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Author SHA1 Message Date
github-actions[bot]
76c847a20f bump(teamcity-cli): 67e21f0b → 5b57662b 2026-06-08 18:03:21 +00:00
10 changed files with 45 additions and 194 deletions

View File

@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@
"url": "https://github.com/aws/agent-toolkit-for-aws.git",
"path": "plugins/aws-agents",
"ref": "main",
"sha": "55b9acfefdcf0866b6bc6cc56c16e6e18e65bd2b"
"sha": "df13dea64baaa1b7031b25d1b2f380756131efec"
},
"homepage": "https://github.com/aws/agent-toolkit-for-aws"
},
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@
"url": "https://github.com/aws/agent-toolkit-for-aws.git",
"path": "plugins/aws-core",
"ref": "main",
"sha": "55b9acfefdcf0866b6bc6cc56c16e6e18e65bd2b"
"sha": "df13dea64baaa1b7031b25d1b2f380756131efec"
},
"homepage": "https://github.com/aws/agent-toolkit-for-aws"
},
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@
"url": "https://github.com/aws/agent-toolkit-for-aws.git",
"path": "plugins/aws-data-analytics",
"ref": "main",
"sha": "55b9acfefdcf0866b6bc6cc56c16e6e18e65bd2b"
"sha": "df13dea64baaa1b7031b25d1b2f380756131efec"
},
"homepage": "https://github.com/aws/agent-toolkit-for-aws"
},
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@
"source": {
"source": "url",
"url": "https://github.com/brightdata/skills.git",
"sha": "bd5bd76bc889f54b744bab3db3cbd42751a1e5b0"
"sha": "3e6d0838285cbc107b86d61e2e1a943baf7ead29"
},
"homepage": "https://docs.brightdata.com"
},
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@
"url": "https://github.com/carta/plugins.git",
"path": "plugins/carta-cap-table",
"ref": "main",
"sha": "9eb312908f4a2e2d15e4e935320981433a549f77"
"sha": "0227331a2f2e5bc34485f3473d1046a3a52084d7"
},
"homepage": "https://carta.com"
},
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@
"url": "https://github.com/carta/plugins.git",
"path": "plugins/carta-crm",
"ref": "main",
"sha": "9eb312908f4a2e2d15e4e935320981433a549f77"
"sha": "0227331a2f2e5bc34485f3473d1046a3a52084d7"
},
"homepage": "https://carta.com"
},
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@
"url": "https://github.com/carta/plugins.git",
"path": "plugins/carta-investors",
"ref": "main",
"sha": "9eb312908f4a2e2d15e4e935320981433a549f77"
"sha": "0227331a2f2e5bc34485f3473d1046a3a52084d7"
},
"homepage": "https://carta.com"
},
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@
"source": {
"source": "url",
"url": "https://github.com/ChromeDevTools/chrome-devtools-mcp.git",
"sha": "702d3734f276a18efd67561ae00b88ce954cc515"
"sha": "7afd01673f99126e3cd98eb7f62190d7784ef71a"
},
"homepage": "https://github.com/ChromeDevTools/chrome-devtools-mcp"
},
@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@
"source": {
"source": "url",
"url": "https://github.com/CodSpeedHQ/codspeed.git",
"sha": "c6112f168b405df8e7310b12a9b80484cd01ac14"
"sha": "9793aaf9c8198eec58a5fa63d940712bf33b3fc5"
},
"homepage": "https://codspeed.io"
},
@@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@
"url": "https://github.com/expo/skills.git",
"path": "plugins/expo",
"ref": "main",
"sha": "c38860242118df93d4ec4381a34f4144fff61928"
"sha": "145a923cce95c2cef20643302e8811363fa2e51d"
},
"homepage": "https://github.com/expo/skills/blob/main/plugins/expo/README.md"
},
@@ -1361,7 +1361,7 @@
"source": {
"source": "url",
"url": "https://github.com/heygen-com/hyperframes.git",
"sha": "25420bf4cfc37b179b4efeace9db25a7178b61bf"
