Exempt the bump bot from the external-PR scope guard (#3402)

* Exempt the bump bot from the external-PR scope guard

The External PR Scope Guard (#3353) and the auto-closer both look up the
PR author's collaborator permission and, for anyone who is not write/admin,
require the PR to ADD marketplace.json entries (additions-only). Internal
bump PRs are authored by github-actions[bot], which is not reported as a
member, so a SHA-bump — a legitimate MODIFY of an existing entry — fails the
guard (e.g. #3391 "modifies existing entry: astronomer-data-agents").

Add a shared isExemptAuthor() helper that exempts both org members and the
repo's own automation bot, and route both workflows through it. Safe under
pull_request_target: a fork PR cannot author as github-actions[bot] (only
the org's own GITHUB_TOKEN workflow can), and the member path is still a
real permission lookup. The helper also wraps getCollaboratorPermissionLevel
in try/catch — previously a non-collaborator/unknown-user lookup threw and
errored the job instead of falling through to scope evaluation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Correct stale "required status check" guidance in scope-guard comments

The scope guard is advisory, not a required status check — the merge gate is
validate + scan + a maintainer approval. The old header told operators to add
it to branch protection, which is now contra-indicated (it would block the
no-approval bump-merge path). Update both workflow comments to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Bryan Thompson
2026-06-26 10:45:10 -05:00
committed by GitHub
parent 82f22ec4f0
commit cbc7d77931
3 changed files with 56 additions and 26 deletions

View File

@@ -121,4 +121,33 @@ async function evaluate({ github, context }) {
return analyze({ changedFiles, before, after, liveRepos: liveReposOf(liveBase) });
}
module.exports = { normalizeRepo, liveReposOf, analyze, readPlugins, evaluate, MARKETPLACE };
// Authors that are NOT subject to the external-contributor scope rules:
// - the repo's own automation bot — its bump PRs legitimately MODIFY existing entries
// (SHA bumps), which the additions-only external-contributor rule forbids; AND
// - org members (write/admin).
// Safe under pull_request_target: a fork PR cannot set its author to github-actions[bot]
// (that login is only ever the org's own GITHUB_TOKEN workflow), and the member path is a
// real permission lookup. Wrapped in try/catch because getCollaboratorPermissionLevel throws
// for a non-collaborator/unknown user — without this, both callers would error the job rather
// than fall through to scope evaluation.
const EXEMPT_BOTS = new Set(['github-actions[bot]']);
async function isExemptAuthor({ github, context }) {
const author = context.payload.pull_request.user.login;
if (EXEMPT_BOTS.has(author)) {
return { exempt: true, reason: `${author} is the trusted automation bot` };
}
try {
const { data } = await github.rest.repos.getCollaboratorPermissionLevel({
owner: context.repo.owner, repo: context.repo.repo, username: author,
});
if (['admin', 'write'].includes(data.permission)) {
return { exempt: true, reason: `${author} is ${data.permission} (member)` };
}
} catch (e) {
// not a collaborator / lookup failed → not exempt; fall through to scope evaluation
}
return { exempt: false };
}
module.exports = { normalizeRepo, liveReposOf, analyze, readPlugins, evaluate, isExemptAuthor, MARKETPLACE };