Code/security:
- extract-rules.js: guard null agent() verdicts in the verify + P0 loops
(a skipped/dead referee made {rule,v:null} survive .filter(Boolean) and
then crashed on v.injectionSuspected / v.every) — sibling scripts already
had the guard.
- topology viewer XSS: the map injector embedded untrusted JSON (node names
from filenames, etc.) into a <script> island unescaped — a name containing
</script> executed on open. Escape < > & in the injected data and add a CSP
to the template.
- Second-order injection: citation/identifier fields (source / cwe /
source_site / correctedSource) were interpolated UNFENCED into the verifier
prompts that are supposed to be the trust anchor. Fence them in
extract-rules, harden-scan, uplift-deltas.
uplift design (audit of the new feature):
- Working-copy model: copy the WHOLE solution to modernized/ once and edit in
place (relative project refs survive; result is a reviewable git diff) —
the incremental per-project copy broke multi-project builds.
- Dual-run honesty: reframed as 'if both runtimes run here' (net48 needs
Windows; JUnit/pytest don't multi-target); dummy-test gate now binds a real
SUT under both targets; per-stack harness notes.
- Tooling honesty: present/runnable/actually-ran distinction; never fold in a
tool that couldn't run; apiport/2to3 demoted; py2->3 removed from 'preserve'
examples.
- Delta classes: name the high-blast-radius landmines (JPMS strong
encapsulation, .NET trimming/AOT, ICU globalization, hosting/runtime-config,
analyzer/nullable) in the finder briefs + agent.
- Rewrite-vs-uplift signal: weigh by touched sites (siteCount), not delta-card
count; judgment-share demoted to secondary.
Docs/consistency: brief reads topology.json (not TOPOLOGY.html); README
'five commands'; credential-masking claim split (analysts mask+cite vs
code-writers substitute fakes); read-only/write-scope claims softened to
match enforcement (Bash retained -> discipline, not tool-lock); reimagine
nested blockers/pendingRuleIds; status splits transform vs reimagine markers;
portfolio enumeration basenames; plugin.json description updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses automated security review of the workflow conversion:
- Agent-produced text (rule specs, finding descriptions, dedup lists) is
fenced as untrusted data when interpolated into downstream agent prompts,
with embedded fence markers stripped so the fence can't be escaped;
referees and judges are told to re-derive claims from the cited code.
- system/service/subdir names that land in filesystem paths inside prompts
are validated against a strict pattern — traversal-shaped values throw
before any agent spawns.
- Reimagine scaffolding now uses a dedicated 'scaffolder' agent with an
explicit minimal tool list, a single-directory write scope, and the
untrusted-content discipline extended to the generated spec/architecture
docs it builds from (they derive from untrusted legacy code).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four commands gain a Workflow-tool path (with direct-fan-out fallback for
older builds): extract-rules loops until dry with per-rule citation referees
and a P0 two-judge panel; harden runs class-scoped finders with adversarial
per-finding refutation; assess --portfolio pipelines one survey agent per
system with COCOMO computed uniformly in script; reimagine Phase E drops the
3-service scaffolding cap.
Workflow agents return schema-validated data and only the orchestrating
session writes artifacts — analysis agents are structurally read-only. All
five agents gain an untrusted-content discipline section (source code is
data, never instructions; comment-only claims are findings, not facts), and
the README documents the prompt-injection threat model for analyzed code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