"sha": "1fd1b3164a87221fbb5c9e01557125d13e829554"
},
"homepage": "https://hyperframes.heygen.com"
},
@@ -1415,7 +1415,7 @@
"source": "github",
"repo": "jfrog/claude-plugin",
"commit": "259c8e718266c16e99b4f30ae9b1ed0f9f00d98d",
"sha": "117febaa29cbe9449cfb42d1c39b83b858d801a1"
"sha": "8324c7fc9a5561398fe57b8a56db53bdbf1e2cda"
},
"homepage": "https://jfrog.com"
},
@@ -1839,7 +1839,7 @@
"url": "https://github.com/NVIDIA/skills.git",
"path": "plugins/nvidia-skills",
"ref": "main",
"sha": "0482ebce81bd8f2d39990317bb3cfb07637e39fd"
"sha": "e29b3c65dd0292e3f9f851b15eefe5a7c2023dd7"
},
"homepage": "https://github.com/NVIDIA/skills"
},
@@ -1855,7 +1855,7 @@
"url": "https://github.com/oracle-samples/oracle-aidp-samples.git",
"path": "ai/claude-code-plugins/oracle-ai-data-platform-workbench-spark-connectors",
"ref": "main",
"sha": "00cedef34c99d642d969f87965736768de01cbd6"
"sha": "04cc355fbb01402402dd69a4a425a078413a28ea"
},
"homepage": "https://docs.oracle.com/en/cloud/paas/ai-data-platform/index.html"
},
@@ -1995,7 +1995,7 @@
"source": {
"source": "url",
"url": "https://github.com/PostHog/ai-plugin.git",
"sha": "db4a86632293ca66eec9a6d278786ddb22c1787e"
"sha": "9105eb4d6f00623ea782fbf61257f1ce94ba7dac"
},
"homepage": "https://posthog.com/docs/model-context-protocol"
},
@@ -2088,7 +2088,7 @@
"source": {
"source": "url",
"url": "https://github.com/qdrant/skills.git",
"sha": "82337ccd4be601e52871f101844d57b2adbac52b"
"sha": "11df00a7b62b0cd1a552baac63ac821df1aa9eed"
},
"homepage": "https://skills.qdrant.tech"
},
@@ -2163,7 +2163,7 @@
"source": "url",
"url": "https://github.com/RevenueCat/rc-claude-code-plugin.git",
"path": "revenuecat",
"sha": "473fd504bf13d25e76bf4a0267b42be3794f6266"
"sha": "b34f9bebe02ceb7e3f32e6d7d081cdfb2e7c37a6"
},
"homepage": "https://www.revenuecat.com"
},
@@ -2215,7 +2215,7 @@
"source": "url",
"url": "https://github.com/RevenueCat/rc-claude-code-plugin.git",
"path": "revenuecat",
"sha": "473fd504bf13d25e76bf4a0267b42be3794f6266"
"sha": "b34f9bebe02ceb7e3f32e6d7d081cdfb2e7c37a6"
},
"homepage": "https://www.revenuecat.com"
},
@@ -2348,7 +2348,7 @@
"url": "https://github.com/SAP/open-ux-tools.git",
"path": "packages/fiori-mcp-server",
"ref": "main",
"sha": "fbfe8c32fb9fc64583aa72ac03ab64f553c407ee"
"sha": "f6e9ae1f44a45886c14f6c2c6f31fc06e256c3e2"
},
"homepage": "https://github.com/SAP/open-ux-tools/tree/main/packages/fiori-mcp-server"
},
@@ -2431,7 +2431,7 @@
"url": "https://github.com/getsentry/cli.git",
"path": "plugins/sentry-cli",
"ref": "main",
"sha": "9e9fe0fb6444f18ed109058b2749cced3c21f87e"
"sha": "329f5c5d2e0d97f26a121fb636b58b7eb81d3a8e"
},
"homepage": "https://sentry.io"
},
@@ -2676,7 +2676,7 @@
"source": {
"source": "url",
"url": "https://github.com/JetBrains/teamcity-cli.git",
"sha": "67e21f0be908daa7ca1e04c8016d1bc81750baee"
"sha": "5b57662b826b4b303fe89d91040a05c31210beed"
},
"homepage": "https://www.jetbrains.com/teamcity/"
},
@@ -2803,7 +2803,7 @@
"url": "https://github.com/val-town/plugins.git",
"path": "plugin",
"ref": "main",
"sha": "02631f998eda9b88d73d699703b062db059d506b"
"sha": "a3e884685d1914f28ce029e4f35acd17442e883f"
},
"homepage": "https://val.town"
},
@@ -2881,7 +2881,7 @@
"source": {
"source": "url",
"url": "https://github.com/wix/skills.git",
"sha": "188ed338f39d70e5aef7f9a2582bbf338f223b78"
"sha": "8ed898abcfa5fb3ff8e43c4c1c39d7a55d9cedef"
},
"homepage": "https://dev.wix.com/docs/wix-cli/guides/development/about-wix-skills"
},

