7.0" # 6.8 adds invoker_iam_disabled on google_cloud_run_v2_service
+    }
+    random = {
+      source  = "hashicorp/random"
+      version = ">= 3.5"
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+provider "google" {
+  project = var.project_id
+  region  = var.region
+}