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2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Bryan Thompson
beb6ec5d10 Correct stale "required status check" guidance in scope-guard comments
The scope guard is advisory, not a required status check — the merge gate is
validate + scan + a maintainer approval. The old header told operators to add
it to branch protection, which is now contra-indicated (it would block the
no-approval bump-merge path). Update both workflow comments to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-25 21:50:37 -05:00
Bryan Thompson
63f2b164fb Exempt the bump bot from the external-PR scope guard
The External PR Scope Guard (#3353) and the auto-closer both look up the
PR author's collaborator permission and, for anyone who is not write/admin,
require the PR to ADD marketplace.json entries (additions-only). Internal
bump PRs are authored by github-actions[bot], which is not reported as a
member, so a SHA-bump — a legitimate MODIFY of an existing entry — fails the
guard (e.g. #3391 "modifies existing entry: astronomer-data-agents").

Add a shared isExemptAuthor() helper that exempts both org members and the
repo's own automation bot, and route both workflows through it. Safe under
pull_request_target: a fork PR cannot author as github-actions[bot] (only
the org's own GITHUB_TOKEN workflow can), and the member path is still a
real permission lookup. The helper also wraps getCollaboratorPermissionLevel
in try/catch — previously a non-collaborator/unknown-user lookup threw and
errored the job instead of falling through to scope evaluation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-25 21:42:26 -05:00
3 changed files with 56 additions and 26 deletions

View File

@@ -121,4 +121,33 @@ async function evaluate({ github, context }) {
return analyze({ changedFiles, before, after, liveRepos: liveReposOf(liveBase) });
}
module.exports = { normalizeRepo, liveReposOf, analyze, readPlugins, evaluate, MARKETPLACE };
// Authors that are NOT subject to the external-contributor scope rules:
// - the repo's own automation bot — its bump PRs legitimately MODIFY existing entries
// (SHA bumps), which the additions-only external-contributor rule forbids; AND
// - org members (write/admin).
// Safe under pull_request_target: a fork PR cannot set its author to github-actions[bot]
// (that login is only ever the org's own GITHUB_TOKEN workflow), and the member path is a
// real permission lookup. Wrapped in try/catch because getCollaboratorPermissionLevel throws
// for a non-collaborator/unknown user — without this, both callers would error the job rather
// than fall through to scope evaluation.
const EXEMPT_BOTS = new Set(['github-actions[bot]']);
async function isExemptAuthor({ github, context }) {
const author = context.payload.pull_request.user.login;
if (EXEMPT_BOTS.has(author)) {
return { exempt: true, reason: `${author} is the trusted automation bot` };
}
try {
const { data } = await github.rest.repos.getCollaboratorPermissionLevel({
owner: context.repo.owner, repo: context.repo.repo, username: author,
});
if (['admin', 'write'].includes(data.permission)) {
return { exempt: true, reason: `${author} is ${data.permission} (member)` };
}
} catch (e) {
// not a collaborator / lookup failed → not exempt; fall through to scope evaluation
}
return { exempt: false };
}
module.exports = { normalizeRepo, liveReposOf, analyze, readPlugins, evaluate, isExemptAuthor, MARKETPLACE };

View File

@@ -23,14 +23,13 @@ jobs:
script: |
const author = context.payload.pull_request.user.login;
const { data } = await github.rest.repos.getCollaboratorPermissionLevel({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
username: author
});
const { evaluate, isExemptAuthor } = require(`${process.env.GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/.github/scripts/external-pr-scope.js`);
if (['admin', 'write'].includes(data.permission)) {
console.log(`${author} has ${data.permission} access, allowing PR`);
// Members (write/admin) and the repo's own automation bot (bump SHA PRs) are never
// auto-closed.
const ex = await isExemptAuthor({ github, context });
if (ex.exempt) {
console.log(`${ex.reason} — allowing PR`);
return;
}
@@ -38,9 +37,9 @@ jobs:
// contribution — it adds marketplace.json entries whose source repo ALREADY backs
// a live plugin here, and changes nothing else. (No maintained allowlist: the set
// of allowed repos is derived from the live marketplace.) This grants only the
// right to open a reviewable PR; the External PR Scope Guard required check and a
// maintainer approval still gate the merge.
const { evaluate } = require(`${process.env.GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/.github/scripts/external-pr-scope.js`);
// right to open a reviewable PR; the validate + scan checks and a maintainer
// approval still gate the merge (the External PR Scope Guard is advisory signal,
// not a required check).
const result = await evaluate({ github, context });
if (result.ok && result.added.length > 0) {
console.log(`In-scope external contribution (adds: ${result.added.join(', ')}) — allowing PR.`);

View File

@@ -1,14 +1,17 @@
name: External PR Scope Guard
# Required status check that constrains what a NON-MEMBER pull request may change.
# Members (write/admin) are unrestricted and skip this check. For a non-member PR this
# fails unless the PR is an in-scope external contribution per .github/scripts/external-pr-scope.js:
# it changes ONLY .claude-plugin/marketplace.json, the delta is additions-only (no existing
# entry modified or removed), and every ADDED entry's source.url is a repo that ALREADY backs
# a live plugin in this marketplace (the allowed set is derived from the live marketplace —
# there is no maintained allowlist).
# Advisory check that surfaces what a NON-MEMBER pull request may change.
# Members (write/admin) and the repo's own automation bot (bump SHA PRs) are unrestricted and
# skip this check. For a non-member PR this fails unless the PR is an in-scope external
# contribution per .github/scripts/external-pr-scope.js: it changes ONLY
# .claude-plugin/marketplace.json, the delta is additions-only (no existing entry modified or
# removed), and every ADDED entry's source.url is a repo that ALREADY backs a live plugin in
# this marketplace (the allowed set is derived from the live marketplace — there is no
# maintained allowlist).
#
# Add the scope-guard job as a REQUIRED status check in branch protection for it to block merge.
# Do NOT add this job to branch protection as a required status check. The merge gate is the
# `validate` + `scan` checks plus a maintainer approval; this guard is advisory signal for the
# reviewer, not a hard gate. (Making it required would block the no-approval bump-merge path.)
#
# Security: runs on pull_request_target but checks out only the BASE repo (trusted) for the
# shared script; the head marketplace.json is fetched as DATA via the API and parsed, never executed.
@@ -29,17 +32,16 @@ jobs:
- uses: actions/github-script@v7
with:
script: |
const author = context.payload.pull_request.user.login;
const { evaluate, isExemptAuthor } = require(`${process.env.GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/.github/scripts/external-pr-scope.js`);
const { data: perm } = await github.rest.repos.getCollaboratorPermissionLevel({
owner: context.repo.owner, repo: context.repo.repo, username: author,
});
if (['admin', 'write'].includes(perm.permission)) {
console.log(`${author} is ${perm.permission} (member) — scope guard not applicable.`);
// Members (write/admin) and the repo's own automation bot (bump SHA PRs) are
// unrestricted; only genuinely external contributions are scope-checked.
const ex = await isExemptAuthor({ github, context });
if (ex.exempt) {
console.log(`${ex.reason} — scope guard not applicable.`);
return;
}
const { evaluate } = require(`${process.env.GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/.github/scripts/external-pr-scope.js`);
const result = await evaluate({ github, context });
if (!result.ok) {