View File

@@ -24,10 +24,6 @@ mkdir -p legacy && ln -s /path/to/your/legacy/codebase legacy/billing
`/modernize-assess` works best with [`scc`](https://github.com/boyter/scc) (LOC + complexity + COCOMO) or [`cloc`](https://github.com/AlDanial/cloc), and falls back to `find`/`wc` if neither is installed. Portfolio mode also benefits from [`lizard`](https://github.com/terryyin/lizard) (cyclomatic complexity). The commands degrade gracefully without them, but the metrics will be coarser.
## Secret handling
Legacy systems routinely contain live credentials, and assessment artifacts get committed and shared. **Every agent in this plugin masks credential values** — findings, rule-card parameters, architecture notes, and test fixtures cite `file:line` with a masked preview (`AKIA****`), never the value. When credentials are found, a per-credential inventory (type, location, blast radius, rotation recommendation) is written to `analysis/<system>/SECRETS.local.md`, which the commands gitignore before writing; on non-git projects the quarantine file goes to `~/.modernize/<system>/` instead. `/modernize-harden` splits its remediation diff so credential-removal hunks (which necessarily contain the raw value) land in a gitignored `security_remediation.local.patch`, never the shareable patch. Pass `--show-secrets` to include raw values in the quarantine file (and only there). If you ran an earlier version of this plugin on a real system, check whether `analysis/` artifacts containing credentials were committed or shared, and rotate anything that was.
## Commands
The commands are designed to be run in order, but each produces a standalone artifact so you can stop, review, and resume.

View File

@@ -29,12 +29,6 @@ For **transformed code**:
- Does the test suite actually pin behavior, or just exercise code paths?
- What would the on-call engineer need at 3am that isn't here?
## Secret handling (mandatory)
When a finding quotes code containing a credential, key, token, or
connection string, mask the value (`'Pr0d****'`) and cite `file:line`
findings get appended verbatim to committed notes files.
## Output
Findings ranked **Blocker / High / Medium / Nit**. Each with: what, where,

View File

@@ -40,15 +40,6 @@ of the technology, skip it.
from structure/names), **Low** (ambiguous; needs SME).
6. If confidence < High, write the exact question an SME must answer.
## Secret handling (mandatory)
Rule parameters sometimes *are* credentials — hardcoded passwords in auth
checks, API keys in partner-service calls, connection strings in batch
routines. Record the **rule**, never the **value**: write the parameter as
`<credential — masked, see file:line>` with at most a 24 character
preview. Rule cards flow into briefs and steering decks; a raw credential
in a parameter list is a leak.
## Output format
One "Rule Card" per rule (see the format in the `/modernize-extract-rules`

View File

@@ -32,15 +32,6 @@ and explain it in terms a modern engineer can act on.
- **Note what's missing.** Unhandled error paths, TODO comments, commented-out
blocks, magic numbers — these are signals about history and risk.
## Secret handling (mandatory)
Legacy code is full of live credentials, and your findings get copied into
shareable reports. When the evidence for a finding — hardcoded config,
dead code, debt, an interface payload — includes a credential, API key,
token, connection string, or private key, **never reproduce the value**.
Cite `file:line` with a masked preview (`VALUE 'Pr0d****'`,
`password=****`). The finding is the practice, not the value.
## Output format
Default to structured markdown: tables for inventories, Mermaid for graphs,

View File

@@ -39,30 +39,7 @@ terminal/screen items don't apply to a SPA. Work through what's relevant:
Use available SAST where it helps (npm audit, pip-audit, grep for known-bad
patterns) but **read the code** — tools miss logic flaws. Show tool output
verbatim — except secret values, which you redact (see below) — then add
your manual findings.
## Secret handling (mandatory)
Legacy codebases routinely contain live production credentials, and your
findings get pasted into decks, tickets, and committed markdown. Copying a
secret into a report multiplies the exposure you were hired to find.
When you discover a hardcoded credential, API key, token, connection
string, or private key:
- **Never write the secret's value into any output** — no finding table,
no report, no quoted code excerpt, no echoed tool output. Mask it to the
first 24 identifying characters plus `****` (`AKIA****`,
`postgres://app_user:****@db-prod…`). If a scanner prints a secret,
redact it before including the excerpt.
- Cite `file:line`. The source file is the canonical location — anyone who
legitimately needs the value can open it there.
- State what the credential appears to grant access to (database, queue,
cloud account, third-party API) and whether it looks like a production
or test credential.
- Recommend rotation for anything that looks live — exposure in source
means it is already compromised, independent of any modernization plan.
verbatim, then add your manual findings.
## Reporting standard

View File

@@ -28,15 +28,6 @@ someone thinks it should do) so that a rewrite can be proven equivalent.
`@Disabled("pending RULE-NNN")` / `@pytest.mark.skip` / `it.todo()` — never
deleted.
## Secret handling (mandatory)
Never copy credential-like literals — passwords, API keys, tokens,
connection strings — from legacy code into test fixtures. Tests live in
the deliverable codebase and get committed. Substitute clearly-fake values
of the same shape and length and note the substitution in a comment.
Anything a test genuinely needs live (e.g. a real database connection for
a dual-run harness) is read from an environment variable, never inlined.
## Output
Idiomatic tests for the requested target stack (JUnit 5 / pytest / Vitest /

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
---
description: Full discovery & portfolio analysis of a legacy system — inventory, complexity, debt, effort estimation
argument-hint: <system-dir> [--show-secrets] | --portfolio <parent-dir>
argument-hint: <system-dir> | --portfolio <parent-dir>
---
**Mode select.** If `$ARGUMENTS` starts with `--portfolio`, run **Portfolio
mode** against the directory that follows. Otherwise run **Single-system
mode** against the system dir. Parse flags positionally-independently:
`--show-secrets` may appear before or after the system dir — the system
dir is the first non-flag token.
mode** against `legacy/$1`.
---
@@ -110,16 +108,12 @@ Spawn three subagents **in parallel**:
2. **legacy-analyst** — "Identify technical debt in legacy/$1: dead code,
deprecated APIs, copy-paste duplication, god objects/programs, missing
error handling, hardcoded config. Return the top 10 findings ranked by
remediation value, each with file:line evidence. If evidence contains a
credential value, mask it per your secret-handling rules — never quote
it."
remediation value, each with file:line evidence."
3. **security-auditor** — "Scan legacy/$1 for security vulnerabilities:
injection, auth weaknesses, hardcoded secrets, vulnerable dependencies,
missing input validation. Return findings in CWE-tagged table form with
file:line evidence and severity. Mask every discovered credential value
per your secret-handling rules — file:line plus a 24 character masked
preview, never the value itself."
file:line evidence and severity."
Wait for all three. Synthesize their findings.
@@ -147,31 +141,6 @@ need explained.
## Step 6 — Write the assessment
**Secrets quarantine first.** The assessment gets shared and committed —
discovered credential values must never appear in it. If the
security-auditor found any hardcoded credentials:
1. Ensure `analysis/.gitignore` exists and contains the lines
`SECRETS.local.md` and `*.local.patch` (create or append as needed —
the patch pattern is used by `/modernize-harden`; writing both now
means the ignore set is complete from first contact). If the project is a
git repo, verify with `git check-ignore -q analysis/$1/SECRETS.local.md`
— do not write any findings until the check passes. If there is **no
git repo** (check for `.svn`/`.hg`/`CVS` too — a `.gitignore` protects
nothing under another VCS): refuse `--show-secrets` and write
`SECRETS.local.md` to `~/.modernize/$1/` instead of the project tree,
telling the user where it went and why.
2. Write `SECRETS.local.md`: one row per credential — masked preview,
`file:line`, credential type, what it grants access to,
production/test guess, rotation recommendation. Only if the user passed
`--show-secrets`, add the raw value column here — this file only, never
ASSESSMENT.md.
3. Masking applies to **every section of ASSESSMENT.md**, whichever agent
produced the finding — the Technical Debt section quotes hardcoded
config; those quotes follow the same masking rule as Security Findings.
The Security Findings section adds a one-line pointer:
"Credential inventory in SECRETS.local.md (gitignored; not for sharing)."
Create `analysis/$1/ASSESSMENT.md` with these sections:
- **Executive Summary** (3-4 sentences: what it is, how big, how risky, headline recommendation)
- **System Inventory** (the scc table + tech fingerprint)

View File

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Merge the three result sets. Deduplicate. For each distinct rule, write a
When <trigger>
Then <outcome>
[And <additional outcome>]
**Parameters:** <constants, rates, thresholds with their current values — credentials masked: `<credential — masked, see file:line>`>
**Parameters:** <constants, rates, thresholds with their current values>
**Edge cases handled:** <list>
**Suspected defect:** <optional — legacy behavior that looks wrong; decide preserve-vs-fix during transform>
**Confidence:** High | Medium | Low — <why; if < High, state the exact SME question>

View File

@@ -1,42 +1,14 @@
---
description: Security vulnerability scan with a reviewable remediation patch — OWASP, CWE, CVE, secrets, injection
argument-hint: <system-dir> [--show-secrets]
argument-hint: <system-dir>
---
Run a **security hardening pass** on the legacy system: find
vulnerabilities, rank them, and produce a reviewable patch for the
critical ones. Parse arguments flag-independently: the system dir
(referred to as `$1` below) is the first non-flag token in `$ARGUMENTS`;
`--show-secrets` may appear anywhere.
Run a **security hardening pass** on `legacy/$1`: find vulnerabilities, rank
them, and produce a reviewable patch for the critical ones.
This command never edits `legacy/` — it writes findings and a proposed patch
to `analysis/$1/`. The user reviews and applies (or not).
## Step 0 — Secrets quarantine setup
Findings files get shared, committed, and pasted into decks — discovered
credential values must never land in them. Before any scanning:
1. Ensure `analysis/.gitignore` exists and contains the lines
`SECRETS.local.md` and `*.local.patch`. Create the file or append the
missing lines.
2. If the project is a git repo, verify with
`git check-ignore -q analysis/$1/SECRETS.local.md` — if that exits
non-zero, fix the ignore rule before proceeding. Do not write any
findings until this check passes.
3. **If there is no git repo** (check for `.svn`/`.hg`/`CVS` too — a
`.gitignore` protects nothing under another VCS): refuse
`--show-secrets`, and write `SECRETS.local.md` and any `.local.patch`
file to `~/.modernize/$1/` instead of the project tree, telling the
user where they went and why.
All secret values in every shareable artifact this command produces are
**masked** (`AKIA****`, `password=****`) and cited by `file:line`. Raw
values may appear in exactly two places, both gitignored: the
`*.local.patch` remediation hunks (unavoidably — see Remediate) and, only
with `--show-secrets`, `SECRETS.local.md`. Never in SECURITY_FINDINGS.md
or patch commentary.
## Scan
Spawn the **security-auditor** subagent:
@@ -48,9 +20,7 @@ hardcoded secrets, vulnerable dependency versions, missing input validation,
path traversal. For each finding return: CWE ID, severity
(Critical/High/Med/Low), file:line, one-sentence exploit scenario, and
recommended fix. Run any available SAST tooling (npm audit, pip-audit,
OWASP dependency-check) and include its raw output. Mask every discovered
credential value per your secret-handling rules — file:line plus a 24
character masked preview, never the value itself."
OWASP dependency-check) and include its raw output."
## Triage
@@ -59,50 +29,26 @@ Write `analysis/$1/SECURITY_FINDINGS.md`:
- Findings table sorted by severity
- Dependency CVE table (package, installed version, CVE, fixed version)
If any hardcoded credentials were found, also write
`analysis/$1/SECRETS.local.md` (the gitignored quarantine file from Step 0):
one row per credential — masked preview, `file:line`, credential type, what
it appears to grant access to, production/test guess, and a rotation
recommendation. With `--show-secrets`, append the raw value column here —
this file only. SECURITY_FINDINGS.md gets a one-line pointer:
"N hardcoded credentials found — inventory in SECRETS.local.md (gitignored;
not for sharing)."
## Remediate
For each **Critical** and **High** finding, draft a minimal, targeted fix.
Do **not** edit `legacy/` — write fixes as unified diffs with **paths
relative to the project root** (`legacy/$1/...`), applied from the project
root, with a comment line above each hunk citing the finding ID it
addresses (`# SEC-001: parameterize the query`).
**Credential findings split into two files.** A diff that removes a
hardcoded secret necessarily contains the raw value on its `-` and
context lines — that cannot go in the shareable patch:
- `analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch` (shareable) — every
non-credential hunk, plus for each credential finding a comment-only
placeholder: `# SEC-NNN: credential remediation — hunk in
security_remediation.local.patch (gitignored; not for sharing)`.
- `analysis/$1/security_remediation.local.patch` (gitignored in Step 0) —
the real, applyable hunks for credential findings only.
Do **not** edit `legacy/` — write all fixes as a single unified diff to
`analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch`, with a comment line above each
hunk citing the finding ID it addresses (`# SEC-001: parameterize the query`).
Add a **Remediation Log** section to SECURITY_FINDINGS.md mapping each
finding ID → one-line summary of the proposed fix and which patch file
carries the hunk.
finding ID → one-line summary of the proposed fix and the patch hunk that
implements it.
## Verify
Spawn the **security-auditor** again to **review both patches** against
the original code:
Spawn the **security-auditor** again to **review the patch** against the
original code:
"Review analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch and
analysis/$1/security_remediation.local.patch against legacy/$1. For each
"Review analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch against legacy/$1. For each
hunk: does it fully remediate the cited finding? Does it introduce new
vulnerabilities or change behavior beyond the fix? Confirm no raw
credential values appear anywhere in the shareable patch. Return one
verdict per hunk: RESOLVES / PARTIAL / INTRODUCES-RISK, with a one-line
reason."
vulnerabilities or change behavior beyond the fix? Return one verdict per
hunk: RESOLVES / PARTIAL / INTRODUCES-RISK, with a one-line reason."
Add a **Patch Review** section to SECURITY_FINDINGS.md with the verdicts.
If any hunk is PARTIAL or INTRODUCES-RISK, revise the patch and re-review.
@@ -111,12 +57,8 @@ If any hunk is PARTIAL or INTRODUCES-RISK, revise the patch and re-review.
Tell the user the artifacts are ready:
- `analysis/$1/SECURITY_FINDINGS.md` — findings, remediation log, patch review
- `analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch` — review, then apply **from the
project root**: `git apply analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch`
(if `legacy/$1` is a symlink, use `git apply --unsafe-paths` or apply
with `patch -p0` from the project root)
- `analysis/$1/security_remediation.local.patch` — the credential fixes;
apply the same way, and rotate the affected credentials regardless
- `analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch` — review, then apply if appropriate
with `git -C legacy/$1 apply ../../analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch`
- Re-run `/modernize-harden $1` after applying to confirm resolution
Suggest: `glow -p analysis/$1/SECURITY_FINDINGS.md`